According to our sources, a group of representatives of military structures has been permanently stationed in the building of the Belarusian Railway (BCh) Traffic Control Center (TCC) for about a year. Its core consists of the military communications bodies (VOSO) of the Belarusian Ministry of Defence, which organize and escort military transport. The group also includes representatives of signal units, classified information protection and other support structures of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus. This is therefore not about periodic visits to the TCC, meetings or the escort of individual shipments, as before, but about the actual integration of the military into the BCh traffic management system.
The presence of VOSO representatives in the TCC building as such is not new. When the departments were allocated at the design stage, a separate room on the 6th floor of the administrative block was provided for staff of the military communications commandant’s office. However, this was a limited presence designed for a few workplaces. The current situation differs fundamentally in its very scale.
According to available information, the entire 8th floor of the building at 1 Stekolny Lane, Minsk, which houses the BCh Traffic Control Center, has been handed over to the military. This amounts to approximately 600 sq. m of office space. Previously, this floor housed units and departments of the BCh Design and Technical Center (DTC). After the military arrived, DTC employees were moved to the 9th floor of the TCC building.
After the 8th floor was handed over to the military, it was internally re-planned. According to available information, some premises were isolated, and partitions were installed in the conference hall, dividing it into several separate working areas. Below are the design floor plans of the TCC building, showing the originally planned arrangement of premises without the later changes related to the transfer of the 8th floor to the military.
In addition to architectural transformations, work was carried out to completely restrict access to the floor for ordinary employees. According to sources, a regime has been implemented and is in effect where access is only possible with special passes, which are issued only to a specific approved and vetted circle of persons, whose composition and total number are not disclosed.
A round-the-clock armed post staffed by the military contingent stationed there has been set up at the entrance to the 8th floor. Stairwell exits on this level are closed and protected from unauthorized access. In fact, the floor has become a separate closed zone within the BCh Traffic Control Center, which railway workers cannot enter, except for a limited circle of persons with special clearance.
The procedure for employees to move around the building has also changed. The elevator in the TCC technically reaches the 8th floor, but the exit at this level is now used only by the military. Previously, employees on the 9th floor could take the elevator to the 8th floor and then walk up to the 9th floor via the stairwell. Now, according to available information, employees who are “lucky” enough to work on the 9th floor have to leave the elevator on the 7th floor and walk up two more floors, as access through the 8th floor is completely closed.
How the floors of the TCC building were originally meant to be used can be seen from an internal BCh memorandum prepared before the facility was put into operation.
The total number of military personnel stationed in the TCC building is not officially disclosed, nor is the fact of their permanent presence publicized. According to sources, this could be approximately 20–30 military personnel. For the usual escort of individual military shipments, such a number seems excessive and points to a broader range of tasks performed within the TCC.
According to available information, this closed military structure began to be formed within the TCC about a year ago, during preparations for the Zapad-2025 exercise. At first the military presence grew gradually, but by now the group is fully formed and effectively integrated into the BCh traffic management system.
The very fact of placing a fully military structure there is telling. The BCh Traffic Control Center is the key facility for operational dispatcher control of the entire transportation process, monitoring of train movements, and interaction with railway divisions, stations, neighbouring railway administrations and other structures that keep the railway network running.
The appearance of a closed group of military representatives within the TCC shows that the interaction between BCh and the military has reached a different level. According to available information, issues related to the organization and escort of military transport now largely go directly through the military personnel at the TCC, without unnecessary intermediate links. This format shortens the chain of approvals, limits the circle of people in the know and reduces the risk of information leaks.
This is especially important against the backdrop of ongoing military transport, the use of BCh infrastructure in the interests of the Russian Federation and the general tightening of military control over the transport system of Belarus. In fact, a closed military zone has been created in the main BCh traffic control center, and access to it is restricted for the vast majority of railway employees.
Thus, this is no longer just about coordinating military transport with the BCh, but about the permanent presence of the military within one of the key management facilities of the Belarusian Railway.
In light of the above, it is important to understand the potential and fairly obvious consequences of such close and direct interaction between BCh and military structures.
If Belarusian territory is again used for aggression against Ukraine — whether to launch attack drones, missile strikes or provocations, or to move Russian troops in preparation for another invasion — facilities involved in military command and in supporting such interaction may clearly no longer be seen as ordinary civilian infrastructure.
In that case, the presence of specialized Ministry of Defence structures inside the BCh Traffic Control Center creates direct risks not only for the railway system itself as delivery infrastructure but also for TCC employees. When a civilian traffic control center coordinates military transport and interacts with military structures, the line between a civilian facility and an element of military support is effectively erased.
That is why BCh employees, and above all TCC staff, need to consider the consequences that the continued use of BCh infrastructure in the interests of the military may have. In the event of new aggression from Belarusian territory, it cannot be ruled out that such a facility will be identified as part of the military support system, which exposes it to certain risks.
