



Community of
Railway Workers
of Belarus



THE MILITARIZATION OF BELARUS

ANALYTICAL REPORT

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INTRODUCTION

The militarization of Belarus is not a natural response to external threats but rather the result of a deliberate policy by the regime of Aliaksandr Lukashenka, which has placed state institutions and the country's territory at the service of Russian military strategy. By providing Russia with infrastructure, airspace, and a staging ground for a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the regime became an accomplice to the war, even without directly sending the Armed Forces to the front lines. At the same time, the orchestrated migration pressure on the EU's borders has become a tool for hybrid attacks designed to destabilize neighboring states and test their ability to respond collectively.

If the current situation does not change, Belarus will increasingly become a source of military and hybrid threats to Ukraine, Poland, and the Baltic states. The strengthening of Russia-Belarus military integration, the deployment of weapons, and the expansion of infrastructure create opportunities for future pressure, provocations, and further escalation. Therefore, the events unfolding in Belarus should be viewed not as an isolated internal crisis but as one of the central challenges to European security. At the same time, an in-depth analysis of the information available to BELPOL indicates that threats to European security cannot be viewed solely within a five- to ten-year timeframe. Recent data indicates that potential risks may materialize much sooner than anticipated, requiring immediate attention.

At the time of this report's preparation, the possibility of another large-scale invasion of Ukraine from the territory of Belarus – including with the direct participation of the country's Armed Forces – remains a subject of expert debate. The traditional approach to assessing such a scenario assumes that the key indicator would be the advance deployment of a large offensive force. However, the experience of the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian war shows that the development of unmanned systems, precision-guided weapons, and new methods of warfare is significantly changing the nature of preparations for aggression. Belarus's involvement may take forms that do not require the advance deployment of a large-scale contingent and are therefore less detectable when using standard assessment methods.

In this regard, analysis should not be limited to monitoring troop strength and movements.

Assessing Belarus's potential for expanded participation in the war requires examining the interconnected political, social, infrastructural, economic, and legal changes underway. This BELPOL report aims to identify and systematize how the Lukashenka regime is systematically establishing the necessary conditions in Belarus to prepare for and carry out aggression.

The report consists of four parts, which analyze the following areas:

- the militarization of society and its ideological and psychological preparation for war;
- the expansion and modernization of military infrastructure, as well as the use of civilian facilities for military purposes;
- the militarization of the economy;
- changes to Belarusian legislation related to the state's preparations for war.

The first part, “Militarization of Society and Preparation for War,” examines a clearly structured system for cultivating “defenders of the Motherland” based on a cult of self-sacrifice for a higher cause and the rejection of democratic values. This section shows how the Ministry of Defense, the education system, and propaganda have been integrated into a single system with specific goals and objectives.

The second part, “Expansion and Improvement of Military Infrastructure and Use of Civilian Infrastructure in Preparation for War,” examines how the functional distinction between military and civilian infrastructure is gradually being erased in Belarus. Using

Belarusian Railway as a specific example, it demonstrates how this infrastructure has been transformed into an instrument for the covert and rapid deployment of troops of the joint Belarus–Russia military grouping in a future war. The materials for Section 2.2, “Preparing Belarusian Railway for Covert Military Transportation,” were prepared by the Community of Railway Workers of Belarus.

The third part, “Militarization of the Economy,” describes the situation in Belarus in which supplies of weapons and ammunition to the Russian Federation have become one of the factors keeping some Belarusian enterprises afloat, the only way to address

unemployment in some regions, and a means of maintaining wages at an acceptable level. At the same time, new arms-production areas are emerging and existing ones are being expanded intensively.

The final part, “Changes to Belarusian Legislation Aimed at Preparing for War,” examines how the Lukashenka regime, having de facto lost its military sovereignty on February 24, 2022, subsequently formalized this loss through agreements with the Russian Federation and new national legislation. It shows that Belarusian legislation has undergone significant changes that provide a legal basis for drawing Belarus into the war.

As with previous BLPOL reports, this report is published in two parts. The publicly available section contains links to documents and descriptions of their contents. The documents themselves constitute the restricted section of the report, access to which is limited.

Part 1.

MILITARIZATION OF SOCIETY AND PREPARATION FOR WAR

1.1 Citizens of Belarus as a Mobilization Reserve for the Lukashenka Regime

In February 2022, following the falsification of the constitutional referendum, a new concept, the “state ideology,” was incorporated into the Constitution of Belarus. In essence, the regime legally formalized the right to do what it had previously done unlawfully: determine the path of personal development for Belarusian citizens and punish any deviation from that prescribed path.

The foundation of the “state ideology” is the regime’s constructed notion of so-called “historical truth,” readiness for self-sacrifice in the name of the State, and hatred toward “ideological enemies” designated by the State. It is important to emphasize that “ideological enemies” refers not only to Belarusians who disagree with the regime’s policies. It also includes all countries of the

so-called “collective West,” and particularly the “Kyiv regime.”

Military education and indoctrination of Belarusian citizens have been brought to the forefront.

The BELPOL report “Children Without a Future” provides detailed documentary evidence of how the function of educating children in Belarus is gradually being taken over from the Ministry of Education by the country’s security agencies.

In 2021, the Council of Ministers of Belarus approved the Program for Patriotic Education of the Population for 2022–2025. The document established a systematic policy of military indoctrination of minors.




Figure 1. Levels and system of military indoctrination of children in Belarus

As part of the indoctrination process, the Ministry of Education is creating special conditions for fully immersing children and young people in an environment modeled on military life. Students are dressed in identical uniforms that closely resemble military uniforms. They are assigned roles ranging from commander to medic. Children are often placed in formation alongside active-duty military personnel. They grow up with weapons in their hands and are subjected to extreme exercises, including being “run over by tanks.”

Against this backdrop, propaganda imposes the following narratives and patterns of thinking on children:

- ▶ The world is divided into “friends” and “enemies.” Reality is viewed in black-and-white terms.
 - ▶ Aggression toward dissent, “enemy” cultural values, and other nationalities is considered normal.
 - ▶ A cult of personality and dependence on authority are promoted.
 - ▶ Loyalty to the leader replaces moral judgment of one’s actions.
- ▶ Personal responsibility for one’s actions is rejected and replaced by blind faith.
 - ▶ Self-sacrifice in the name of a “higher goal” is presented as the norm.
 - ▶ Violence is presented as an acceptable way to resolve conflicts.

All of the above create the conditions for raising a completely uncritical and obedient soldier.

Having begun the process of raising obedient soldiers, the regime proceeded to develop a pipeline for reproducing personnel for all security agencies and the repressive apparatus.

The Armed Forces of Belarus, the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Emergency Situations, the State Border Committee, the Investigative Committee, and even the Customs Service have their own cadet or specialized classes in secondary schools. Security agencies are gradually pushing teachers out of the educational process, while clubs organized by the Ministry of Internal Affairs are pushing parents themselves out of the upbringing process.



▶ **Figure 2.** The product of military indoctrination carried out by the Lukashenka regime in Belarus

Figure 3, shown below, is a slide from a presentation¹ by the Chair of the Education Department of the Navapolatsk City Executive Committee. The figure shows a list of military units and law enforcement agencies that have patronage over schools in the city of Navapolatsk. Among them is even Navapolatsk Correctional Colony [Prison] No. 1.

Of the ten schools in Navapolatsk, eight are under the patronage of law enforcement agencies, as well as the city's only lyceum and one of its two gymnasiums. In total, this small city has 10 specialized classes and 8 clubs. The situation in Navapolatsk is just one example that can be extrapolated to the whole of Belarus.




Figure 3. Assignment of schools, gymnasiums, and lyceums in Navapolatsk to security agencies

The statistics on the reach of military education among children are staggering.

By early 2023, there were a total of 968 military-patriotic interest groups operating in Belarus, involving more than 14,500 students.

During the 2023 summer vacation alone, 736 children's military-patriotic camps operated in cooperation with military units and security agencies (in 2022, there were only 583). Nearly 27,000 children attended these camps (compared to about 21,000 in 2022). Of these, 98 camps were operated on military bases alone (compared to 48 in 2022), where nearly 2,800 children spent their summer break (compared to about 1,600 in 2022). According to official data, plans were already in place to "improve the health" of more than 30,000 children at military-patriotic camps in 2024.

The regime's Ministry of Internal Affairs carries out the most intensive indoctrination of minors and makes the largest investments in equipment, uniforms, and training involving live weapons. By 2024, the Ministry of Internal Affairs had established around 300 children's clubs, where approximately 8,000 children are being "educated." The approach to training young fighters is highly systematic. For example, the Zircon military-patriotic club in Grodno, run by the Internal Troops, has developed and implemented a training program for young UAV operators.

The National Educational and Recreational Center for Patriotic Education of Youth, built within the Brest Fortress, operates under the patronage of the Ministry of Defense. It has the capacity to accommodate 5,000 children per year, increasing to 7,000 when the summer tent camp is taken into account.

¹ Presentation by the Chair of the Education Department of the Navapolatsk City Executive Committee

The evidence above demonstrates the military indoctrination of children. Older people are also being mobilized for military purposes. Under the so-called “people’s militia,” units are being formed that include older men. For example, as of February 2024, more than half of the members of the militia unit in the town of Dzisna, Miory District, Vitebsk Region, were over 65 years old. The unit commanders were 69 and 72 years old.

According to a presentation² by the Military Commissar of the Vitebsk Region, one of the goals of enacting the Law on the People’s Militia was to provide citizens of Belarus with the opportunity to participate in the country’s defense. In other words, the regime seeks to utilize as many human resources as possible if Belarus enters a war.

The militarization of Belarusian civil society has not yet reached its peak. However, the process is well underway, and its scale is staggering. The Lukashenka regime initiated it and actively drives it forward. Today, no event organized by the regime takes place without a military component. Belarusians are being subjected to a triad of “War. Sacrifice. Leader.” Lukashenka’s code name, “First,” has ceased to be used exclusively within the security agencies and has entered everyday life, the media, and clothing merchandise.

Regardless of how peaceful events organized by the Belarusian authorities may be, even when they have no connection to military themes, the authorities introduce a military component into the atmosphere of the celebrations. Weapons,

people in military uniforms with their faces covered, and military equipment have long become permanent features of cultural events in Belarus. For example, in 2026, Slavianski Bazaar, an exclusively civilian cultural event, was infused with a pro-war element through the participation of Russian singers who have publicly supported the war.



▶ **Figure 4.** Russian pro-war artists on an armored vehicle of the Internal Troops of Belarus. Slavianski Bazaar International Arts Festival

1.2 The Combat Brotherhood of Belarus and Russia. Russian Propaganda and Common Enemies. The Information Vacuum

The erasure of historical memory and the suppression of Belarusian national identity are driven by the myth of “brotherly peoples.” This is a dangerous factor that facilitates the easy and rapid penetration of the imperial ideology of the “Russian World” into the consciousness of Belarusian citizens. This is particularly pronounced among Belarusian military personnel, where it is reinforced by a deeper psychological bond known as “comradeship in arms.” Moreover, this comradeship is instilled

from childhood in youth paramilitary organizations and in military units and formations.

The photo below, Figure 5, from the Telegram channel of the 61st Fighter Base of the Armed Forces of Belarus, was published exactly one day after the start of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The 61st Air Base became one of the main airfields in Belarus from which missile and bomb strikes were launched against Ukrainian territory.

² Presentation of the Law on the People’s Militia by the Military Commissar of the Vitebsk Region



Figure 5. "Military brotherhood." The aggressor and co-aggressor in the same formation

Telegram channels of military units are filled with such photographs and accompanying comments.

Within the military community, a deep bond between Belarusian and Russian servicemen is forged during numerous joint exercises, competitions, and propaganda-driven events.

Belarusian children are often sent to Russia to attend military-patriotic camps. For example, at the request³ of the First Deputy Governor of the Pskov Region, the Vitsebsk Regional Executive Committee was required to provide 100 teenagers aged 14 to 17 to participate in the Kurgan Druzhby military-patriotic camp.

Such contacts can have serious consequences that should not be overlooked. In the cultivated environment of "combat brotherhood," leaving the circle of "brothers in arms" and opposing crimes committed by the "brotherhood," including war crimes, is regarded as betrayal. Few Belarusian

servicemen are able to overcome this psychological barrier. Propaganda and corresponding indoctrination further reinforce it.

Propaganda blurs the boundaries of moral choice that an ordinary person would not cross. It promotes the image of a "patriot of the State." For such people, Lukashenka's oft-quoted phrase, "Sometimes laws are not the priority!" serves as a direct call to action. For example, Belarusian military Telegram channels deny the crimes committed by the Russian army in Bucha and Irpin. Evidence of crimes against civilians in these cities presented by Ukraine is portrayed on Belarusian military information resources as fabrications by Ukrainian propaganda.

One example of the gradual erasure of the distinction between Belarusian and Russian military personnel is Major General Andrei Lukyanovich, the current Commander of the Air Force and Air Defense Forces of Belarus.

³ Request from the Deputy Governor of the Pskov Region regarding the participation of Belarusian children in a military-patriotic camp in Russia


Until the age of 30, as a Russian citizen, he served in the 150th Military Transport Aviation Regiment of the Russian Armed Forces. Lukyanovich obtained a Belarusian passport through an expedited procedure only in 2000. Before that, he had served in the Russian Armed Forces for 10 years.

The regime deliberately conceals and distorts information about this individual. For example, official sources claim that Lukyanovich was born and raised in Belarus. In fact, a personnel record on Lukyanovich,⁴ signed by Major General Ihar Holub, then Commander of the Air Force and Air Defense Forces of Belarus, confirms that he was born in Kazakhstan.

During Russian air strikes against Ukraine launched from Belarusian territory, Lukyanovich served as Deputy Commander of the Belarusian Air Force and Air Defense Forces and Head of Aviation.

He bears full responsibility for the use of the 50th Mixed Aviation Base (Machulishchy), the 61st Fighter Aviation Base (Baranavichy), the 116th Assault Aviation Base (Lida), and other airfields in Belarus to conduct airstrikes against Ukraine.

European citizens should understand and accept as a fact that servicemen of the Belarusian Special Operations Forces and Internal Troops are at risk of committing war crimes alongside Russian servicemen. It was specifically the servicemen of the 38th and 103rd Brigades of the Special Operations Forces who were tasked with covering the flank and rear of the Russian invasion force in Ukraine on the Kyiv axis in February 2022 (Figure 6). BELPOL wrote about this in its analytical article.⁵ The figure below shows the locations where military equipment belonging to the 38th and 103rd mobile brigades was documented via photographs and video footage several days before the start of the invasion of Ukraine.



► **Figure 6.** Covering the right flank of the Russian invasion force by the 38th and 103rd Special Operations Forces brigades of Belarus

Simultaneously with this “fraternization,” Belarusian servicemen are being directly or indirectly indoctrinated to view Ukraine and civilized Western countries as the enemy. Belarusian propaganda most aggressively promoted this image of the enemy during the

first days of the invasion in the online chats of the Belarusian military units supporting the invasion. These include special operations forces, as well as radio-technical support and electronic intelligence and countermeasures units.

⁴ Official report on Lukyanovich, Commander of the Air Force and Air Defense Forces of the Defense Ministry of Belarus

⁵ <https://belpol.pro/en/karta-ot-hrenina/>

The regime currently imposes severe penalties for viewing or commenting on any information source other than those controlled by the state. Hundreds of information resources have been banned and subjected to criminal prosecution. However, the Belarusian regime is completely indifferent to openly pro-Russian content posted on military unit Telegram channels. On a systematic basis, information intended to promote the ideology of the “Russian World” and the narratives of the so-called “special military operation” is uploaded to the Telegram channels of Belarusian military units to push their agenda among Belarusian servicemen. To this end, Telegram channels such as “На западном рубеже”, “БелВПО”, “Ребята с Красного двора”, “Форпост”, and others have been created for Belarusian servicemen. The very names of these channels (“On the Western Frontier,” “BelVPO,” “Guys from Krasny Dvor,” “Outpost,” respectively) promote the narrative that Belarus is an outpost and western frontier of the Russian Federation.

Russian media outlets impose their agenda among Belarusian servicemen without any intervention by Belarusian state bodies responsible for countering the spread of Russian imperial ideology, which ultimately threatens Belarus’s sovereignty.

For example, the profile of the BelVPO information resource⁶ states that it covers “the military-political situation in Europe and the world,” offering “a view from the Republic of Belarus.” In reality, the “view from the

Republic of Belarus” consists exclusively of the aggressive ideology of the Russian state within its so-called “special military operation.” The resource has a Telegram channel, a website, a TikTok account, and other popular online platforms.

It is important to note that the website was established by a group of like-minded individuals who are reserve (retired) officers of the former Byelorussian Military District of the Soviet Union and the Armed Forces of Belarus. They represent a pillar of the Russian (Soviet) empire in Belarus. After the withdrawal of the Soviet Armed Forces from Eastern European countries, around 14,000 Soviet officers settled in Belarus. According to the BelVPO resource’s profile, “a large number of active-duty and former servicemen live in the Republic of Belarus who care about the fate of the Motherland and whose potential remains far from fully realized.” It was this generation of Soviet officers that laid the foundation for educating officers loyal to the Soviet (or, in this context, Russian) empire in Belarusian military educational institutions – officers deprived of a national consciousness and of their people’s historical memory.

The screenshots of the Telegram channel shown in Figure 7 demonstrate that the channel uses the colors of the official Belarusian flag – red and green. The V-shaped abbreviation is also rendered in the colors of the current Belarusian flag, with a visible inscription “ZOV,” a symbol associated with Russia’s war against Ukraine.



Figure 7. Screenshots from the BelVPO Telegram channel

⁶ t.me/Belarus_VPO

The intended meaning of the “ZOV” triad is to unambiguously indoctrinate Belarusian military personnel regarding the war being waged against Ukraine. The essence of the messages directed at Belarusian military personnel is to support an aggressive war in which the Russian Armed Forces suffer no losses but inflict heavy damage on “Ukrainian Nazis.” The channel shows videos of combat operations in Ukraine and monitors and describes ethnically motivated conflicts, such as those between Poles and Ukrainians in Poland. The channel lumps servicemen of the Armed Forces of Belarus and the Russian Federation into a single category – “OURS.”

Examples of this kind of generalization include headlines such as “OUR FPV drone crews are operating on the front line,” “OUR FPV drone operators continue to actively eliminate Ukrainian Nazis,” and “Combat operations by OUR UAV operators.”⁷ Belarusian servicemen are constantly being conditioned to believe that there is no distinction between them and Russian servicemen and that the actions being carried out on Ukrainian territory are a common cause.

Despite the peaceful statements made by officials of the Belarusian Ministry of Defense and Lukashenka, this channel’s information agenda systematically relays aggressive Russian ideology to Belarusian servicemen in units of the Belarusian Ministry of Defense. The following Belarusian military units repost BelVPO publications on their Telegram channels:

- 116th Assault Aviation Base;
- 50th Mixed Aviation Base;
- 61st Fighter Aviation Base;
- 103rd Detached Guards Airborne Brigade;
- 38th Detached Guards Air Assault Brigade;
- 8th Radio Engineering Brigade;
- 49th Radio Engineering Brigade;
- 48th Detached Electronic Warfare Battalion;
- 56th Detached Communications Regiment;
- 74th Detached Communications Regiment;
- Telegram channel of the Belarusian Internal Troops;
- and others.

As can be seen, most units and formations of Belarus are subject to Russian propaganda. At

the same time, the ideological bodies of the Armed Forces of Belarus have all the resources and means to prevent this, including the legal authority to criminally prosecute and shut down the aforementioned information resources. However, this is not being done as a matter of principle. This is the reason why a pro-war sentiment continues to take root among Belarusian military personnel and civilians. Moreover, the Lukashenka regime is doing this deliberately. Proof of this lies in the fact that the agenda of BelVPO resources is shaped and promoted by the regime’s ideologues and active-duty military personnel of Belarus.

For example, Colonel Andrei Bahadzel (Bogodel), Deputy Head of the General Staff’s Faculty for Training and Scientific Work and Head of the Training and Methodology Department at the Military Academy of Belarus, frequently appears as a regular contributor and expert on the platform.

The image below does not feature the official flag of the Lukashenka regime, but it does include a double-headed eagle – a symbol of the Russian Empire (the successor to the Soviet Union) and a symbol of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, which is, in a sense, a successor to the Warsaw Pact. Even this image demonstrates the fact that Belarus lacks agency.

The Deputy Head of the General Staff Faculty of the Armed Forces hosts joint livestreams with the so-called military expert Artamonov from Russia, who supports the war and tells Belarusian servicemen that the West is preparing a new front against Belarus.

Alongside the propaganda campaign targeting military personnel, an information vacuum was created that persists to this day. While the Ukrainian army’s casualties have been reported since the early stages of the war, statistics on Russian army casualties have never once been published on military Telegram channels in the entire history of those channels. The Telegram channels of military units are also completely silent regarding strikes carried out by Ukraine on Russian territory. This creates an inaccurate perception among Belarusian servicemen of the potential threats to their lives and health should Belarus enter the war. At the same time, the lives and health of servicemen are currently the only leverage available to pressure them and deter them from agreeing to participate in combat operations.

⁷ https://t.me/Belarus_VPO/87119



Figure 8. Colonel Andrei Bahadzel (Bogodel), Deputy Head of the General Staff Faculty of the Armed Forces for Academic and Research Affairs and Head of the Academic and Methodological Department of the Military Academy of Belarus, relays Russian imperial narratives through the BelVPO platform

The results of the regime's efforts are plain to see. The number of Belarusian citizens who have signed contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense and are participating in combat operations on the Russian side exceeds the number of those who fight on the Ukrainian side. According to data officially published by Ukraine, as of May 26, 2026, 2,871 people from Belarus were fighting on Russia's side against Ukraine. At the same time, according to available data, the number of Belarusian citizens killed while fighting for Russia is many times greater than the number killed in combat on Ukraine's side. Among them are quite a few former members of Belarus's security agencies.

Interviews with Belarusian prisoners of war who fought on Russia's side reveal that the overwhelming majority of them did not fully grasp the gravity of the consequences until the very moment of combat. Most importantly, however, the captive Belarusians did not, in principle, question the classification of their own actions or those of the Russian Federation within the "victim"–"aggressor" framework.

Any attempt to seek out objective information is suppressed by the threat of punishment. To this end, Telegram channels of military units and pro-government sources systematically publish lists of "extremist" (opposition) resources and threats of imprisonment for up to seven years.

1.3 Militarization of Government and Local Self-Government Bodies, Political Parties, and Public Organizations

All pro-regime organizations, state and local government bodies, and Belaya Rus – the only party officially registered in Belarus in decades – are actively involved in militarizing society, while independent civil society organizations have been systematically crushed and banned.

Strict and unquestioning obedience allows the regime to mobilize all of the elements described above.

As an example, consider the Regulation⁸ on the National Military Applied Game

⁸ Regulation on the National Military Applied Game "Proryv 2025"

“Proryv 2025.” This game is intended for students. Among the active participants and organizations coordinating the program, alongside the Ministry of Defense of Belarus, are the Ministry of Education, the BRSM Youth Union, the Belaya Rus Public Association, and the Belarusian Union of Officers. Funding for the military game is provided directly or indirectly from the national budget.

All levels of local government in Belarus are involved in the military indoctrination of children and adolescents. For example, the Minsk Regional Executive Committee. Cited as an example is its Order⁹ on the Results of Inspections of Military-Patriotic Associations. The entire structure of the Ministry of Education, under the strict control of the Prosecutor’s Office, is involved in this process. BELPOL possesses documentary evidence showing how the Prosecutor’s Office conducts inspections of secondary educational institutions to identify deviations from the military orientation of children’s education and demands punishment for such deviations. This documentary evidence is presented in the report “Children Without a Future: The Militarization of Childhood in Belarus”^{2,10}.

For systematic training under Lukashenka’s Decree on the Development of Military-Patriotic Clubs, the Molodaya Gvardiya Charitable Foundation was established under the patronage of the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Belarus, with the aim of providing financial support for the military indoctrination of Belarusian children. The financial burden of funding this process falls on enterprises under the Ministry of Industry. Moreover, the Ministry of Industry itself is responsible for compelling its enterprises to make donations.¹¹

One of the largest reactionary public associations in Belarus capable of supporting military rhetoric in the context of defending the so-called Union State of Belarus and Russia is the Belarusian Union of Officers, which has more than 20,000 members. The overwhelming majority of this organization’s members adhere to the ideology of the Soviet

empire, which they currently see embodied in the Union State. This represents a fairly large potential mobilization resource, backed by years of military training, a strong conviction in their own righteousness, and high motivation. This organization played a reactionary role during the 2020 protests. There is no doubt that it will side with pro-Russian forces should Belarus enter a war.

In April 2024, the Ministry of Defense of Belarus began retraining hunters from the Belarusian Society of Hunters and Fishermen [RGOO BOOR] as snipers. A nationwide system for retraining hunters was established for this purpose. At that time, the association had approximately 60,000 hunters. Ihar (Igor) **Shunevich**, Chairman of the Belarusian Society of Hunters and Fishermen (and former Minister of Internal Affairs), stated, “We will gradually increase the potential number of people who, if necessary, can be deployed as specialists – as a highly specialized, surgical, so to speak, tool in military operations.”

As an example and proof of this trend, a letter from Shunevich is provided.¹² The letter states that Lukashenka gave instructions to select 200 of the most highly trained and loyal hunters from among the society’s members to organize their training in the military specialty of sniper.

Another document demonstrating the personal involvement of Lukashenka himself in directing the militarization of Belarus is the Plan for Implementing the President of Belarus’s Instructions,¹³ approved by the Chairman of the Belarusian Society of Hunters and Fishermen. The first item of the plan, quoting it verbatim, called for

“selecting 200 of the most loyal to the state [here, this should be understood as ‘loyal to Lukashenka’] in each region of Belarus to organize their training as snipers.”

Overall, virtually all areas of state activity and government administration are involved in the militarization process to some extent. For example, executive committees are being tasked with equipping their respective

⁹ Order on the Results of Inspections of Military-Patriotic Associations

¹⁰ <https://belpol.pro/en/deti-bez-budushhego-doklad-belpol-i-nau/>

¹¹ Letter from the Ministry of Industry of Belarus to holding companies regarding contributions to the Molodaya Gvardiya Foundation

¹² Letter from Shunevich, Chairman of the Society, to the chairmen of the regional branches of the Belarusian Society of Hunters and Fishermen

¹³ Plan for Implementing the President of Belarus’s Instructions

territories for military purposes. One piece of evidence is a letter from the Belarusian Ministry of Defense, "On the Assignment to the City of Pochep, Russian Federation,"¹⁴ signed by Defense Minister Viktor Khrenin. According to the document, the chairmen of the Brest and Homiel regional executive

committees are to travel to Pochep, Bryansk Region, Russia, together with Khrenin. The group's task is to improve the participants' training in the operational preparation of border areas and provide practical instruction on organizing work to construct defensive fortifications.

1.4 Who Will Get Belarus's Human Resources?

Diplomatic representatives of Western countries should clearly distinguish between the rhetoric and the practical actions of the Lukashenka regime in Belarus.

On the one hand, the regime is trying to maintain the status quo by making peaceful statements and calling for friendship. On the other hand, it is also putting into practice precisely the goals that the Kremlin is pursuing with regard to Belarus. Regardless of how events unfold, Lukashenka will not embrace European values. These values, in and of themselves, pose a real and substantial threat to his power and are completely at odds with the core ideology of his regime. This assertion is supported by the fact that, following the Euromaidan in 2013–2014, Belarus decided to establish the Southern Operational Command, creating the core staff of the command headquarters at the Military Academy of Belarus and drafting documents for its deployment. In other words, when Ukraine

took a step toward Europe, the Lukashenka regime automatically classified it as a potential enemy.

Given Belarus's deep economic dependence on Russia, it can be stated with absolute certainty that Lukashenka and his regime are the guarantors that the situation will, sooner or later, look exactly as shown in the figure below.

If drawn into a war, Belarus would become a bottleneck, with its mobilization resources trapped on one side by the line of contact with NATO forces and on the other by security forces such as the National Guard and the Military Police of Russia. These are ideal conditions for treating Belarusians the same way the Russians treated the adult population in the occupied territories of the Donetsk Oblast and Luhansk Oblast of Ukraine (the so-called "Donetsk People's Republic" and "Luhansk People's Republic").




Figure 9. Expansion of the aggressor's manpower through Belarus's mobilization potential

¹⁴ Letter from the Ministry of Defense of Belarus "On the Assignment to the City of Pochep, Russian Federation"

Military integration is already underway, cemented by agreements that we will discuss below. These programs are being implemented regardless of the rhetoric used by the dictator and his subordinates in their speeches and intended for an external audience.

Claims by some Belarusian opposition politicians that Lukashenka is trying to distance himself from

Russia through maneuvering are not supported by evidence. For this to be put into practice, the dictator would need, at a minimum, to suspend the programs aimed at building the Union State and halt the absorption and mutual integration of Russian and Belarusian military structures. This is not happening in practice. On the contrary, current processes continue to facilitate the further absorption of Belarus by Russia.

CONCLUSIONS

1. The Lukashenka regime's statements about friendship and its peaceful rhetoric are at odds with its actions. Its statements do not correspond to reality.
2. The regime is creating all the conditions to deprive Belarusians of a sense of national identity, which in turn facilitates the integration of the security sector and society as a whole into Russian structures.
3. This process will continue as long as Lukashenka and his associates remain in power. There is a real threat that Belarus's human resources could become part of the Russian military machine.
4. The Lukashenka regime has driven out of Belarus the civic activists and civil society organizations capable of organizing and leading resistance to Russia's creeping hybrid occupation of Belarus.
5. The continued existence of the regime in Belarus serves the Kremlin's interests, while responsibility for the ongoing absorption of Belarus by Russia rests entirely with Lukashenka.

Part 2.

EXPANSION AND IMPROVEMENT OF MILITARY INFRASTRUCTURE AND USE OF CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURE IN PREPARATION FOR WAR

2.1 Reconstruction of Military Infrastructure and Its Integration with Civilian Infrastructure

Belarus is currently covertly constructing and reconstructing military infrastructure facilities and building new transportation networks. This work is undoubtedly creating conditions that are highly likely to serve as the basis for further hybrid or direct aggression against Ukraine.

Drawing on the experience of 2022, the regime is actively creating and refining a system to counter all threats and challenges to the covert and unimpeded movement of troops across Belarusian territory.

An example of the cover story used for such construction is a facility located 10 kilometers east of Krychaw, Mahilyow Region, Belarus. According to the cover story, a facility called the “Klimavichy District Logistics Center” is being built on this site. However, military equipment is actually stationed there. Moreover, reinforced anti-drone defenses are being erected around the buildings under construction – a level of protection previously unseen at any civilian or military facility in Belarus.



Figure 10. Secret military facility, the “Klimavichy District Logistics Center.” Anti-drone defenses have been installed on the buildings

The Ministry of Defense of Belarus is constructing its own towers¹⁵ and actively utilizing civilian communication networks to build a stationary radio relay communication network based on them. To build this network, it is using cell tower infrastructure belonging to the civilian company MTS [Mobile Telesystems, SOOO Mobilnyye Telesistemy]. Russians own 49% of the company's shares, while the remaining 51% of the shares are owned by the Belarusian state.

The topology of the stationary radio relay communications network¹⁶ indicates that it has been deployed not so much in the interests of Belarus as to support the plans of the joint Russia–Belarus force grouping. Figure 11 below clearly shows, for example, that in the southern part of Belarus, the radio relay communications line runs along the main road from the Russian city of Klintsy toward Brest.




Figure 11. Fixed radio relay communication system created by the Ministry of Defense of Belarus near the Ukrainian border

Many of the towers housing the radio relay communication equipment have so-called channel allocation points – containers with telecommunications equipment. Both Belarusian and Russian military communications equipment can be connected to this system via standard telecommunications interfaces. In essence, the Klintsy–Brest route has been prepared and equipped to provide communications support for troop movements from the Russian Federation.

A similar situation exists along Belarusian roads from Smolensk to Minsk, as well as along routes from the northern part of Belarus to the south toward Ukraine, specifically the Pskov–Homiel route.


There can be only one logical explanation for this topological structure of tower placement: to ensure operational control in the event of a large-scale, end-to-end troop movement across Belarusian territory from east to west and from north to south, and to support troop logistics along these routes.

Of particular interest is the installation of Russian-made communications equipment in Belarusian integrated communications systems. Until a certain point, these systems could not communicate with one another because of differences in the information exchange protocols used by the radio interfaces of the radio relay stations.

However, Russian-made radio relay communications equipment is now being installed in Belarusian communications equipment complexes that support the development of strategic- and operational-level communications networks. This indicates a trend toward standardizing the communications equipment of the Armed Forces of Belarus with that of the Ministry of Defense of Russia. The purpose of this modernization is to ensure interoperability between Belarusian and Russian communications systems. Once again, this demonstrates which side of the Russia–Belarus tandem is the “junior partner” and which is the “senior partner.”

¹⁵ Report “Construction of a Fixed Radio Relay Communication Network for the Armed Forces – Phase 4,” Site No. 58


¹⁶ Network topology of the fixed radio relay communication system of the Ministry of Defense of Belarus



► **Figure 12.** Russian M-416GM radio relay stations installed in the communications equipment of the Belarusian Ministry of Defense to enable the integration of the Belarusian and Russian field military communications components

Once again, based on the facts, we can conclude that the Lukashenka regime continues to voluntarily integrate its security agencies into the structure of Russian security agencies,

both organizationally and technically, while the command-and-control system of Belarus's security forces is gradually being absorbed into Russia's command-and-control system.



► **Figure 13.** DMR trunked radio base stations near the Ukrainian border


Another noteworthy development is the establishment of an extensive DMR-standard trunked radio communications network in eastern Belarus, particularly in the Homiel Region, which borders Ukraine.

The regime is known to be concerned about the potential for renewed protests. However, these are the regions with the lowest potential for protest activity. Despite this, they have the highest concentration of Ministry of Internal Affairs digital radio communication base stations in Belarus. This distribution of base stations can only be explained by an effort to ensure that the area is prepared to operate under de facto martial law.

As with the fixed radio relay communications system of the Ministry of Defense of Belarus, this network is built primarily on towers operated by the Belarusian-Russian mobile network operator Mobile TeleSystems [SOOO Mobilnyye Telesistemy], mentioned above.

Thus, in terms of communications, Belarusian territory has been prepared for the maneuvering of a joint force group and the maintenance of martial law.

The facts listed above are not the only evidence. Belarus is also reconstructing its airfield infrastructure, including its technical capabilities. For example, there is evidence that some Belarusian airfields, including those used by the Russian military to launch strikes from Belarusian territory, are receiving and installing new radar systems, Russian-made instrument landing systems, and other equipment. Airfields that Belarus had no need for before the invasion of Ukraine are also being equipped with such systems. For example, the Russian-made 12A6 Sopka-2 route radar system¹⁷ is being installed at the airfield in Babruysk, similar to systems being installed by Russia at its own airfields. This equipment is more modern and reliable than the Soviet-made systems previously in use. The 12A6 route radar system is designed to operate without maintenance personnel. This means that Belarusian air bases and airfields will be capable of supporting a sufficiently intensive operational cycle of military aviation. Figure 14 below shows the installation plan for the 12A6 route radar system at the position of military unit 19764, the 116th Assault Aviation Base in Lida.



► **Figure 14.** Installation plan for the TRLK 12A6 route-based radar system at the position of military unit 19764, the 116th Assault Aviation Base in Lida

Belarus has already provided its airfields along with all the infrastructure and personnel necessary for their operation, as well as a system for the delivery of aviation munitions, fuel, and equipment. There is no doubt that this could

happen again for several simple reasons. First, documents have already been signed at the interstate level obligating Belarus to fulfill its allied obligations to the Russian Federation. Second, the regime is highly dependent on the Kremlin.

¹⁷ General layout of the installation of the 12A6 route radar system at the airfield in Babruysk

2.2 Preparing Belarusian Railway for Covert Military Transportation

Military transportation is a key prerequisite for deploying and employing a large military force. Carrying out such transportation requires more than simply allocating railcars and locomotives. Loading and unloading stations, routes, interstate interchange points, timetables, and procedures for routing military trains must be determined in advance. At the same time, shunting operations, communications, security, personnel catering, technical support, and information-security measures must be arranged. Therefore, the railway's readiness for military transportation should be assessed not only by the condition of its tracks but also by its command-and-control system, security arrangements, and coordination with military authorities.

Belarusian Railway has already undergone a practical test of this system. Between January 17 and April 11, 2022, 11,889 railcars carrying military cargo with a total weight of more than 229,843 tonnes were delivered to Belarus, including 730 railcars carrying personnel. Russian troops and military materiel were received at 27 Belarusian Railway stations. The shipments included 8,002 railcars carrying military equipment, 1,300 railcars carrying ammunition, and 946 railcars carrying fuel. More than half of the railcars were sent to areas where the offensive grouping was being assembled near the border with Ukraine.¹⁸

The General Staff of the Belarusian Armed Forces and Belarusian Railway operated under the control of the Russian Ministry of Defense. Evidence of this can be found in a letter¹⁹ from the Transport and Logistics Center of Belarusian Railway to the Commercial Court of Moscow, Russia. The legal dispute concerned debts owed by the Russian Ministry of Defense to Belarusian Railway for unpaid railcar detention fees. The railcars had been designated to transport military equipment, personnel, and military materiel at Belarusian stations during the active phase of the invasion of Ukraine from Belarusian territory.

The document states, quoting it verbatim: ***"Representatives of the Russian Central Office of Military Communications were continuously present at the Ministry of Defense of Belarus as part of the group responsible for organizing the transportation at issue in this case. They planned and managed these operations and had full information concerning military rail transportation carried out in the interests of the Russian side."***

The document also states that the transportation operations were coordinated at joint meetings involving representatives of the Belarusian Ministry of Defense, the Russian Ministry of Defense, Belarusian Railway (BCh), and the state-owned carrier Belintertrans.

The movement of such a volume of military cargo could not have been improvised. Military train schedules are prepared well in advance. The military transportation authorities of the Ministry of Defense play a key role in organizing such movements, coordinating with the leadership of Belarusian Railway, its transportation service, railway divisions and stations, as well as neighboring railway administrations. This means that Belarusian Railway's administration and the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Belarus had advance information on the number of military trains, the composition of their cargo, unloading points, and arrival schedules. The experience of 2022 demonstrated that Belarusian Railway can rapidly adapt civilian transportation operations to the task of deploying a large military force.

THE PRACTICAL MECHANISM FOR DEPLOYING AND WITHDRAWING TROOPS

The organization of transportation in 2022 covered the entire operational cycle, from the entry of troops into Belarus to their withdrawal. In April 2022, an additional 4,101 empty railcars, including 250 passenger cars, were sent from the Russian Federation to Homiel station for loading and transporting military equipment, ammunition, equipment, supplies, and personnel out of Belarus. A significant portion of the rolling stock was in poor technical condition and required repairs; nevertheless, Belarusian Railway

¹⁸ <https://belzhd.info/news/logistika-vtorzheniya-kto-i-kak-dostavlyal-voynu/>

¹⁹ Letter from the Transport and Logistics Center of Belarusian Railway to the Commercial Court of Moscow

ensured that it was received and incorporated into the transportation process.²⁰

The use of 27 unloading stations made it possible to distribute the flow across several directions rather than creating a single critical point. The largest volumes were handled by Khoyniki, Asipovichy-I (Osipovichy-I), Yelsk, Brest-Uskhodni (Brest-Vostochny), and Rechytsa. This arrangement simultaneously facilitated the movement of units toward areas of concentration, allowed transportation flows to be maneuvered, and made it possible to change routes if restrictions arose on individual sections.

Thus, 2022 was a test of Belarusian Railway's ability not only to receive a Russian military grouping but also to rapidly organize its reverse flow. This required a reserve of rolling stock, the operation of repair facilities, dispatch coordination, coordination with Russian Railways, and centralized management of railway stations. **All of the mechanisms listed are part of the railway's standard operating system and can be reactivated without having to build a new structure from scratch.**

FORCEFUL RESTRUCTURING OF BELARUSIAN RAILWAY CONTROL SYSTEM

Following the 2020 protests over the regime's rigging of the presidential election results and with the outbreak of war in 2022, the regime systematically tightened its security control over the railway. To this end, new positions were introduced into the management structure, and former employees of the KGB, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, border agencies, and other law enforcement agencies were appointed to leadership positions. In 2021, the position of Deputy Head of Belarusian Railway in charge of ensuring the secure operation of enterprises was created. It was filled by Ihar Kazlouski (Igor Kozlovsky), a former officer of the KGB's central headquarters. Similar deputy positions for security were established in all six branches of Belarusian Railway.²¹

By late 2023, the existing system of security and information protection units within Belarusian Railway's central administration

and each of its divisions, whose primary task was to maintain confidentiality, had been significantly strengthened both organizationally and technically. The security departments were granted additional powers and broader oversight capabilities. At the same time, this structure was supplemented by information security units within the Main Information and Settlement Center, a dedicated information security service within Belarusian Railway's central administration, and corresponding personnel at the level of individual railway enterprises. As a result, the security departments, deputy heads of railway divisions responsible for security, the information security service of the central administration, and the information security units of the Main Information and Settlement Center formed an extensive network with access to internal operational information, employees' personal data, and the railway's information systems.²²

Belarusian Railway's General Technical Service occupies a special place within this system. Its responsibilities include organizing military transportation, operational coordination with the Ministry of Defense, KGB, Ministry of Internal Affairs, and other agencies, including Russian Federation structures, preventing acts of terrorism, and coordinating Belarusian Railway's Paramilitary Security Service. In 2024, the service was headed by a former officer of the Ministry of Internal Affairs' Department for Operational and Investigative Activities who had no previous experience working in the railway sector.

The appointment of security personnel to positions related to transportation control, security and information protection, and physical protection serves two purposes at once. First, it ensures unquestioning compliance with orders from military agencies and the regime's senior leadership. Second, it restricts the circle of people with access to information about preparations for military transportation and suppresses any attempts to disclose information about the routes and composition of military trains. In 2022, this was achieved through mass arrests of railway workers and repression against "railway partisans." Today, such control is embedded directly into Belarusian Railway's regular organizational structure.

²⁰ <https://belzhd.info/news/logistika-vtorzheniya-kto-i-kak-dostavlyal-voynu/>

²¹ <https://belzhd.info/news/belorusskaya-zheleznaya-doroga-predpriyatie-lider-po-chislu-silovikov-i-bezopasnikov-v-shtate/>

²² <https://belzhd.info/news/rakovaya-opuhol-poglotila-bzhd-metastazy-kgb-povsyudu/>



► **Figure 15.** The dominance of former security agency personnel within Belarusian Railway

TECHNICAL AND PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF ROUTES

In parallel with personnel restructuring, the technical surveillance system is being expanded. In 2023, 121 Belarusian Railway facilities equipped with 729 video cameras were connected to the National Public Safety Monitoring System. The plan called for increasing the number of connected facilities to 484 and the number of cameras to 2,916. The Ministry of Internal Affairs has access to the system, while the railway bears the costs of designing, installing, and maintaining the equipment.²³

Particular attention is being paid to facilities whose damage could halt traffic along an entire route. Commissions led by the Deputy Chief for Security of Belarusian Railway inspected railway bridges, electrical signaling stations, communications buildings, and technical and service facilities. They assessed the risk of unauthorized access, the functionality of video surveillance systems, and the readiness of responsible personnel. Based on the inspection results, plans were made to install cameras not only on guarded bridges but also on unguarded ones.²⁴

After the war began, the list of strategically important bridges was expanded. Belarusian Railway's Paramilitary Guard was reinforced with 130 riflemen to provide round-the-clock security for 13 bridges. The Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Internal Affairs provided Belarusian Railway with 1,132 Makarov pistols and 76,976 rounds of ammunition for the Paramilitary Security Service units. All of this is in addition to the railway facilities already being connected to the state video surveillance system.²⁵

Formally, these measures are being carried out under the guise of counterterrorism and critical infrastructure protection. However, given the military use of the railway, they ensure the security of routes along which military convoys may travel and allow for the monitoring of unauthorized persons near stations, bridges, and other facilities. The combination of armed guards, video surveillance, access control, and forceful monitoring of personnel creates conditions for the covert and uninterrupted movement of troops.

²³ <https://belzhd.info/news/bezopasnost-net-totalnyj-kontrol-za-lichnostyu-i-za-schet-zheleznodorozhnikov/>

²⁴ <https://belzhd.info/news/glavnyj-bezopasnik-bzhd-otrabatyvaet-uzkie-mesta-mosty/>

²⁵ <https://belzhd.info/news/voprosy-obespecheniya-bezopasnosti-bzhd-obsuzhdalis-na-soveshhanii-u-Lukashenka/>

INFORMATION SECRECY AND PERSONNEL CONTROL

During the 2022 invasion, the secrecy of transport operations was ensured not only by organizational measures taken by Belarusian Railway but also by direct coercive pressure. In the last week of March alone, more than thirty railway workers were detained. Internal troops and special police units were deployed to guard the infrastructure and individual trains, while Belarusian Railway leadership conducted “educational sessions” with employees, threatening them with criminal liability for resistance and for passing on information about the movement of Russian troops.²⁶

In 2022, these measures constituted an emergency response to information leaks and the activities of “railway partisans.” In subsequent years, this control became a permanent feature. The dominance of former security forces within Belarusian Railway, along with regime and information security units, video surveillance, and restricted access to facilities, makes it possible to identify employees with knowledge of transport preparations and monitor their actions even before a train set departs on its route.

Under this system, most railway workers learn about military shipments only within the scope of their specific operations: track preparation, locomotive dispatch, receiving a train, or handing it over to a neighboring section. The overall picture – the number of trains, destination stations, the composition of the convoy, and the timing of the deployment – is concentrated at the Traffic Control Center, military communications agencies, and among a limited circle of senior officials. This allows preparations for the transports to remain hidden until they begin.

INTEGRATION OF MILITARY UNITS INTO TRAFFIC CONTROL

The most significant change has been the permanent deployment of Belarusian Ministry of Defense personnel directly

inside Belarusian Railway's Traffic Control Center (TCC). According to sources from the Community of Railway Workers of Belarus, a group of representatives from military structures has been operating in the Traffic Control Center building for about a year. The group is primarily composed of military transportation authorities of the Ministry of Defense. It also includes representatives of communications, classified information protection, and other support units.

The entire eighth floor of the Transportation Control Center – approximately 600 square meters – has been allocated to the military personnel (Figure 16). The premises have been redesigned, access to the floor is restricted to authorized personnel with special passes, and a 24-hour armed guard post operates at the entrance. The group is estimated to consist of approximately 20–30 people. This is no longer a matter of supporting individual transportation operations but of maintaining a permanent military presence inside the main facility responsible for the operational management of train movements.²⁷


Belarusian Railway's TCC manages the transportation process, coordinating with the branches, stations, and neighboring railway administrations. The deployment of military communications units within this center shortens the chain of approval, reduces the number of personnel involved, and allows the military to participate directly in organizing transportation. This arrangement was established during preparations for the Zapad 2025 exercise. At the same time, the military transportation authorities of Belarus and Russia coordinated on the delivery of Russian personnel, equipment, weapons, and ammunition to the territory of Belarus.²⁸

This means the military component is no longer integrated into the civilian management system only for individual transports. It is now permanently embedded in it. This allows military authorities to quickly change train priorities, determine stations and routes, coordinate with the Russian side, and keep preparations for military transports hidden from most Belarusian Railway employees.

²⁶ <https://belpol.pro/doklad-uchastie-rezhima-Lukashenka-v-rossijskoj-agressii-protiv-ukrainy/>

²⁷ <https://belzhd.info/military-transportation/voennye-zanyali-czelyj-etazh-v-czentre-upravleniya-perevozkami-bzhd/>

²⁸ <https://belzhd.info/military-transportation/v-blizhajshee-vremya-po-bzhd-nachnyotsya-dostavka-rossijskih-voennyh-tehniki-i-vooruzheniya-na-ucheniya-zapad-2025/>



BACKUP TRAFFIC CONTROL CENTERS

In addition to the main Traffic Control Center in Minsk, Belarusian Railway operates a network of backup TCCs. These facilities are scaled-down replicas of the main center and are designed to maintain dispatch control of the transportation process in the event of a complete physical failure of the equipment in the TCC building. According to the Community of Railway Workers of Belarus (CRWB), there are a total of six backup TCCs – one in each railway division. Their locations are classified, and the facilities themselves are camouflaged.²⁹

Before the war, the backup control centers were largely symbolic. Practical training for personnel was limited to occasional drills and familiarization with the backup control consoles. Beginning in March 2022, Belarusian Railway's administration organized operational checks of these facilities, brought previously unused equipment back into service, and assessed the technical condition of workstations and the knowledge of dispatch personnel.

According to additional information from CRWB sources, as of August 1, 2026, the work had gone beyond the scope of periodic inspections. In addition to the backup control center in Kroshyn, preparations and

reactivation are underway at all Belarusian Railway backup centers. Communication channels, dispatcher workstations, power supply, and personnel readiness to switch to the backup control scheme are being checked.

Under normal operating conditions, there is no need to maintain all backup TCCs in operational readiness simultaneously. Their purpose is to maintain traffic control in the event of the destruction, damage, or disruption of the main center. Simultaneous preparation of the entire network means creating a distributed and resilient traffic control system capable of continuing to operate even if the central control point is compromised. In the context of military transportation, this allows for the continued control of convoys, routing, and coordination with the Russian side even if the primary TCC is disrupted.

What matters is not merely the existence of backup facilities but transitioning them from a nominal state to a state of operational readiness. A separate backup control console, to which personnel are granted access only during infrequent training exercises, does not ensure resilient control. Effective deployment requires maintaining the operational readiness of equipment, communications, power supply systems, and hardware and software systems, as well as regularly testing dispatchers' skills. It is precisely these measures that are currently being implemented across the entire Belarusian Railway network.


The placement of backup control centers in each of the six regional offices allows for the continued control of individual sections of the railway even in the event of a loss of communication with Minsk or the physical inaccessibility of the main center. In such a case, dispatching operations, the organization of train movements, the coordination of station activities, and communication with neighboring regional offices can continue at the regional office level. For military transportation, this means maintaining control over the route not only at the central level but also at the regional level.

A permanent military team at the central control center and the simultaneous preparation of all backup centers are components of a single system. The military gains direct access to the active traffic control

²⁹ https://t.me/belzhd_live/2026; additional information from sources within the Community of Railway Workers of Belarus

authority, while the backup network ensures the continuity of its functions in the event of a disruption at the central facility. Taken together, this enhances the resilience of

military logistics, reduces dependence on a single control point, and allows for the secrecy of preparatory activities even during a crisis or the onset of hostilities.



▶ **Figure 17.** Network of railway traffic control centers of Belarusian Railway

DEVELOPMENT OF MILITARY INFRASTRUCTURE

In parallel with the changes to the command and control system, railway facilities are being built and modernized across Belarus to receive military trains, serve ammunition storage bases, and support new military production facilities.

On the site of the former Krychaw-6 (Krichev-6) airbase, under the guise of constructing a “logistics center,” a railway complex has been built to serve the needs of a Russian military facility. It includes eight tracks for various purposes, loading and unloading

infrastructure, and a separate junction – the “245 km Track Post.” The turnouts are equipped with an electric signaling system, and control is possible both from the Krychaw station and from the Belarusian Railway Traffic Control Center. This arrangement allows railcars to be routed directly into the restricted area and unloaded without using public station yards.³⁰

In late December 2025, a military train consisting of 61 railcars carrying Russian military equipment, gear, and ammunition arrived at the facility. The railcars were routed from the Krychaw-I station into the territory of the former airbase via shunting maneuvers.

³⁰ <https://belzhd.info/military-transportation/krichev-6-%C2%ABlogisticheskij-czentr%C2%BB-dlya-nuzhd-ministerstva-oborony-rf/>

As of mid-May 2026, no return shipments of the delivered equipment and property had been recorded. However, no confirmation was received regarding the delivery of the launchers and missiles for the Oreshnik system.³¹

Belarusian Railway also prepared the infrastructure to support the new production of artillery and rocket ammunition at the Hull Products Plant [ZAO Zavod korpusnykh izdeliy] in the Slutsk District. Instead of building a track directly to the plant, a special loading and unloading ramp was constructed near the Navadvortsy (Novodvortsy) station. From there, explosives, ammunition components, and finished products will be transported by road over a distance of more than 40 kilometers. The ramp was constructed by OAO Dorstroyontazhtrest, a part of the Belarusian Railway system.³²

A more substantial facility is being built near the 1405th Artillery Ammunition Depot in the vicinity of the village of Vialikaya Harozha (Bolshaya Gorozha) in the Asipovichy District. On the Asipovichy-2-Elizava (Osipovichy-2-Elizovo) section, a new junction is effectively being built, featuring a receiving and dispatch track at least 1,050 meters long, as well as access, passing, and loading/unloading tracks. The project includes electrically controlled switches and the capability for dispatcher control. By late December 2025, construction was in its final stages.

Krychaw-6, the ramp near Navadvortsy, and the railway complex in Vialikaya Harozha demonstrate that this is not a matter of isolated construction projects but rather a systematic expansion of infrastructure for receiving troops, storing and transporting ammunition, and servicing new military production facilities.

MILITARY TRANSPORTATION AFTER 2022

After the withdrawal of the northern invasion grouping, Belarusian Railway's use for military purposes did not cease. The volume

and nature of the transportation changed: instead of the one-time deployment of a large offensive grouping, the railway is now primarily used for targeted deliveries of weapons and ammunition, the movement of units to training grounds, the transportation of equipment, fuel, and other materiel, as well as the supply of Russian military facilities in Belarus.

In 2024, 216 railcars carrying military cargo were delivered from Russia to Belarus by rail. Of these, 161 railcars were bound for missile and artillery arsenals, air force ammunition storage bases, and warehouses. The remaining 55 railcars carried radar equipment, anti-aircraft missile systems, military equipment, and spare parts. The recipients were ten Belarusian military units.

At the same time, Belarus continued to supply the Russian military. In the summer of 2024, 94 open railcars carrying missile armaments for anti-aircraft missile systems and five escort railcars were dispatched from the 1562nd Detached Anti-Aircraft Repair and Technical Base near Asipovichy to the 23rd Arsenal of the Main Missile and Artillery Directorate of the Russian Ministry of Defense. The delivery took place in five separate groups under tight security.³³

MAINTAINING THE CAPABILITY FOR ORGANIZED TROOP DEPLOYMENT

In August–September 2025, six military convoys were deployed as part of the Zapad-2025 exercise and the CSTO exercises Vzaimodeystviye 2025, Poisk 2025, and Echelon 2025. Units from the 2nd Guards Motorized Rifle Division, the 4th Guards Tank Division, the 333rd Combat Training Center of the Russian Armed Forces, and the 98th Guards Airborne Division were transported by rail.³⁴

The scale of these transports was significantly smaller than before the 2022 invasion. However, volume alone is not the only factor crucial for assessing the system's readiness. Belarusian Railway

31 <https://belzhd.info/military-transportation/krichev-6-%C2%ABlogisticheskij-czentr%C2%BB-dlya-nuzhd-ministerstva-oborony-rf/>

32 <https://belzhd.info/military-transportation/zheleznodorozhnye-postavki-vooruzheniya-iz-rossii-v-belarus-dannye-za-iv-kvartal-i-itogi-2024-goda/>

33 <https://belzhd.info/military-transportation/po-zheleznoj-dorogi-iz-belarusi-osushchestvlyalsya-vyvoz-boepripasov-na-atakovannye-arsenaly-v-rossii/>

34 <https://belzhd.info/military-transportation/voinskie-perevozki-po-belorusskoj-zheleznoj-doroge-vo-ii-iii-kvartalah-2025-goda/>

once again ensured intergovernmental coordination, the allocation of railcars, the formation of trains, their passage, unloading, support for the units, and their subsequent return. Consequently, the organizational mechanism for transporting Russian units remains operational and is regularly tested in practice.

In 2025, the recorded volume of military transportation from Russia to Belarus amounted to 764 railcars. In the opposite direction, 1,154 railcars were transported. The inbound flow included Belarusian units returning from training grounds in Russia, Russian units arriving for exercises, weapons, ammunition, specialized equipment, and other materiel. From September to December, 168 railcars were sent from Belarusian arsenals and storage bases to Russian Main Missile and Artillery Directorate arsenals, including 157 railcars carrying explosive materials.³⁵

By quarter in 2025, the incoming flow was distributed as follows: 53 railcars in the first quarter, 488 railcars in the second and third quarters combined, and 223 railcars in the fourth quarter. In the opposite direction, 182, 697, and 275 railcars were dispatched, respectively. The highest volume occurred between April and September – a period marked by the transportation of units to training grounds, the conduct of joint exercises, the return of military units, and the execution of targeted military deliveries.

In January–April 2026, the only shipment from Russia to Belarus consisted of 20 tank cars carrying diesel fuel to a Russian radio-technical facility. In the opposite direction, 219 railcars were shipped: 126 railcars carrying products from the Minsk Wheel Tractor Plant [OAO Minskiy zavod kolesnyh tyagachey, OAO MZKT], 76 open railcars carrying reinforced concrete products from OAO Spetszhelezobeton, and 17 railcars carrying other military cargo. By month, outbound shipments totaled 81 railcars in January, 62 in February, 53 in March, and 23 in April. No organized trains carrying military units, weapons, or ammunition were detected in the inbound direction during this period.

A decrease in the number of military trains during a specific period does not indicate a decline in infrastructure readiness. The current traffic consists primarily of targeted deliveries of defense-related products and supplies to military facilities. If necessary, this same dispatch, station, and interstate system can be switched to transporting military units, as was already done during the 2025 exercises.

The statistics presented show that after 2022, the railway did not return to exclusively civilian use. Belarusian Railway continues to fulfill the tasks of Russian–Belarusian military logistics, and its management system and infrastructure are being progressively adapted to a more closed and centralized organization of transportation.

2.3 Development of Military Infrastructure for the Union State's Joint Military Grouping

BELPOL has documentary evidence that the integration of Belarusian and Russian military components and infrastructure into a shared space with common military objectives is ongoing. Within this space, Belarus serves as the first echelon. Fuel, ammunition, and other materiel are being stockpiled in Belarus and Russia, while military facilities intended to support the joint force grouping are being reconstructed.

Available data indicate that over the past several years, stocks of materiel, weapons, and ammunition have been moved and redistributed within Belarus, as well as supplied from Russia to the arsenals of the Belarusian Ministry of Defense.

For example, ammunition and materiel are being moved from arsenal storage facilities near the Ukrainian border to locations farther toward central Belarus.

³⁵ <https://belzhd.info/military-transportation/voinskie-perevozki-zheleznodorozhnym-transportom-mezhdu-belarusyu-i-rossiej-itogi-2025-goda-i-obyomy-v-yanvare%E2%80%9393aprele-2026-goda/>



► **Figure 18.** Reconstruction of the tank farm for storing strategic fuel reserves for the Regional Force Grouping. Pochinok, Smolensk Region

CONCLUSIONS

1. The build-up of Belarus's military infrastructure is determined not by national interests but by Russian interests. At the same time, this infrastructure is being gradually integrated into Russia's military structure.
2. Belarus is creating the technical conditions for maintaining a state of martial law through strict and sustained controls.

THE REGIME PLACES PARTICULAR EMPHASIS ON MILITARY TRANSPORTATION

The example of Belarusian Railway allows the following conclusions to be drawn:

1. In 2022, Belarusian Railway demonstrated its ability to rapidly facilitate the movement and deployment of a large Russian military grouping. This experience has been incorporated into the system for planning military transportation and coordinating Belarusian Railway with military transportation authorities.
2. Since the outbreak of the war, Belarusian Railway's management structure has been staffed with former employees of the KGB, Ministry of Internal Affairs, border agencies, and other security structures. The resulting chain of command provides control over personnel, internal information, information systems, and compliance with orders from military agencies.
3. Armed protection of strategic bridges, expanded video surveillance, access-control measures, and oversight of critical infrastructure simultaneously protect military train routes and prevent monitoring of their movements.
4. The permanent presence of military transportation authorities and other military units in Belarusian Railway's main Traffic Control Center amounts to the de facto integration of military personnel into the operational management of railway traffic. This reduces the time required to coordinate transportation and limits the number of people with access to information about it.
5. The reopening and preparation of all six backup Traffic Control Centers creates a distributed management system capable of maintaining operational control over railway traffic and military transportation if the main center in Minsk is damaged or blocked.
6. The creation of restricted railway infrastructure at Krychaw-6 and the preparation of other facilities make it possible to receive and unload military trains away from public railway stations. This significantly increases the secrecy of preparations and troop deployments.
7. Regular transportation of units to joint exercises, as well as sustained deliveries of military products, confirms that mechanisms for interstate coordination, the formation of military trains, and their passage through the railway network continue to be used in practice.

Part 3.

MILITARIZATION OF THE ECONOMY

3.1 New Defense Production Facilities and the Use of Belarusian Industrial Capacity for Russia's State Defense Orders

The supply of weapons and ammunition to Russia is one of the factors keeping some Belarusian enterprises afloat, as well as a major source of job growth and maintaining wages at an acceptable level. At the same time, new areas of weapons production are developing rapidly.

Several regions of Belarus have to some extent addressed the problems of unemployment and unprofitable enterprises. One example is the Orsha District in the Vitsebsk Region, one of Belarus's economically depressed areas. The region's development program essentially consists of a series of projects aimed at developing defense-related production.

Alongside the State Authority for Military Industry, the Ministry of Industry plays an active role in the militarization of the economy, serving as a key driver of this process.

The summary of a speech by Belarus's Deputy Prime Minister Viktor Karankevich,³⁶ approved by Deputy Minister of Industry Aliaksei Kazlou (Aleksei Kozlov), shows that the government of Belarus secured a Russian loan to organize the production of components for 122-mm rocket projectiles at the Legmash Plant [OAO Zavod Legmash] and 152-mm artillery shells at the Minsk Bearing Plant [OAO Minsk podshipnikovyi zavod]. Under the plan, the ammunition components were to be purchased for at least five years. As production was being established, Legmash was transferred from the Ministry of Industry to the State Authority for Military Industry, along with a substantial shareholding in the company.

The sale of rocket projectile components proved profitable. Legmash made a dramatic leap

forward from being a lagging enterprise. By 2025, the number of employees had increased nearly threefold compared to 2022.

The document cited also proves that the Russian Ministry of Defense was persistently urged to purchase MAZ trucks produced by the Minsk Automobile Plant [OAO Minskij avtomobilnyj zavod].

To boost sales of its products, BelOMO [Belarusian Optical and Mechanical Organization, OAO MMZ imeni S.I. Vavilova Upravlyayushchaya Kompaniya Kholdinga BelOMO], the largest manufacturer of sights, organized special demonstrations for the Chief of the Main Missile and Artillery Directorate of the Russian Ministry of Defense.

The Belarusian Ministry of Industry is a key driver of military-related exports to Russia. The volume of deliveries of electro-optical sights and other military optics is particularly striking.

In 2024 alone, a total of 105,161 various types of sights, rangefinders, monoculars, and other products were supplied to the Russian Ministry of Defense. In gross volume, this was 40 times higher than in 2023.

MAZ vehicles, as well as tankers manufactured by the Hrodna Mechanical Plant [OAO Grodnenskiy mehanicheskij zavod], were also shipped to the Russian Federation. According to the relevant report, at least 200 tankers were shipped in 2024.

The notes from a speech by Deputy Prime Minister Karankevich⁴⁰ convey a clear message: they signal to Russian counterparts that Belarusian enterprises have unused production capacity.

³⁶ Key points from the speech by Karankevich, Deputy Prime Minister of Belarus

For example, the notes state that the Vitsebsk Plant of Electrical Measuring Instruments [OAO Vitebskij zavod elektroizmeritelnyh priborov] successfully fulfilled orders in the interests of Russia's state defense procurement program without any disruptions. Moreover, the document directly indicates that the plant has 30% of its production capacity unused, which could be used to strengthen Russia's military potential.

The document makes clear that key enterprises under the Belarusian Ministry of Industry are ready to meet Russia's state defense procurement needs with their products.

The concluding section of the notes is particularly revealing.

First, the Belarusian Ministry of Industry is prepared, at a minimum, to maintain current production volumes of military-related goods for Russia.

Second, the Belarusian Ministry of Industry explicitly emphasizes its interest in expanding defense production for Russia and is prepared to fully utilize machine-building enterprises to meet the needs of the Russian defense industry.

Third, the Ministry of Industry informs the Russian side that Belarus has enterprises with unused production capacity that could be used to manufacture what the document calls "special-purpose" products.

There can be no doubt that Belarus is ready to support the aggressor with all its might and resources.

The assignment given to Belarusian Defense Minister Khrenin for his trip to Moscow³⁷ on October 17, 2024, and the rationale for the Belarusian Prime Minister's order regarding Khrenin's trip³⁸ leave us no doubt that its purpose was to intensify the strategic partnership in military and technical cooperation, taking into account the needs of the Russian Armed Forces.

Both documents state that one of the objectives of the trip was to **"discuss issues related to the production of highly demanded types of weapons, military and special equipment in the interests of the special military operation."**

The next document is dated September 23, 2024. It is a letter signed by Deputy Chairman of the Belarusian State Authority for Military Industry Viachaslau Rassalai (Vyacheslav Rossolai).³⁹ The Authority urgently requests, via this letter, that its enterprises report the quantity of products ready for delivery starting in 2025 to Region 790. In the Authority's designation system, the number 790 is assigned to the Russian Federation.

On February 16, 2026, BELPOL published a list⁴⁰ of 120 Belarusian companies working to fulfill the Russian Federation's state defense orders. This list is supported by documentary evidence. Another list is currently being prepared for publication. The list includes such leading companies of the Belarusian economy as Belaz [OAO BELAZ], the Minsk Bearing Plant, and others.

It is telling that some Belarusian enterprises are no longer able to conduct their economic activities without funding from Russian state defense contracts. For example, consider a letter from the General Director of the Minsk Wheel Tractor Plant [MZKT] to the Head of the Russian Defense Ministry's Directorate of Military Representatives.⁴¹ MZKT is subordinate to the Belarusian State Authority for Military Industry.

The plant's Director writes of a significant decline in orders for automotive equipment from the Russian Ministry of Defense. Under these circumstances, the plant has made efforts to utilize its production capacity with products intended for civilian consumption. However, it has not been possible to offset the decline in production profitability. The company's only chance to stay afloat is to retain Russian state defense orders. To this end, due to delays in payments for military products supplied to Russia, the enterprise

³⁷ Assignment for Belarusian Defense Minister Khrenin's trip to Moscow

³⁸ Rationale for the Belarusian Prime Minister's order sending Khrenin to Moscow

³⁹ Letter from Rassalai, Deputy Chairman of the Belarusian State Authority for Military Industry

⁴⁰ <https://belpol.pro/kto-v-belarusi-pomogaet-rossijskoj-agressii/>

⁴¹ Letter from the General Director of the Minsk Wheel Tractor Plant (MZKT) to the Head of the Russian Defense Ministry's Directorate of Military Representatives

continues to incur losses associated with taking out loans and bearing unplanned expenses to purchase components and materials needed to fulfill defense contracts. This demonstrates that, for the enterprise, even these costs pose a far smaller threat than losing Russia's state defense procurement contracts.

The letter also leads to another conclusion: the majority of Belarusian enterprises are overseen by Russian Ministry of Defense military representative offices. These offices supervise the production of goods and compile reports and catalogs on the production capabilities of Belarusian enterprises in relation to potential Russian defense contracts.

Two Russian Ministry of Defense military representative offices are based in Belarus: Military Representative Office No. 1281 and Military Representative Office No. 363. The military representative offices are divided into groups, each responsible for specific enterprises under the Belarusian State Authority for Military Industry and the Ministry of Industry. These assignments are made in accordance with a list maintained by the Russian Ministry of Defense.

For example, Military Representative Office No. 363 is responsible for the following enterprises: the Minsk Wheel Tractor Plant [MZKT]; the Minsk Automobile Plant [OAO Minskij avtomobilnyj zavod – upravlyayushaya kompaniya holdinga BELAVTOMAZ]; and even Volat-Sanjiang, 50% of which is owned by the China Space Sanjiang Group.

The main functions of the Russian Ministry of Defense military representative offices in Belarus include:

- ▶ quality control of products manufactured for Russia's state defense procurement programs;
- ▶ preventing disruptions to deadlines for fulfilling Russia's state defense procurement contracts;
- ▶ verifying the cost calculations for products manufactured by supervised enterprises;
- ▶ handling claims concerning products supplied under Russia's state defense procurement programs;
- ▶ overseeing research and development work carried out in the interests of the Russian Ministry of Defense's state defense procurement programs.

Military representative offices have established staffing structures that include both Russian Armed Forces personnel and civilian employees.

The military representative offices have information on the full range of products manufactured by the enterprises under their supervision and maintain and regularly update records on these enterprises. One example is the enterprise record card for the Agat Electromechanical Plant [OAO Agat – elektromekhanicheskij zavod].⁴² It was compiled by Military Representative Office No. 1281 of the Russian Ministry of Defense and contains basic information about the enterprise, including a brief biography of the director.

Scientific institutions in Belarus are also registered with the military representative offices. One example is the A.N. Sevchenko Institute of Applied Physical Problems of the Belarusian State University.⁴³ This Belarusian research institution participates in research and development projects for Russia that are overseen by its military representative offices. For example, the institute is carrying out work for the S.P. Korolev Rocket and Space Corporation Energia [Raketno-kosmicheskaya korporaciya Energiya imeni S.P. Korolyova] on the development of an orientation system for the Sova-2 video-spectral equipment used on Russian satellites.⁴⁴

Belarus is currently implementing plans to localize ammunition production within the country. The project is large-scale and represents a new development. Previously, Belarus had no production facilities for shell and rocket components, nor did it have industrial production of explosive chemicals and propellants.

The facility that will produce fully assembled 152 mm artillery rounds and 122 mm rockets

⁴² Record card of the Agat Electromechanical Plant

⁴³ Record card of the A.N. Sevchenko Institute of Applied Physical Problems of the Belarusian State University

⁴⁴ Letter and Agreement between the S.P. Korolev Rocket and Space Corporation Energia and the A.N. Sevchenko Institute of Applied Physical Problems regarding the implementation of the joint portion of the experimental design and development work

will be located near Slutsk, Minsk Region. Construction is being carried out covertly and is expected to be completed in early 2027. The regime plans to integrate some Belarusian enterprises into the project that already manufacture ammunition components and supply them to Russia. Most of these enterprises are under the Belarusian Ministry of Industry.

In its investigation,⁴⁵ BELPOL revealed all the information about this facility and provided the necessary documentary evidence.

Among the Belarusian companies involved in ammunition production are the Belarusian

Steel Works [OAO BMZ – upravlyayushaya kompaniya holdinga BMK], BAZtube [OOO BAZtyub], Legmash, Belaz, the Homiel Foundry and Standard Parts Plant [OAO Gomelskij zavod litya i normalej], the Barysau Plant of Automotive and Tractor Electrical Equipment [OAO Borisovskij zavod avtotraktornogo elektrooborudovaniya], the Precision Electromechanics Plant [RPUP Zavod tochnoj elektromehaniki], the Minsk Motor Plant [OAO Upravlyayushaya kompaniya holdinga Minskij motornyj zavod], Diaproektor [OAO Rogachevskij zavod Diaproektor], Termoplast [OAO Minskij zavod Termoplast], and the Smarhon Optical Machine Tool Plant [OAO Smorgonskij zavod opticheskogo stankostroeniya].




Figure 19. Belarusian companies involved in the production of sights for the Russian Armed Forces

However, these are not the only statistics regarding the participation of Belarusian enterprises in fulfilling Russian state defense contracts. Another investigation by BELPOL⁴⁶ shows that, for example, approximately 50 Belarusian companies of various ownership structures are involved in the production of sights for armored vehicles and small arms.

But returning to the production of ammunition, it should be noted that the regime has thought through every detail and direction of this industry, which is new to Belarus.

Establishing this type of production would not have been possible without recognizing that, sooner or later, Belarus would need to develop the technologies required to produce explosives

and propellants, as well as identify sources of raw materials for them. The Belarusian Ministry of Industry and State Authority for Military Industry were tasked with this.

To address this challenge, companies such as Bellessbumprom (the state forestry and wood-processing concern), Belneftekhim (the state petrochemical concern), and even Bellegprom (the state light industry concern) were brought in. In particular, one of its enterprises, the Orsha Linen Mill [RUP Orshanskij Inokombinat], was being considered as a source of material for propellant production, using specially processed flax.

Specialists from the Institute of Chemistry of New Materials of the National Academy of Sciences of

⁴⁵ <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UCZHSxnQgQw&t=2330s>

⁴⁶ <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eAc1S4zhFIk&t=2850s>

Belarus and the Belarusian State Technological University were also brought in to address this task. To study Russian expertise, specialists from these organizations visited the State Research Institute of Chemical Products in Kazan, Russia.

In 2024, preparations began for recruiting students to the Belarusian State Technological University and for developing curricula for the specialty “Chemical Technology of Energy-Dense Materials and Products.” It includes two specialized tracks: “Technology of Gunpowder, Solid Rocket Fuels, and Products” and “Technology of Explosives and Products.” The first intake of students for these programs took place in 2025.⁴⁷

If plans to acquire chemical components or to purchase technology and equipment for the production of explosives and gunpowder are implemented, Belarus will be able to produce ammunition as early as 2027.

Belarus considers Russia, China, Iran, and Pakistan to be the main potential suppliers of explosive components and gunpowder. Negotiations are underway with all of these countries. Documentary evidence of this was provided in the BELPOL investigation.²⁷

The figure below shows a scheme of the companies’ involvement in the production of 122-mm rocket projectiles. The scheme indicates existing and prospective production links.



► **Figure 20.** Production scheme for 122 mm rockets and the Belarusian companies involved

Given the significant changes in the tactics for using weapons on the battlefield, Belarus has also joined efforts to establish production facilities for unmanned aerial vehicles and systems.⁴⁸

Many unmanned systems have already been adopted by the Armed Forces of Belarus. At the same time, Belarusian companies are actively seeking buyers abroad.

One of the most dynamic companies promoting its products in foreign markets is KB Unmanned Helicopters [OOO KB Bepilotnye vertolety] and its subsidiary, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles [ZAO Bepilotnye letatelnye apparaty]. The company’s successful development has been facilitated by the regime’s support for this sector and its lobbying on behalf of companies of this kind. For example, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles was granted, by Lukashenka’s personal order,⁴⁹ the

right to purchase a plot of land in central Minsk through its expropriation from the existing owner, for the production of Mirotvorets strike drones. The company also benefits from loans provided by the Development Bank and funding from the Belarusian Innovation Fund. It has received other benefits as well, including deferrals on principal and interest payments on loans. Under such conditions, it is virtually impossible for any other enterprise in Belarus to develop on an equal footing.

Work is currently underway with the Indian Armed Forces’ Regiment of Artillery to supply six sets of Mirotvorets strike unmanned aerial vehicle systems, complete with 106 strike UAVs. The transaction is being conducted through Belspetsvneshtekhnika, a state-owned special trade agency. Alongside the development of the drones, ammunition for them is also being designed and manufactured.

⁴⁷ <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JCvTXq0Yi-g>

⁴⁸ Album: Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Systems of Belarus

⁴⁹ Lukashenka’s Order on the Expropriation of Land for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles

Seven Belarusian companies and organizations directly involved in the development and production of combat drones are participating in efforts to develop unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Among them is the National Academy of Sciences of Belarus. Around ten other organizations and companies are involved in developing munitions for combat drones.

There is reliable information⁵⁰ indicating that products from the 588th Aircraft Repair Plant [OAO 588 Aviacionnyj remontnyj zavod] were tested by the Russian Armed Forces in Ukraine. This concerns the Chekan strike drone. Amid the failure of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the 588th Aircraft Repair Plant, acting with urgency and removing all indications that the Chekan UAV was manufactured by the plant, delivered a batch of drones to the Russian Ministry of Defense on June 9, 2022.

The regime is also pursuing cooperation with Iran in areas beyond ammunition production. UAVs are another area of cooperation.

On April 27, 2024, representatives of Iran's Malek Ashtar University of Technology visited the National Academy of Sciences of Belarus.


Following the visit, the parties signed a cooperation protocol.⁵¹ A substantial portion of the proposed areas of cooperation

concerns dual-use technologies and UAV-related technologies. The areas of joint work included:

- ▶ developing and implementing a video navigation or visual odometry system based on a neural network algorithm;
- ▶ cooperation on the supply of eight-channel navigation systems with protection against jamming and spoofing;
- ▶ cooperation on providing equipment for testing UAV hardware and weapons;
- ▶ cooperation on the development of laser target-designation systems;
- ▶ development of UAV swarm methods and algorithms.

The subject matter of these areas of cooperation leaves little doubt that the regime in Belarus intended to exchange expertise with the regime in Iran on the development of combat drones.

Belarus has also adopted a program to develop and put into production solid-fuel rocket engines for rockets and rocket-propelled projectiles of various calibers, including for the Polonez multiple launch rocket system. Belarus has modernized the ground-based component of the system and begun establishing domestic production of its own rockets.



▶ **Figure 21.** Polonez multiple launch rocket system. Photo from the product's technical specifications

⁵⁰ <https://belpol.pro/bespilotniki-kotoryh-nikto-ne-videl/>

⁵¹ Cooperation Protocol between Iran's Malek Ashtar University of Technology and the National Academy of Sciences of Belarus

For this purpose, three test ranges have been designed for testing solid-fuel rocket engines for rockets of various calibers. Construction is now nearly complete.

The figure below shows one of the test ranges for 301 mm rocket engines for the Polonez MLRS, located near Dziarzhynsk, Minsk Region.




Figure 22. Test range for the engines of the Polonez MLRS rockets

The primary developer of the engine is the Plant of Precision Electromechanics. At the same time, the Belarusian State Authority for Military Industry expects the products to be in demand on foreign markets as well.

The chemical components required for the rocket engine development programs have already arrived in Belarus from China. These include ammonium perchlorate and a binder material – rubber. The customer for these components is one of the participants in the rocket engine development program, the Research Institute of Pulse Processes with Experimental Production (Russia). The supplier of the components is Capital Sunrise International Inc. (China). The deliveries are documented by CMR waybills.^{52,53}

In addition to heavy weaponry, Belarus is also developing small-arms production. To this end, the Belarusian State Authority for Military Industry is exploring the purchase of equipment and technology for manufacturing small-arms barrels. Under the project,

codenamed Aist, Kidma Tech [OAO Kidma Tek] (Minsk) is expected to establish production of small-arms barrels.

The production line is expected to have a capacity of 15,000 barrels per year. The primary export markets are expected to be the Middle East, Central and East Asia, and Africa.

This work is being carried out by Belvneshpromservice and the Iranian Defense Industries Organization (DIO). Since 2023, negotiations have been underway on the supply to Belarus of a specialized set of production equipment meeting the required technical specifications, together with complete technical and process documentation.

Kidma Tech is just one of several companies subordinate to the Belarusian State Authority for Military Industry, which continues its efforts to secure Russian state defense procurement orders for Belarusian enterprises.

⁵² CMR Waybill No. 10343

⁵³ CMR Waybill No. 11189

For example, on July 30, 2026, Belarusian State Authority for Military Industry Chairman Dzmitry Pantus held another working meeting with the CEO of Russia's Rosoboronexport. The meeting focused on implementing

existing defense contracts, strengthening ties between the two countries' defense enterprises, and exploring potential areas of cooperation in military research and development.


3.2 Militarization of Research Institutions

To support military research and development projects, the regime is mobilizing Belarusian scientific institutions.

The figure below shows a range of unmanned aerial vehicles developed by the Scientific and Production Center for Multifunctional Unmanned Systems [RUP Nauchno-proizvodstvennyj centr mnogofunkcionalnyh bespilotnyh kompleksov]. Almost all of the unmanned aerial systems developed by the center have military or dual-use applications. Its product range covers all types of unmanned aerial vehicles, including kamikaze

strike drones, reusable strike drones, reconnaissance drones, and even a carrier for strike drones, such as the Burevestnik MK.

The Laboratory for the Disposal of Conventional Munitions and the Study of Explosive Material Properties, a scientific division of the State Scientific and Production Association of Powder Metallurgy, develops the munitions. The Center for the Disposal of Airborne Weapons, which is subordinate to the State Scientific and Production Association of Powder Metallurgy, handles their serial production.



► **Figure 23.** Range of combat strike and reconnaissance drones developed by the Scientific and Production Center for Multifunctional Unmanned Systems

The screenshot below shows Aliaksandr Illiushchanka (Aleksandr Ilyushchenko), Director General of the O.V. Roman Powder Metallurgy Institute [GNU Institut poroshkovo metallurgii imeni akademika O.V. Romana], demonstrating warheads for

the Mirotvorets and Chekan UAVs, as well as a fuze for an unguided aircraft rocket. All of these items were developed and manufactured by scientific institutions, and they represent only a small part of the work they carry out.



The National Academy of Sciences' UAV catalog⁵⁴ includes the full range of unmanned systems developed by the Scientific and Production Center for Multifunctional Unmanned Systems. The vast majority are military-purpose UAVs. To promote UAV development projects, the National Academy of Sciences has established the

Main National Cluster for Unmanned and Light Aviation.

As the photographs show, civilian scientists and heads of scientific institutions are wearing military uniforms. This illustrates the essence of the ongoing process: even Belarusian science has been mobilized in the interests of war.

CONCLUSIONS

1. The production of weapons for Russia involves enterprises under both the Belarusian State Authority for Military Industry and the Ministry of Industry.
2. Senior Belarusian officials are actively involved in organizing weapons supplies to Russia.
3. Lukashenka and his inner circle are reliable and active accomplices of Russia in its war of aggression.

⁵⁴ UAV catalog of the National Academy of Sciences

Part 4.

CHANGES TO BELARUSIAN LEGISLATION AIMED AT PREPARING FOR WAR

4.1 Interstate Agreements and the Loss of Belarus's Military Sovereignty

The de facto date of Belarus's loss of military sovereignty should be considered February 24, 2022, when Russian troops invaded Ukraine from Belarusian territory. This was subsequently formalized through agreements and other documents signed with Russia.

In December 2022, in an expedited process at Minsk National Airport, the defense ministers of Belarus and Russia signed a protocol amending the 1997 Agreement between Belarus and Russia on joint provision of regional security in the defense sphere.

The amendments effectively legalized the presence of Russian military formations and military infrastructure facilities in Belarus under the guise of the "Russian component of the regional grouping of troops." Both their routine activities and combat operations were authorized. At the same time, the Russian and Belarusian defense ministries were granted the right, by mutual agreement, to organize and operate the so-called "regional grouping" of troops in a manner different from that originally established by the Agreement.

The amended Agreement introduced the terms "region," "regional military security," and "regional grouping of troops (forces)." In effect, it establishes at the interstate level Belarus's role as the first echelon of the regional grouping of troops.

The definition of the "regional grouping of troops" set out in the Agreement states that it is intended to repel aggression **under a unified plan and operational concept.**

Under military doctrine, the deployment of a military formation or force in a particular area of operations determines its tasks, objectives, and role. As noted above, Belarus clearly forms part of the first echelon of the joint grouping, carrying out a specific task within the Kremlin's broader strategic plan.

If Belarus and Russia were to enter a war, Lukashenka, despite being the so-called Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Belarus, would be little more than a figurehead, while command of the Belarusian Armed Forces would be exercised from the command post of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces. In other words, within the joint command structure of the Russian and Belarusian General Staffs, the Belarusian General Staff would be subordinate to its Russian counterpart. A unified operational plan cannot be implemented through two independent command centers.

The same applies to the Belarusian Ministry of Defense's communications system. Within a joint system, its fixed and field networks would form part of the Russian system. Under established military principles, the relative seniority of communications nodes is determined by the seniority of the command posts they serve.

The current situation is a catastrophe for Belarus.

The first echelon is precisely where the heaviest losses are sustained. It is also the area where settlements suffer the greatest damage, civilian casualties are highest, and infrastructure faces the most extensive

destruction. The cities and towns of eastern Ukraine provide a clear example.

Based on the above, another definition contained in the Agreement also requires consideration and analysis: “regional military security.” According to the Agreement, this means a state of military and political affairs in the region in which the **national and common interests** of the Union of Belarus and Russia **are guaranteed protection** from potential and actual military threats. In reality, Belarus entering the war on Russia’s side and the resulting escalation of the conflict in Europe would, rather than protecting Belarus’s national interests, **guarantee a national catastrophe for Belarus**. For Russia, meanwhile, it would provide a buffer zone in the form of Belarus, extending approximately 250 to 500 kilometers in depth depending on the direction.

To reinforce this point, consider one example.

Like hundreds of officers who graduated from the Command and Staff Faculty (now the Faculty of the General Staff), current Defense Minister Khrenin completed a first-year training exercise, “A Mechanized Brigade in Defense,” within the area of

responsibility of the Western Operational Command. The exercise scenario included preparatory measures such as blowing up the dam of the Zelva Reservoir to flood routes accessible to tanks, as well as creating minefields and setting fires in protected landscape areas to impede the movement of enemy forces. The man-made disaster at Ukraine’s Kakhovka Reservoir illustrates how such plans could potentially be put into practice.

In addition, in March 2023, Belarus and Russia signed the Agreement on the Establishment and Operation of Joint Combat Training Centers. Under the agreement, Belarus provides Russian personnel at these training centers, free of charge, with real estate, engineering and airfield infrastructure, electricity and heating, other utilities, food, fuel and lubricants, and medical care. The agreement also **permits Belarusian military personnel** at these joint training and combat centers **to wear Russian military uniforms and insignia**.

In December 2024, Lukashenko and Putin signed the Treaty on Security Guarantees within the Union State. This treaty effectively put a definitive end to the process of surrendering Belarus’s military sovereignty.

4.2 Changes to Belarusian Legislation and Their Objectives

On February 27, 2022, a referendum on amendments to the Constitution was held in Belarus.

This was a deliberate step by the regime, carried out through yet another crime: the falsification of the referendum results.

The new constitutional provisions fundamentally altered the future of Belarus. Among the amendments, the most damaging were:

1. Abandonment of neutrality.
2. Abandonment of non-nuclear status.
3. Preservation of “historical memory.”

The first provision established the right of Belarus to join military alliances.

It should be noted that, in the Lukashenko regime’s lawmaking practice, it is common to commit unlawful acts and violations of the Constitution and laws of Belarus, and then subsequently enshrine those actions in law. A striking example is the regime’s violation of Belarus’s fundamental law, the Constitution. On February 24, 2022, the Lukashenko regime violated the constitutional provision affirming Belarus’s aspiration to remain neutral.

Yet even under the new Constitution, which entered into force on March 15, 2022, the regime continued to violate the Constitution. The new Constitution stipulated that Belarus would not allow military aggression against other states to be launched from its territory.

The second provision effectively allowed the country to become a potential target for nuclear weapons.

The third elevated “historical memory” to an absolute and fundamental principle of Belarusian society, focusing on the past rather than the future. The entire centuries-long history of Belarus was reduced to a relatively short period known as the “Great Patriotic War” (the Soviet term for the Eastern Front of World War II). Sacrifice in war, including the willingness to give one’s life for supposedly higher ideals, became a central narrative in the upbringing of a new generation and a foundation for propaganda aimed at preparing society for a future war.

One important point must be emphasized: the constitutional amendments adopted in 2022 did not reflect the will of the Belarusian people. The referendum, like all other voting campaigns conducted in Belarus, was falsified. BELPOL exposed how the regime’s unprecedented election-falsification machine operates in its report “On Readiness of the Electoral Fraud System in the 2025 Presidential Election in Belarus.”⁵⁵

This example directly demonstrates that Lukashenka is not a guarantor of independence in the region. The crime of referendum falsification committed by his regime created yet another serious problem for European security: the deployment of nuclear weapons on Belarusian territory.

The documents signed between Belarus and Russia, as well as the amendments to the Constitution of Belarus, triggered a wave of changes to the country’s domestic legislation.

The dictator himself was the initiator of the large-scale legislative changes. This is evidenced by a letter⁵⁶ from Defense Minister Khrenin addressed to state organizations, enclosing the draft Law on Amendments to Laws on National Security. The letter states that the amendments are being introduced based on instructions from Lukashenka. Attached to the letter is a 22-page comparative table of the proposed legislative changes.⁵⁷

Amendments were made to:

- ▶ the Criminal Code of Belarus;
- ▶ the Labor Code of Belarus;
- ▶ the Code of Administrative Offenses of Belarus;
- ▶ the Law on Military Duty and Military Service;
- ▶ the Law on Mobilization Preparation and Mobilization;
- ▶ the Law on Telecommunications;
- ▶ the Law on the Procedure for Exit from the Republic of Belarus and Entry into the Republic of Belarus by Citizens of the Republic of Belarus.

In addition to amendments to existing legislation, new laws were adopted, including the Law on the People’s Militia.

All these changes serve one purpose: to create the conditions for large-scale mobilization of Belarusian citizens and establish a system of coercion to fulfill the so-called “military duty.”

The Criminal Code was amended to introduce harsher penalties for evading military conscription and mobilization.

An important change was also made to the Law on the Status of Military Personnel. Foreign nationals may now be accepted for military service in Belarus, including in the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, in positions for privates, sergeants, and warrant officers. This creates a legal pathway for Russian military personnel and private military company mercenaries to serve in the Belarusian Armed Forces, creating a real risk of changing the personnel balance within the Belarusian military and increasing the number of people prepared to participate, as Belarusian servicemen, in military provocations and direct hostilities.

Amendments were also made to the Law on Military Duty and Military Service. These include restrictions on leaving Belarus for all conscripts and the formal authorization of SMS notifications concerning military conscription.

⁵⁵ <https://belpol.pro/bezvybory-2025-dodlad-belpol/>

⁵⁶ Letter from Defense Minister Khrenin to government agencies regarding the draft Law on Amendments to Laws on National Security

⁵⁷ Comparative table of legislative changes concerning national security

Even more unusual is the draft Resolution of the Council of Ministers of Belarus on the Voluntary Participation of Citizens in Defense-Related Work in Peacetime.

The proposed activities include:

- constructing trenches, dugouts, bunkers, and shelters for military equipment and military personnel;
- preparing defensive lines and preparing populated areas for defense;
- upgrading premises allocated to military units under mobilization orders and restoring damaged military facilities;
- restoring destroyed or damaged buildings, structures, engineering networks, roads, and railways;
- clearing rubble and debris and removing destroyed buildings and structures from streets and roads in populated areas;
- opening up destroyed or damaged basements, industrial facilities, and civilian buildings to rescue people trapped inside;
- searching for and extracting injured people from damaged buildings and rubble, providing assistance to the injured, and transporting them to healthcare facilities.

The regime is seeking to legalize the Russian model of the so-called “special military operation” in Belarus, in which no war is officially declared, and the country is supposedly at peace, while hostilities are nevertheless underway. This would require people to dig trenches, build “defensive lines,” clear rubble from damaged sites, and rescue people trapped beneath it.

At the same time, the draft proposes involving “volunteers” aged 16 and older, with no upper age limit. The proposed pay was 15 Belarusian rubles per day (€4.50 at the time the report was prepared) – one-thirtieth of the

monthly subsistence minimum – which resembles compensation for heavy wartime labor more than ordinary civilian employment.

Another new law adopted in Belarus is the Law on the People’s Militia. It provides for the formation of people’s militia units in administrative-territorial divisions, authorizes them to use firearms and ammunition, and assigns them security and other force-related tasks during wartime and states of emergency. Such units have already been formed, and exercises involving them have been conducted in several regions. The people’s militia includes individuals who are not subject to military conscription, including older men and women who are not liable for military service.

Many foreign politicians are deeply mistaken in believing that Lukashenka can be pulled away from the Kremlin and that the dictator himself wants this.

These misconceptions are based on several overlooked facts:

1. Democratic values pose a threat to the state system built by Lukashenka and to his personal power. For this reason, he will remain aligned with Russia’s authoritarian regime as long as it exists.
2. To prevent Belarus from being drawn into a war and to loosen its ties with Russia, Belarus would need to withdraw from the Treaty on the Establishment of the Union State. However, this presents several problems. First, although the treaty was adopted through the regular legislative process, withdrawal is possible only through a referendum, and the treaty would remain in force for 18 months after the referendum. Second, holding such a referendum would require the dictator’s consent and the dismantling of the election-fraud apparatus to ensure that its results are objective. The dictator will allow neither a referendum nor changes to the electoral system.

CONCLUSIONS

1. Belarusian domestic legislation is now fully adapted to mobilizing the population for armed conflict. It provides for the involvement of the entire male population from the age of 16 in the construction of defensive infrastructure, as well as older people in the “people’s militia.”
2. The external agreements and treaties with Russia provide a durable foundation for the inevitable absorption of Belarus by Russia. No statements by Belarusian officials about friendship and mutual respect with their neighbors can alter this objective reality. European policymakers should take this factor into account when shaping their relations with the regime.
3. The only objective indicator of a change in this situation, and evidence that the regime is genuinely prepared to defend Belarusian sovereignty, would be a declaration of withdrawal from its agreements and arrangements with Russia, followed by concrete steps to implement that decision.

CONCLUSION

In this report, BELPOL has demonstrated, based on documentary evidence and open sources, that as long as the totalitarian regime remains in power in Belarus, the country will remain within Russia's sphere of influence and dependent on it.

The EU must take its own security into account. The Lukashenka regime cannot be left out of the equation when assessing EU security, nor can this factor be disregarded. Otherwise, the equation cannot be solved. Ignoring this fundamental reality will ultimately allow Russia to expand its territorial, human, and economic resources, which could be mobilized in a potential war.

SEVERAL FACTORS NEED TO BE CONSIDERED TO FULLY UNDERSTAND THE SITUATION

First factor. Some politicians short-sightedly dismiss the possibility of renewed aggression originating from Belarus. In doing so, they rely on assumptions and patterns of thinking rooted in the paradigm that existed before February 24, 2022. Military action does not necessarily require the creation of large troop groupings. A conflict can begin with hybrid actions and gradually escalate. The means of exerting pressure can be simple yet highly effective. The migrant crisis on Europe's eastern border is one example. Dictator Lukashenka not only managed to profit financially from the crisis but also forced the EU to spend billions of euros protecting its borders.

Second factor. Given the radically changed tactics and strategies of modern warfare, the level of potential threat should be assessed in terms of whether the necessary conditions for waging war are in place. This is precisely what this report examines.

Third factor. The Lukashenka regime's statements about its peaceful intentions and readiness to cooperate cannot be taken at face value. They are merely external rhetoric intended to mislead European politicians. In practice, the Lukashenka regime is taking entirely different actions that increase the likelihood of Belarus becoming involved in an escalation of the conflict.

Fourth factor. The Belarusian opposition believes that Belarusians do not want to participate in any military action, especially on Russia's side. This is objectively true. However, it does not mean that the wishes of Belarusians will be taken into account when the regime or the joint Union State command issues orders under martial law. Belarusian legislation already establishes criminal liability for disobeying orders and instructions from military commanders. Belarusian society is currently highly atomized. Distrust among people and the elimination of community leaders create fertile ground for forcing Belarusians to die for imperial interests. At the same time, Russia has experience coercing populations into participating in hostilities on its side. The male population of the so-called "People's Republics" of Luhansk and Donetsk is one example.

Fifth factor. Russia continues to seek to create a casus belli to draw Belarus into an armed conflict. A striking example of such efforts to manufacture a pretext was the incident involving a combat drone strike on a bus carrying Belarusian children in Russia's Bryansk Region. Even before any investigation had taken place, Russian state media and officials accused Ukraine of deliberately attacking a bus carrying Belarusian citizens.

Sixth factor. Belarus is becoming less important to Russia as a base for defense production and a hub for importing military and dual-use goods. The main reasons are sanctions that have disrupted supply chains to defense production facilities, as well as strategic miscalculations by the Lukashenka regime in organizing defense production for Russia. As modern warfare evolves rapidly, the regime has failed to adapt Belarusian industries to the types of weapons currently in demand. As a result, Belarus's strategic importance to the Kremlin is increasingly shifting toward its potential role as a source of tension that could divert Europe's attention from Ukraine and force it to focus on domestic issues and problems along its eastern border.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION ON BELARUS IN THE NEAR TERM

New weapons production facilities should not be allowed to be established in Belarus, or their operation should be made economically unviable. To this end, sectoral sanctions should be imposed on Belarus's State Authority for Military Industry and its system of enterprises.

Sanctions imposed on Belarusian enterprises involved in fulfilling Russian state defense procurement orders should be indefinite, and decisions to impose them should not be reviewed until Russia's aggression against Ukraine has fully ceased and a peace agreement has been concluded. At the same time, sanctions should only be lifted after all supplies of military and dual-use goods from Belarus to Russia have been completely halted.

The supply to Belarus of goods, licenses, software, spare parts, and consumables used to manufacture communications, signals intelligence, and electronic warfare equipment and systems should be prohibited. Such goods may include communications equipment manufactured by Motorola and SAF, as well as products from Rohde & Schwarz, Anritsu, and other companies.

A policy should be introduced to shut down any information resources that support the so-called "special military operation" and use information platforms based in democratic

states. At the same time, democratic information resources whose activities focus on anti-war counter-propaganda among Belarusian military personnel and civilians should be supported.

Due to the high risk of Belarusians being cut off from external sources of information if the internet is blocked, consideration should be given to creating alternative sources of information beyond online resources, such as radio and satellite broadcasting, for countering propaganda.

IN THE LONG TERM

Any peace negotiations should include a separate provision establishing Belarus's neutrality and non-nuclear status, with no accession to military alliances and no foreign military bases on its territory. Belarus must not become a Russian buffer state or pose a threat to the European Union.

Lukashenka and his closest associates who made the decision to provide Belarusian territory for the invasion and facilitated the creation and logistical support of invading forces should be brought before an international tribunal. This would help create divisions within the regime's ranks and serve as a deterrent against a repetition of such actions in the future.

And finally, **the key recommendation**: a transition away from the current regime and the establishment of a democratic, nationally oriented Belarus are essential to ensuring a stable and peaceful future for Europe.



www.belpol.pro

BEPOL is an independent monitoring and analytical organization of Belarus's democratic forces that works closely with Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya's Office, European Union institutions and sanctions groups, the U.S. Department of State, OFAC, and independent Belarusian media.

BEPOL's main areas of work include investigating corruption involving dictator Aliaksandr Lukashenka and his inner circle, political repression, the Minsk regime's complicity in Russia's aggression against Ukraine, and other crimes. It also identifies sanctions-evasion mechanisms and contributes to strengthening international sanctions pressure aimed at restoring democracy in Belarus.



Community of
Railway Workers
of Belarus



www.belzhd.info

The Community of Railway Workers of Belarus

is an independent democratic monitoring and analytical initiative established in 2020 by current and former employees of Belarusian Railway. The project combines sector-specific expertise with systematic work with sources within the railway system, including the collection and verification of documents, transportation data, and other relevant information.

The Community's main areas of work include monitoring military transportation and the involvement of Belarus's railway infrastructure in supporting Russia's aggression against Ukraine; researching export logistics and sanctions-evasion mechanisms; and analyzing the economic situation of Belarusian Railway, corruption risks, railway safety, the condition of rolling stock, and the situation of railway workers.



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