On May 23, 2025, at the IV Conference of Belarusians of the World, the BELPOL initiative presented the report “The Lukashenko Regime’s Involvement in Russia’s Aggression Against Ukraine”. The 64-page report is based on documents, photo and video materials from open and closed sources. It describes the involvement of Belarusian authorities in preparing the invasion, in supporting the invasion force during the first months of the war, and in further support of the Russian Federation Armed Forces.
The Community of Railway Workers of Belarus is one of the co-authors of the report. A significant portion of the evidence base is founded on data we have published since the start of the full-scale war, primarily on materials from monitoring military transport. The materials for Chapter 3.4 “Deliveries of Ammunition and Military Equipment” were prepared by our team.
Transfer of the Invasion Force
According to our information, transport of Russian Federation Armed Forces troops via Belarusian Railway was conducted from January 17 to April 11, 2022. During this period, 11,889 railcars with military cargo weighing approximately 230,000 tons arrived in Belarus, including 730 railcars with personnel. Unloading was performed at 27 BCh stations, with the largest volumes received at Khoyniki, Asipovichy-I, Yelsk, Brest-Vostochny, and Rechytsa. More than half of the railcars arrived in districts bordering Ukraine, where the force was deployed for the offensive on the Kyiv direction. Details in the material “Invasion Logistics: Who and How Delivered the ‘War'”.
The report includes our data on troop train routes, departure and destination stations, rolling stock, nature of cargo, consignors and consignees. Among the recipients of military cargo, including ammunition, shipping documents list the Directorate of Military Communications of the Ministry of Defence of Belarus (document).
Officially, the exercises were to conclude on February 20, 2022, however half of the invasion force’s ammunition reserves arrived at the Ukrainian border on February 20–23. Train diagrams for troop trains on BCh are compiled approximately one month before transport begins, and their organization is ensured by the Directorate of Military Communications of the Ministry of Defence. Consequently, the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Belarus knew at least one month in advance that troops and ammunition were being concentrated not for exercises.
Support of the Force After February 24
With the start of the invasion, the Belarusian side continued to ensure transport, unloading, and servicing of Russian troops. On April 4, 2022, at Khoyniki station, approximately two dozen heavy tractors from the 288th Automobile Reserve Base of the Ministry of Defence of Belarus were provided for unloading a troop train. The train delivered a battalion tactical group of the Russian Federation Armed Forces with equipment bearing the tactical sign “V”, including a TOS-1 heavy flamethrower system. Station security was provided by military personnel of the Armed Forces of Belarus.
Aviation fuel was continuously delivered by rail. Main reserves were concentrated in Baranovichi and Lida, and for army aviation in Zhlobin. The frequency and volumes of deliveries coincided with the intensity of Russian aviation sorties from Belarusian airfields.
Ammunition and Armament for the Russian Federation Armed Forces
From January 2022 to January 2023, approximately 131,500 tons of ammunition were exported from Belarus to Russia by rail (details). This is 24 times greater than the reserve created for the “Vostok” invasion force. The maximum monthly volume occurred in April 2022 and amounted to 29,700 tons. Loading at arsenals was conducted by military personnel of the Armed Forces of Belarus. For instance, on June 24, 2022, 16 military personnel from the 74th Independent Signal Regiment were present at the loading of ammunition at the 46th Arsenal of Missiles and Ammunition (Bronnaya Gora settlement).
Export continued thereafter. In 2024, 183 railcars with explosive materials and ammunition, including artillery shells and missiles, were dispatched from Belarus to Russia. In late July–early August 2024, 94 gondola cars with missiles for anti-aircraft missile systems were dispatched in five groups from Asipovichy-I station to Staraya Toropa station. Consignor: 1562nd Repair and Technical Base of Air Defence of the Ministry of Defence of Belarus. The cargo was intended for the 23rd Arsenal of GRAU of the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation in Tver Oblast, which was struck by Ukrainian drones in September 2024 (details).
Since autumn 2022, the Ministry of Defence of Belarus has been transferring equipment from storage bases to Russia. In October 2022 alone, the Russian Federation Armed Forces received 211 units of armament and military equipment, including 98 T-72A tanks (sufficient to equip three tank battalions), 60 BMP-2 infantry fighting vehicles, 20 of them without turrets, and 53 Ural cargo trucks (details).
Training of Russian Troops at Belarusian Ranges
Russian units arrived by troop trains at stations near Belarusian ranges, underwent combat training there, and departed for front-line areas. For instance, on February 25, 2023, a troop train with equipment and Russian Federation Armed Forces personnel who had completed training in Belarus departed from Slonim station to Matveyev Kurgan station of the North Caucasus Railway (Rostov Oblast, Donetsk direction) (details). Training and dispatch of Russian Federation Armed Forces units continued at least until July 2023.
MZKT Products for Russian Federation Defence Enterprises
Minsk Wheeled Tractor Plant delivers to Russia chassis and repair kits for Iskander operational-tactical missile systems, Smerch multiple rocket launchers, air defence systems, as well as tractor units for transporting heavy armored vehicles. Based on our transport data, the report includes a diagram of these deliveries. In 2024, 306 railcars of MZKT products were dispatched to enterprises of the Russian Federation defence-industrial complex. Among consignees: JSC Obukhovsky Zavod (61 railcars), JSC FNPC Titan-Barrikady (40), CJSC SKB, Perm (40), JSC Tyazhmash (33), PJSC NPO Almaz (27) (details).
Persecution of Railway Workers
Ensuring military transport was accompanied by repression against those who resisted it. In the last week of March 2022 alone, more than thirty railway workers were detained (details). From March 19, 2022, military unit 3214 of the internal troops was engaged in guarding railway infrastructure in Gomel and Brest oblasts. Patrols were armed and equipped with radios and GPS trackers. Trains with Russian military property were escorted by guards, and individual trains were protected by special police detachments. BCh management conducted so-called “explanatory work” with employees, threatening criminal liability for resisting transport. Against detained rail partisans who offered no resistance, security forces used firearms.
Report Conclusions
The report’s authors conclude that the Lukashenko regime is a full accomplice in Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. BELPOL declared readiness to initiate criminal prosecution of Lukashenko, leadership of the Armed Forces of Belarus, security structures, the state military-industrial complex, and other persons, and to provide the evidence base for this purpose.
The full text of the report in Russian and English is available below:
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Russian-language version of the report: |
English-language version of the report: |
