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SVIATLANA TSIKHANOUSKAYA
NATIONAL LEADER OF BELARUS

Representation for Social Policy
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Community of Railway Workers of Belarus



REPORT

THE LUKASHENKO REGIME'S INVOLVEMENT IN RUSSIA'S AGGRESSION AGAINST UKRAINE

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INTRODUCTION



«And now I'll show you where the attack on Belarus was being prepared from!»

This report presents evidence of the Lukashenko regime's complicity in Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine.

It is divided into three parts. Each section examines different aspects of how the Belarusian regime has directly supported the war — from helping Russia prepare for the invasion to backing its military operations — using documented evidence from both open and confidential sources.

The first part describes the support provided to the Russian Federation in preparing for the invasion from Belarusian territory. The findings in this section are based on information from media sources such as the monitoring project Belaruski Hajun, the Belarusian Railway Workers' Community, Flagstok, and other open sources.

It also presents evidence that the Lukashenko regime conducted reconnaissance on Ukrainian territory in Russia's interest to help identify future targets for air and missile strikes. Additionally, Belarusian troops secured the flank of Russia's operational-tactical group «Vostok» and protected the airbases used by the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS RF).

The second part provides an analysis of the actions of the Belarusian regime from the beginning of the war until the defeat of the Russian military group that invaded from Belarusian territory. It examines aspects of combat support provided by the regime, including the security and radio-technical support of Russian Aerospace Forces flights used to conduct strikes against Ukraine. The section also documents the regime's role in logistical support for Russia's northern invasion group, including the supply of fuel and ammunition to the occupying forces and the provision of medical assistance to Russian troops.

Additionally, this part outlines a range of other crimes committed by the regime during this period, including war propaganda and incitement of hatred toward Ukrainians in Belarusian Armed Forces communication channels; the suppression of peaceful anti-war protests; repression against the

so-called «railway partisans»; and the persecution of individuals for donating to the Armed Forces of Ukraine or to the Kastus Kalinouski Regiment.

Chapter 2.5 uses information from White Coats, a media project by the BYMEDSOL Medical Solidarity Foundation. Chapter 2.8 was prepared by the Representation for Social Policy of United Transitional Cabinet. This part also draws on reporting from the Belaruski Hajun monitoring project and the Belarusian Railway Workers' Community.

The third part is dedicated to the longest period of the war and the most extensive and prolonged support provided by the regime aimed at continuing the war in Ukraine.

The primary body of evidence in this section consists of dozens of documents from various levels of state administration and industrial enterprises, obtained from confidential sources.

This part assesses the scale of Belarus's production of weapons, military and special equipment, ammunition, and other tangible assets Russian government Defense procurement orders. It also provides evidence that the weapons produced were used on the territory of Ukraine.

The materials in Chapter 3.4, concerning the volume of ammunition and military equipment supplied from storage depots, were prepared and provided by the Belarusian Railway Workers' Community.

The report also includes materials based on witness testimonies — for example, the statement of political prisoner Palina Sharenda-Panasiuk regarding the sewing of uniforms for the Russian army by inmates. Some witnesses chose to remain anonymous.

This part also presents evidence of the Lukashenko regime's involvement in the abduction and indoctrination of Ukrainian children.

The analysis of the presented evidence leads to the clear conclusion that the regime's actions must not go unpunished. Not only dictator Lukashenko, but also the leadership of the Ministry of Defense of Belarus and officials from various government bodies must be brought before an international tribunal.

PART ONE.
SUPPORT IN FORMING THE INVASION FORCE: OPERATIONAL DECEPTION AND FLANK PROTECTION FOR RUSSIAN TROOPS

1.1. Assistance in Forming the Offensive Grouping and Preparing for the Aggression

In one of his interviews, dictator Lukashenko claimed that Russian troops, returning from military exercises, simply decided to pass through Ukraine on their way home.

However, even the example of the redeployment of Russian forces alone proves that the regime was not only aware of the planned invasion but actively assisted in the formation of the offensive grouping and supported its functioning during the preparatory phase of the war. In other words, it did everything to ensure the success of the invasion.

To demonstrate this, we examine the movement of Russian Armed Forces units and formations across Belarusian territory. The regime facilitated the transport of military trains to unloading stations and oversaw the movement of combat equipment, personnel, ammunition, and supplies from those stations to the designated concentration areas of the invasion force.

To fully understand the regime's full awareness and intent behind its actions, the following facts must be taken into account.

First, the personnel control system within the Armed Forces of Belarus is based on daily reporting. Information about service members, weapons, equipment, and ammunition located outside permanent deployment sites is submitted to the Ministry of Defense of Belarus on a daily basis. Every type of weapon, every individual unit, and even every single round of ammunition is accounted for. All such information is transmitted through the operational command system and reported directly to the Minister of Defense. Similarly, data regarding foreign military personnel, equipment, and weapons on Belarusian territory are also reported. The loss of ammunition or weapons, or unauthorized absence by a service member, is classified as a serious incident.

Second, under regulatory and legal acts in the Republic of Belarus, live-fire exercises involving heavy military equipment are conducted only at specially equipped training grounds, while small arms fire is permitted only at designated shooting ranges and training facilities. To ensure the safety of live-fire exercises, these training grounds are filled with military equipment and personnel in quantities, designed to maintain maximum safety during drills. In other words, the size and composition of the Russian forces that arrived in Belarus under the pretext of joint exercises far exceeded the capacity of Belarusian training grounds and posed a serious risk both to military personnel and to the civilian population.

Third, conducting live-fire exercises requires only a limited supply of ammunition — enough for demonstration drills by select units and a small number of rounds for exercises involving individual tanks, artillery systems, or small arms. As will be demonstrated and documented below, even during the planning phase of Russian equipment movements through Belarus, the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Belarus was fully aware that each combat vehicle was being brought into the country with a full combat load of ammunition. It also knew that additional ammunition was being stockpiled in the transport vehicles of the units and formations, and that further resupply had been planned — exceeding what could be stored in the vehicles and transport equipment of the support units. The General Staff clearly understood that the accumulation of personnel, combat vehicles, and ammunition outside designated training grounds was not intended for exercises, but for real combat operations. The General Staff was fully aware of the purpose behind the accumulation of personnel, combat equipment, and ammunition outside designated training grounds.

The Military Transport Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of Belarus played a significant role in the movement of troops. The Belarusian Railway Workers' Community[1] provided an overview

[1] https://belzhd.info/news/logistika-vtorzheniya-kto-i-kak-dostavlyal-vojnu/

of the activities carried out by the Belarusian Railway and the Military Transport Directorate in facilitating the transfer of Russian troops in preparation for the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. According to the Belarusian Railway Workers' Community, based on documentary evidence, the transportation of troops began on 17 January and concluded on 11 April 2022.

During this period, 11,889 railcars carrying military cargo with a total weight of 229,843,421 kilograms arrived in Belarus, including 730 railcars transporting personnel.

Deliveries were made to 27 stations across the Belarusian railway network, with the highest volume of shipments received at the following stations:

- Khoiniki: 1,483 railcars, 21,200 tons.
- Osipovichy-I: 1,362 railcars, 22,800 tons.
- Yelsk: 1,320 railcars, 21,100 tons.
- Brest-Vostochny: 1,061 railcars, 15,900 tons.
- Rechitsa: 1,003 railcars, 17,900 tons.
- Novobelitskaya: 780 railcars, 10,300 tons.
- Pukhovichy: 96 railcars, 8,900 tons.
- Luninets: 539 railcars, 8,200 tons.
- Dobrush: 514 railcars, 10,600 tons.

More than 50% of all railcars arrived near the Belarus-Ukraine border, in the area where the offensive grouping for the Kyiv axis was being formed.

According to the documents, one of the recipients of the military cargo, including ammunition, was the Military Transport Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Belarus.[2]

Figure 1.1 shows the accumulation of ammunition by the invasion force near the Belarus-Ukraine border. Notably, ammunition continued to arrive even after the officially scheduled end date of the joint exercises — 20 February 2022. Half of the total ammunition stockpiles arrived on 20, 21, 22, and 23 February. This is significant because the schedules for military train movements are drawn up at least one month before the actual transfers begin. This timing is determined by the planning cycle of the Belarusian railway system and the procedures for organizing military transport — a process in which the Military Transport Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of Belarus plays a key role.

The transport planning procedure is illustrated in Figure 1.2.

This means that the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Belarus knew — at least one month before the official end date of the exercises — that



Figure 1.1. Invasion force ammunition accumulation trend by February 24, 2022.

[2] https://belzhd.info/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/1.1.-poluchatel-mo-rb-yanvar-2022-g.pdf



Figure 1.2. Outline of the organization of military transportation.

Добруш	1815	Войсковая часть 03522 – филиал федерального казенного учреждения «Объединенное стратегическое командование Западного военного округа»	36020000
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Вещества взрывчатые готовые, кроме пороха	33000	22.02.2022	28.02.2022
Вещества взрывчатые готовые, кроме пороха	33000	22.02.2022	28.02.2022
Вещества взрывчатые готовые, кроме пороха	33000	22.02.2022	28.02.2022
Вещества взрывчатые готовые, кроме пороха	33000	22.02.2022	28.02.2022
Вещества взрывчатые готовые, кроме пороха	33000	22.02.2022	28.02.2022
Вещества взрывчатые готовые, кроме пороха	33000	22.02.2022	28.02.2022
Вещества взрывчатые готовые, кроме пороха	33000	22.02.2022	28.02.2022
Вещества взрывчатые готовые, кроме пороха	33000	22.02.2022	28.02.2022

Figure 1.3. Excerpt from the ammunition delivery schedule to Dobrush station, February 2022.

Russian personnel, combat equipment, and ammunition would not be returning to their permanent bases. On the contrary, they would continue to accumulate at an increased pace near the Ukrainian border.

The General Staff of Belarus was aware that, following the exercises, ammunition would continue to accumulate beyond the standard storage capacity of combat vehicles and the logistical transport of military units. Evidence of this can be seen in the ammunition delivery schedule[3] to the Dobrush station. A screenshot of a portion of the delivery schedules is shown in Figure 1.3.

The delivery schedule shows that some railcars carrying ammunition were scheduled to depart from Russian territory on 20 February and arrive at their destination — Dobrush station — on 28 February 2022. As previously stated, the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Belarus, through its Military Transport Directorate, had access to this information and was fully aware that Russian forces were preparing for combat operations. The ammunition arriving on 28 February was intended to replenish the expended combat loads.

A similar situation occurred with the accumulation of aviation fuel. Fuel stockpiles not only failed to decrease following the end of the exercises but, on the contrary, continued to grow (Figure 1.4).

From the unloading stations, the convoys carrying equipment and ammunition were escorted by Belarusian security agencies. A clear example of this is a video[4] showing a convoy of approximately fifty covered vehicles (Figure 1.5).

The video was obtained from Belaruski Hajun. It was recorded on the R-131 Kalinkovichy-Mozyr highway on 21 February 2022. The absence of visible combat vehicles and the tightly fastened tarpaulins suggest that the trucks were carrying stockpiles of ammunition, supplies, or provisions. This is a prime example of echeloning stockpiles

[3] https://dj5rh7pe9ykaa.cloudfront.net/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/2.2.-poluchatel-vch-03522-fevral-2022-g.pdf

[4] https://t.me/Hajun_BY/13

Accumulation of Aviation Fuel by the Beginning of the Invasion, kg



Figure 1.4. Statistics on the Accumulation of Aviation Fuel Stockpiles by the Beginning of the Invasion.



Figure 1.5. Escort of a Russian military convoy by the Military Inspectorate on the R-131 highway (Kalinkovichy–Mozyr). 21 February 2022.



Figure 1.6. **Escort of a Russian military convoy by the Military Inspectorate in the Gomel area. 21 February 2022.**

on «wheels». The convoy also included fuel tankers to ensure the continuous mobility of these supplies, meaning they were prepared for delivery to any point of active combat. This logistical approach is characteristic of offensive operations.

A key detail is that the Russian convoy is led and escorted by an official vehicle of the Military Inspectorate of the Main Military Commandant's Office of the Ministry of Defense of Belarus with the fleet number "112 MINSK."

On 21 February,[5] a convoy of fuel tankers accompanied by armored personnel carriers was seen moving through the Gomel district. Once again, the convoy was led by a vehicle of the Mil-



Figure 1.7. **Escort of a Russian military convoy by the State Automobile Inspectorate near Krichev, 22 February 2022.**

[5] https://t.me/Hajun_BY/48

itary Inspectorate of the Main Military Commandant's Office of the Ministry of Defense of Belarus — this time bearing the fleet number "116 MINSK" (Figure 1.6).

However, it was not only military inspectorate vehicles that escorted the convoys. On 22 February, near the city of Krichev[6] (Mogilev region), a convoy of approximately 70 military vehicles was seen. Most of them were transport trucks carrying materiel. The convoy was escorted by a vehicle of the State Automobile Inspectorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Belarus (Figure 1.7).

This is by no means an exhaustive list of documented evidence of Russian military convoys being escorted by vehicles of the Belarusian Military Inspectorate and the State Automobile Inspectorate. Such escort operations could not have taken place without orders or directives from the General Staff of the Ministry of Defense of Belarus. The General Staff must have had the plans for the movement of Russian troops across Belarusian territory in order to issue escort orders and oversee those movements.

The image below shows a convoy of transport trucks carrying tracked armored vehicles near the city of Svetlogorsk, Gomel region. The video[7] was recorded on 20 February 2022. One of the transporters is carrying a Rakushka armored personnel carrier, a model not in service with the Armed Forces of Belarus. However, the transport trucks are Belarusian and belong to the 288th Vehicle Reserve Base of the Ministry of Defense of Belarus, located in the city of Slutsk, Minsk region. The 288th Base is directly subordinate to the Ministry of Defense, which means that only the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Belarus can give it assignments of this nature.

Thus, the General Staff, the Minister of Defense, General Khrenin, and therefore Lukashenko himself, had full knowledge — before the beginning of the invasion — of the location of Russian units on Belarusian territory, their composition and armament, as well as the stockpiling and transportation of ammunition, fuel, and materiel.

At least two days before the invasion, the Ministry of Defense of Belarus had a clear understanding that the offensive grouping was in the final stage of formation and possessed a detailed deployment plan for Russian troops on Belarusian territory, with real time updates.

Having this information, the General Staff of the Ministry of Defense of Belarus had an absolutely clear understanding of the main directions of attack and the intended targets. This means that Lukashenko and the Security Council were also in possession of this information.



Figure 1.8. **Transportation of Russian armored vehicles by trucks of the 288th Vehicle Reserve Base of the Ministry of Defense of Belarus. 20 February 2022.**

[6] https://t.me/Hajun_BY/98

[7] https://t.me/Hajun_BY/36

1.2. Belarus's Participation in Operational Deception During the Invasion Preparations: Conducting Reconnaissance in the Interest of the Russian Armed Forces and Flank Protection of Russian Strike Groups by Belarusian Troops

On 22 February 2022, the Minister of Defense of the Republic of Belarus V. G. Khrenin in a conversation with the Minister of Defense of Ukraine A. Y. Reznikov gave his "officer's word" and said that there would be no offensive from the territory of Belarus to Ukraine. The lie of Minister of Defense Khrenin as the head of the military agency of the co-aggressor state is explained by the fact that he took part in the implementation of the preparatory stage of the Russian Federation's invasion plan. That is, he directly participated in the part of the plan called "misleading the enemy about the true intentions".

The illustration below clearly shows that the area of the exercise coincides with the area of formation of one of the Russian Federation's strike groups, Task Force VOSTOK. The figure is a screenshot of a video[8] of Lukashenko's 1 March 2022 report at an enlarged session of the Security Council of Belarus.

In his report and on the accompanying map, Lukashenko claimed that he had requested the Russian troops to concentrate in the area after the exercises. However, as proved above, the formation of the grouping and the stockpiling of ammunition, materiel, and fuel had already begun in mid-January 2022. This fact clearly proves that the Union Resolve 2022 exercises were conceived solely as a cover story for the actual war preparations, and that the Belarusian party took all necessary measures to support and maintain this deception plan.



Figure 1.9. Map from Lukashenko's report at the enlarged session of the Security Council of the Republic of Belarus, 1 March, 2022.

[8] https://youtu.be/I79gEfr7qDY?si=IOEKjb1-Ug1VmYJs

The video recording of the enlarged session of the Security Council of Belarus on 1 March 2022 constitutes nothing less than documented evidence of crimes — with the perpetrators providing direct, self-authored evidence of the regime's criminal conduct.

In the recording, dictator Lukashenko openly admits that the regime engaged in reconnaissance, a specific form of combat support. He states that Belarusian intelligence services, operating on the territory of the sovereign state of Ukraine through an agent network, identified targets for strikes and passed this information to Russian intelligence. In particular, dictator Lukashenko mentions the positions of Tochka-U tactical missile systems, the coordinates of which were provided to the Russian Federation. As a result of this cooperation, according to Lukashenko, Russia carried out missile strikes against Ukraine from Belarusian territory. The main perpetrator himself clearly and audibly states the date and time of the strike: 23:00 on 23 February 2022.

In his report, Lukashenko repeatedly turns to the Minister of Defense of Belarus, Viktor Khrenin, asking him to confirm his statements. From Lukashenko's report and his exchange with Khrenin, it becomes absolutely clear that the Minister of Defense is fully informed about the composition, deployment, and intentions of Russian forces. The dictator also states that he receives regular reports from the military.

As with the military exercises, the true objectives of the actions of Belarusian troops are concealed under a cover story.

According to the dictator's version, border detachments, mobile groups of border troops, and five battalion tactical groups are securing the state border of Belarus. In reality, under the given circumstances, the only clear and logical objective of the Belarusian troops' actions is to cover the right flank of the Russian operational-tactical group "Vostok" and to protect its rear supply lines.

As shown in Chapter 2.9, the military formation specifically assigned to this task — the 38th Separate Guards Air Assault Brigade — became the focal point of an aggressive campaign aimed at promoting war propaganda, glorifying Russian soldiers, and demeaning Ukrainian service members.

In his report, Lukashenko also presents a cover story for the creation of a joint air Defense grouping. In reality, the main purpose of this air Defense grouping was to provide cover for the cluster of airbases used by strike aircraft, primarily in the Baranovichy-Lida area.

Based on the evidence presented thus far, the following conclusions can be drawn:

1. The command of the Armed Forces and the leadership of the Republic of Belarus were aware of the planned invasion.

2. The command of the Armed Forces and the leadership of the Republic of Belarus took all possible measures to mislead the state of Ukraine and the international community regarding the actions of Russian forces, with the sole aim of concealing preparations for aggression. The Union Resolve 2022 exercises were used as a cover for this deception.

3. The command of the Armed Forces and the leadership of the Republic of Belarus facilitated the preparation of the Russian offensive grouping on Belarusian territory and actively enabled the invasion to proceed from Belarusian territory.

4. The regime ensured the security of the invasion force's flanks.

5. The actions of the Belarusian leadership were deliberate and consistent.

PART TWO.
THE START OF THE INVASION: COMBAT OPERATIONS UNTIL THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE NORTHERN INVASION GROUPING

2.1. Types of Combat and Rear Services Support Provided by the Belarusian Regime for Russian Military Operations: Use of Belarusian Airspace for the Aggression

In this chapter, we will provide factual evidence that, although Belarusian units did not invade the territory of Ukraine, Belarusian troops performed the function of combat and rear support for the invading forces.

One of the types of combat support is "force protection".

One of its functions is to prevent enemy reconnaissance in the areas where the troops are stationed, and to provide the guarded units with time and favorable conditions for deployment and combat operations.

From the very beginning of the invasion, the Minsk regime assumed responsibility for force protection and the Defense of Russian troop movement routes, including efforts to suppress attempts of the Belarusian people to expose the movement of military trains, the locations of Russian units and formations, and the actions of the so-called "railway partisans" along these routes. As shown below, the regime carried out this function with particular zeal — and with exceptional cruelty toward Belarusians who sought to prevent the aggression.

Another form of combat support for the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS RF), assigned to the Armed Forces of Belarus, was radio-technical support. This refers to a set of measures necessary for collecting and providing data on the location of objects in the airspace.

To support combat operations by Russian aviation from Belarusian territory, the radar assets and information-gathering systems of the radio-technical troops of the Ministry of Defense of Belarus, as well as Belarusian air bases, were employed.

Every airfield involved in flight operations uses complex radio-technical systems, which include: short-range navigation radar systems, marker beacons, radar landing systems, identification friend-or-foe systems, long-range and short-range radar units, lighting systems for night operations, communication and data transmission systems, and air traffic control equipment.

There is no doubt that personnel from Belarusian Air Force bases were involved at all airfields to support Russian combat aviation sorties. Their participation was essential for maintaining 24-hour operations of the technical systems required for flight support, as described above. Across the country, radar posts of the Radio-Technical Troops of Belarus remained continuously active. Chapter 2.3 provides an analysis of the results of support rendered by Belarusian military personnel to the aviation units of the Russian Aerospace Forces.

On 24 February 2022, Belarus provided its airspace to ensure the passage of the second air invasion echelon assigned to expand the foothold at Hostomel airport (Kyiv). At around 21:00, 18 military transport aircraft IL-76 carrying personnel and equipment of the Russian Armed Forces took off from the Russian city of Pskov to land at Hostomel. The purpose of this echelon of troops was to expand the foothold in Hostomel and advance on Kyiv.

However, by this point the Armed Forces of Ukraine had regained control of Hostomel airport, so the regime provided the Russian occupants with an airfield in Bobruisk for landing aircraft with paratroopers on board. According to documentary evidence, starting at around 22:00, IL-76 heavy transport aircraft continuously landed in Bobruisk,[9] Gomel region, Belarus.

Thus, we see that all airspace, air bases and airfields have been put at the complete disposal of the Russian occupants. At the same time, it is absolutely clear that the command of the Air Force

[9] https://t.me/Hajun_BY/246?single

and Air Defense Forces of Belarus had full knowledge of the situation and assisted the invasion. A witness, one of the former technicians of the 50th air base (Machulishchi, Minsk district), who served during the beginning of the war, says in an interview[10] that the command of the air base was pressured to provide flight maintenance and repair services to the Russian Aerospace Forces aircraft.

In addition to combat support, the regime also assumed responsibility for logistical support of military operations — including the provision of fuel and ammunition, as well as medical support. These issues are addressed in Chapters 2.2 and 2.5.

2.2. Delivery of Military Equipment, Weapons, and Ammunition for the Second Echelon of the Invasion. Supplying the Invasion Grouping with Ammunition and Fuel

With the beginning of the aggression against Ukraine, the regime's actions in support of the invasion remained unchanged. This time, the Belarusian government ensured the transport, unloading, and servicing of the second echelon of the invasion.

Military trains carrying combat and special-purpose equipment, as well as ammunition, continued to arrive at railway stations. Once again, one of the listed recipients of these military shipments was the Military Transport Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of Belarus.

In a similar manner, the Ministry of Defense of Belarus continued to manage the transportation of tracked armored vehicles from unloading stations. The figure 2.2 contains screenshots from a video obtained from the Belaruski Hajun project.[12]

The video shows approximately two dozen heavy transport trucks from the 288th Vehicle

Ammunition Deliveries Following the Start of the Invasion, kg



Figure 2.1. Ammunition deliveries into Belarus to supply the invasion grouping following the start of hostilities.

[10] https://news.zerkalo.io/life/70071.html

[11] https://belzhd.info/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/1.3.-poluchatel-mo-rb-mart-2022-g.pdf

[12] https://t.me/belzhd_live/1481

Reserve Base of the Ministry of Defense of Belarus — the same trucks referenced in Part One of this report. The vehicles are positioned to unload a military train carrying Russian combat equipment, personnel, and ammunition. The video was recorded on 4 April 2022 at the Khoiniki station, Gomel Region, near the border with Ukraine. This time, the Russian equipment bears the invasion force's "V" tactical marking.

The composition and configuration of the military equipment indicate that a battalion tactical group arrived with this train. The flatbed railcars carried infantry fighting vehicles, armored personnel carriers BTR-82A, *Rakushka* and *Skrezhet* equipped with anti-aircraft systems, *Nona-S* self-propelled artillery units, a *Solntsepyok* heavy flamethrower system with transport-loaders, and various military trucks. Given that the 288th Vehicle Reserve Base is under central command, there is no doubt that the Ministry of Defense of Belarus was involved in supporting the Russian Armed Forces during the active phase of the invasion. It should also be noted that it was Belarusian military personnel that provided the security of the railway station.

Dozens of videos and photographs confirm that transport trucks from the 288th Vehicle Reserve Base were used to move armored vehicles throughout the entire period of the northern invasion group's presence in Ukraine and assisted in transporting this equipment during its withdrawal from Belarus.

Military convoys continued to be escorted by vehicles of the Military Inspectorate of the Ministry of Defense of Belarus. In the figure 2.3, a vehicle of the Military Inspectorate of the Main Military Commandant's Office can be seen escorting a convoy of specialized equipment marked with the "V" tactical symbol.

This video[13] was filmed on 7 March 2022 on the M5 highway in the direction of Osipovichy, Mogilev district.

Belarusian railway delivers aviation fuel on a continuous basis. The cycle and volumes of fuel delivery coincide with the increase in the intensity of flights of the Russian strike aviation from the Belarusian airfields (Figure 2.4).

The main fuel reserves were concentrated in the Belarusian towns of Baranovichy, Lida — and for the army aviation (helicopters) — in Zhlobin.

The above examples are only a part of the open-source facts confirming that the Minsk regime was making every effort to ensure uninterrupted provision of the Russian combat operations.



Figure 2.2. **Transport of Russian Armored Vehicles by Trucks of the 288th Vehicle Reserve Base of the Ministry of Defense of Belarus. 4 April 2022.**

[13] https://t.me/Hajun_BY/1634



Figure 2.3. Escort of a Russian military convoy by a Military Inspectorate vehicle near Osipovichy. 7 March 2022.



Figure 2.4. Statistics of aviation fuel deliveries from the start of the invasion.

2.3. Operations of Russian Military Aviation from Belarusian Territory. Missile Strikes Launched from Belarus

As noted earlier, Belarusian military personnel enabled Russian combat aviation sorties by providing access to air base infrastructure, flight control and navigation systems, and by directly participating as part of flight operations support teams. The 61st Fighter Air Base (Baranovichy) and the 116th Assault Air Base (Lida) made the most significant contributions to the operations of the Russian Aerospace Forces' tactical strike aviation. Figure 2.5 shows the intensity of air sorties conducted to bomb targets in Ukraine. This intensity declined following the defeat of the Russian invasion grouping by early April 2022. Nevertheless, airstrikes from Belarusian airfields continued.

The largest number of strike aircraft sorties — 67 per cent — took place at airfield of the 61st airbase.

It would have been impossible to ensure the full cycle of combat operations of the Russian Air Force without the participation of the base commanders, technical, logistics and security units of the base itself. Similarly to the case of the Minister of Defense, the commanders of air bases, who are also heads of military garrisons, knew in advance about the preparations for combat sorties. It is natural to assume that the commander of the Air Force and Air Defense Forces at the time, Major-General I.V. Golub, knew and was well aware of the forthcoming attack on Ukraine. However, none of these officials took any action to stop the crime being prepared and committed. Moreover, there is no doubt that these people completely obeyed the aggressor's plans, putting all available resources at its disposal.

Over the entire period of operations by the northern invasion grouping, at least 633 missile strikes[14] were launched from Belarusian territory. The wide geographic distribution of launch positions indicates that the regime in no way restricted the actions of Russian operational-tactical missile systems. In many cases, launch sites were selected near populated areas.

Combat Aviation Sorties from the Baranovichy and Lida Airfields



Figure 2.5. Statistics of combat sorties from Baranovichi and Lida airfields.

[14] https://youtu.be/rdgB1X8Zgqo?si=8TBKaUJV4SsbzT1o

2.4. Providing the Invasion Force with Communications

In assessing the support provided to the Russian army, it is also important to examine the communications systems that form the backbone of military command and control.

Several documented cases demonstrate that Belarusian communication units provided communications support to the Russian invasion force. For example, according to documented photographs published by *Belaruski Hajun*,[15] an R-434 "Citrus" digital radio-relay station was observed in the village of Verbovichy, Narovlia district, Gomel region. This system is produced in Belarus and is used exclusively by the Belarusian communication troops.

The photographs were published on 24 February 2022 at 10:40, which is a critical detail. This station is in service with the 74th Separate Communications Regiment (Grodno), the 60th Separate Communications Regiment (Borisov), and the 86th Communications Brigade (Minsk). The nearest garrison locations of these communications units to Verbovichy are in Minsk and Borisov — both more than 300 kilometers away. Taking into account the time required to issue orders, deploy the unit to the village of Verbovichy, set up the station, and establish communications, it can be stated with absolute certainty that the order to move the station crew was issued prior to the start of the invasion.

The fact is that the Citrus station is in essence a mobile communications center of the military field communications backbone network. However, the station extends communications to civilian communication centers as well. In order to do this, the Communications Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces has to apply in advance to the Ministry of Communications for the lease of civilian public telecommunications network channels. In other words, the communication scheme in which this station was involved had been developed by the Communications Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces several days before the invasion.

The location of the R-434 station along one of the main axes of advance of the "Vostok" operational-tactical group serves as conclusive evidence that the station's crew was operating in the interests of the occupying forces. It also indicates that the Communications Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Belarus, along with the General Staff as a whole, was involved in the planning and execution of the invasion of Ukraine.



Figure 2.6. Radio relay station R-434 «Citrus», Verbovichy. 24 February 2022.

[15] https://t.me/Hajun_BY/156?single



Figure 2.7. **R-409MB radio-relay station, Yelsk. 20 January 2022.**

Below is another example of the use of Belarusian communications troops in support of the occupying forces.

As early as 20 January, long before the start of the exercise, a field communications unit with a radio relay station was spotted at the Yelsk railway station, Gomel region (the area where the invasion force was formed).

The presence of a transceiver unit on the antenna allows the system to be identified as a R-409MB digital radio-relay station[16] of Belarusian manufacture, which clearly indicates that both the station and its crew belong to communications troops of the Armed Forces of Belarus.

According to Belaruski Hajun, the radio-relay station remained in the same location on 3 and 5 March 2022.[17]

On 4 March, a total of 410 tons of ammunition arrived at Yelsk station, followed by an additional 559.19 tons on 5 March, destined for Russian forces engaged in combat operations.

The communications node remained in Yelsk on 31 March,[18] as well as on 6,[19] 16,[20] 18,[21] and 20[22] April. Figure 2.9 shows photographs taken in Yelsk on 20 April 2022. This time, the railway station in Yelsk was being used to evacuate damaged Russian military equipment.

There is no doubt that this communications node was deployed specifically to provide communications support for the unloading point of Russian equipment and ammunition at Yelsk station.

Similarly, a communications node, which also included an R-409MB1 radio-relay station, was seen at a railway station in the city of Rechitsa. This system can be unequivocally identified as equipment belonging exclusively to the Belarusian Armed Forces, based on its distinctive antenna and the "national" flag of Belarus displayed on the cabin door — an identifying feature found on all Belarusian military communications vehicles.

The operation of the communications node at the Rechitsa railway station was documented on 29 March,[23] 1 April,[24] 3 April,[25] and 10 April. On one of these dates, a Russian satellite communications station was also seen in close proximity to the Belarusian communications station. A screenshot capturing this is shown in the lower right corner of Figure 2.10. This provides clear evidence of coordination between the communications units of the Belarusian and Russian armed forces.

[16] https://t.me/flagshtok/6664
[17] https://t.me/Hajun_BY/1215
[18] https://t.me/Hajun_BY/3503
[19] https://t.me/Hajun_BY/3890
[20] https://t.me/Hajun_BY/4175
[21] https://t.me/Hajun_BY/4200
[22] https://t.me/Hajun_BY/4241
[23] https://t.me/Hajun_BY/3336
[24] https://t.me/Hajun_BY/3580
[25] https://t.me/Hajun_BY/3676



Figure 2.8. Radio-relay station R-409MB, Yelsk. 3 March 2022.



Figure 2.9. Radio-relay station R-409MB, Yelsk. 20 April 2022.

The Rechitsa and Yelsk railway stations played a critical role in the transport of military equipment and ammunition — both during the preparatory phase and throughout the course of the invasion.

On 20 March 2022, the Belarusian Community of Railway Workers published[26] information and photographic evidence that the communication troops of the Armed Forces of Belarus were deploying radio relay stations at some intermediate stations along the route of military echelons.

This is another proof that the action plans of the communication troops of the Armed Forces of Belarus were synchronized with the actions of the aggressor, and the Belarusian military communication system was subordinated to the task of servicing the troops of the Russian occupants.

[26] https://t.me/belzhd_live/1395



Figure 2.10. **Identification of radio-relay station R-409MB1, Rechitsa.**

2.5. Medical Support for Russian Armed Forces

The Belarusian initiative *White Coats* identified signs of a covert mobilization of Belarus's medical infrastructure even before the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine began. Starting in early February 2022, unusual activity was observed at the Republican Scientific and Practical Centre for Transfusiology and Medical Biotechnology in Minsk. Specifically, there was an increase in the number of donor chairs and the resumption of unscheduled donor calls, including through administrative channels in educational institutions.

Blood donation drives were suddenly organized in schools and universities for March, two months ahead of the usual schedule. This caused confusion among regular donors, who had not previously encountered such unscheduled calls.

This evidence of deliberate preparation for the large-scale reception of wounded personnel is yet another indication that the Minsk regime was aware of Russia's true intentions. Orders of this nature to the Ministry of Health could only have come from the highest levels of government.

From the very first hours of the invasion on 24 February, the White Coats initiative documented reports of wounded Russian servicemen being admitted to medical facilities in Gomel Region, including the Mozyr and Narovlia district hospitals, as well as the Gomel regional hospital. These servicemen had sustained injuries near the Veselovka–Senkovka border crossing on the Belarus-Ukraine border.

On 25 February 2022, a tent camp to receive the injured was set up at the Gomel Regional Clinical Hospital.

The Gomel City Clinical Hospital No. 4 in Kostyukivka (Gomel) began freeing up space for the wounded.

On the same day, Russian occupants were found on the territory of the Gomel Centre for Radiation Medicine.

By late February to early March, the healthcare system in Gomel region began to experience severe strain. As of 28 February, more than 400 wounded and deceased were reported at the Republican Scientific and Practical Centre for Radiation Medicine and Human Ecology, with bodies being delivered to the morgue of Homel City Hospital No. 3. A similar situation was observed at the Mozyr District Hospital, which had effectively been converted into a military field hospital.

According to *White Coats*, in the absence of official orders, mobile medical teams made up of surgeons and anesthesiologists began to form. This indicated an informal yet centrally coordinated effort between the healthcare systems of the two countries.

During the same period, medical professionals who voiced opposition to the war were subjected to arrests. Doctors Dmitry Markelov, Yevgeniya Tochitskaya, and Irina Markelova were prosecut-



Figure 2.11. Russian soldiers at the Gomel Centre for Radiation Medicine, 25 February 2022.



Figure 2.12. Russian sanitary buses on the streets of Gomel.

ed for their anti-war statements. These repressive measures within the medical community were accompanied by increased control and restrictions on civil liberties, consistent with the broader authoritarian response of the regime.

Alongside the growing number of the wounded, shortages of basic medical supplies were reported — ranging from saline solutions to blood components, including red blood cells. These shortages were confirmed by reports from healthcare institutions in Gomel, Bobruisk, and Minsk. The situation clearly indicated a priority reallocation of resources in favor of the Russian Armed Forces.

On 1 March, Major General Sergei Nyrkov of the Russian Armed Forces was admitted with injuries to the Gomel Republican Scientific and Practical Centre. This case confirmed the systematic use of Belarusian territory not only for the evacuation of lower-ranking personnel, but also for senior military command.

The number of testimonies was growing day by day. This forced Lukashenko to admit[27] at an enlarged session of the Security Council of Belarus on 1 March 2022, that the regime was indeed providing assistance to the wounded occupants. At the same time Lukashenko stated that the Minister of Health personally reported to him every morning about the state of affairs with the wounded. The dictator named the cities where the wounded servicemen of the Russian Federation arrived, namely Gomel and Mozyr.

Until a certain time, the orders on medical support for the Russian troops took the form of tacit instructions in order to conceal the involvement of the regime. Even in response to an official enquiry on 14 March, the Belarusian Ministry of Health officially talks[28] only about the 'possibility of providing' medical assistance to the Russian military, referring to the 1992 agreement on medical support for the CIS countries. The document explicitly states that the costs can be covered from the budget of the host country — that is, Belarus. De facto, the Ministry of Health tried to conceal the sponsorship of the war without giving direct documented instructions.

On 22 March, information emerged about the establishment of transport routes for the bodies of deceased Russian servicemen through Gomel, including the use of helicopters and trucks operated by the Russian Ministry of Defense. For temporary storage, a hangar without refrigeration equipment was used — the bodies were kept in body bags at outdoor temperatures. This points to the scale of the casualties and the failure to provide appropriate conditions for the preservation of remains.

In early April, alarming reports surfaced of Russian soldiers being hospitalized after receiving dangerous levels of radiation exposure during their presence in the Red Forest, near the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant. They were treated at the Republican Scientific and Practical Centre for



Figure 2.13. Hangar and morgue for the storage of corpses in Gomel.

[27] https://t.me/brest38sso/5124

[28] https://t.me/belhalat_by/6834

Radiation Medicine and Human Ecology in Gomel without appropriate isolation measures, in clear violation of radiation safety protocols — thereby endangering both medical personnel and other patients.

The use of civilian medical infrastructure to serve the needs of a warring party — while Belarus continues to claim neutrality — seriously undermines the credibility of that claim and may constitute complicity in acts of aggression.

The large-scale and systemic actions documented on the territory of Belarus allow us to speak about the significant involvement of the Belarusian medical infrastructure in support of the Russian military actions.

The secrecy, pressure on the medical community and redistribution of resources in favor of the aggressor's troops call into question the neutrality of Belarus and raise questions about compliance with international humanitarian law.

2.6. Actions by Belarusian Security Agencies to Secure and Ensure the Covert and Uninterrupted Movement of Russian Troops Across Belarusian Territory

Efforts to conceal the movement of Russian troops began as early as their arrival in Gomel region. Orders were issued at the level of district executive committees within the region.[29] Below is a screenshot of an announcement from the Gomel district council of deputies dated 2 February 2022. As shown, at this stage the language is framed as a request. However, the situation changed significantly with the onset of the aggression.

With the start of military operations, Belarusian security agencies were mobilized to ensure the covert movement of Russian troops. The regime's objective was to prevent any disruption to Russian military transit across Belarusian territory, and to keep troop numbers and operational intentions in secret.

To achieve this, the state organized a systematic and coordinated effort across all key agencies, including the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the KGB.

KGB officers from the central apparatus and regional departments operated actively on the railway network.

In just the last week of March 2022, more than thirty railway workers were detained.[30] These actions were accompanied by a broader campaign of intimidation targeting the Belarusian population,



Figure 2.14. An announcement with the request not to publish information about the movement of troops.

[29] https://t.me/flagshtok/6819

[30] https://t.me/belzhd_live/1453



Figure 2.15. **"Confession" videos of detained Belarusian railway workers.**

including the release of **"confession" videos** featuring detainees.

The Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs deployed patrols and ambushes and used firearms against Belarusian citizens who attempted to prevent the movement of Russian forces[31] across Belarusian territory.

Patrols were assigned to protect military trains carrying Russian equipment.

As of 19 March 2022, Military Unit 3214[32] of the Internal Troops was deployed to secure railway infrastructure in the Gomel and Brest regions. Patrols were equipped with firearms, radios, and GPS trackers.



Figure 2.16. **Deliberate gunshot injuries inflicted on detained railway partisans as an act of intimidation.**

[31] https://t.me/belzhd_live/1459

[32] https://t.me/belzhd_live/1378

The most brutal act of repression and intimidation against the Belarusian population was the deliberate use of firearms against unresisting, already-detained individuals. The images shown at figure 2.16 were deliberately released by pro-government sources. To secure certain military train convoys, the regime deployed dedicated police units.[33] The management of Belarusian Railways sought to intimidate railway workers by threatening them with criminal liability for any acts of resistance, framing this as an "informational outreach campaign".[34]

The clear objective behind all these measures was to ensure — at any cost — the unhindered and timely delivery of Russian servicemen, weapons, ammunition, and fuel to the combat areas. This effort was coordinated and overseen by senior state officials and high-ranking military officers.

2.7. Filtration Facility for Ukrainian Prisoners of War in Belarus and the Forced Displacement of Civilians

On 30 November 2024, Radio Liberty released an investigation[35] regarding the establishment of a filtration camp for captured Ukrainians on the territory of Belarus.

An investigation established that in the spring of 2022, at the outset of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russian military personnel set up a filtration camp in the Belarusian town of Narovlia, Gomel region.

The facility became a site of unlawful detention, torture, and abuse of Ukrainian prisoners of war and civilians, including children. Those detained were interrogated and beaten, and footage of them was later used in propaganda videos.

The findings of this investigation are based on testimonies from Ukrainian citizens.

Article 49 of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Geneva, 12 August 1949) strictly prohibits the forcible transfer or deportation of civilians from occupied territory to the territory of the occupying power or to any other country, regardless of whether that country is occupied or not.

On 23 March, the *Flagstok* project published an interview[36] with a Ukrainian woman who had been forcibly transferred from Hostomel to Belarus by Russian occupying forces. The forcibly displaced civilians were held in one of the sanatorium resorts in Belarus.

This demonstrates that the Minsk regime participated in the forced transfer of civilians to its territory and permitted the establishment of a filtration camp on Belarusian soil.



Figure 2.17. Filtration camp in Narovlia, Belarus.

[33] https://t.me/belzhd_live/1446

[34] https://t.me/belzhd_live/1467

[35] https://www.svoboda.org/a/do-utra-ne-dozhivete-filjtratsionnyy-lagerj-dlya-ukraintsev-v-belarusi/33220411.html

[36] https://d2uy8l7fpcdb88.cloudfront.net/by/vybary-2020/kak-ukrainku-nasilno-privezli-v-sanatorij-pod-gomelem.html

2.8. Repression of Anti-War Protesters and the Hunt for the "Partisans"

Against the backdrop of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, many Belarusians have expressed — and continue to express — solidarity with the Ukrainian people. Some joined protests, others donated to the Ukrainian army, and some shared information about the crimes committed by Russia. However, all forms of support for Ukraine have come under severe repression by the Belarusian authorities. In a country where any dissent is already punishable by imprisonment, expressions of sympathy for Ukraine are now treated as acts of "extremism" or even "terrorism."

In the three years since the war began, hundreds of criminal cases have been opened in Belarus against individuals who voiced anti-war sentiments. Repression has affected both Belarusians and Ukrainian citizens residing in the country. Political loyalty to the Kremlin and the desire to suppress any show of solidarity with Ukrainian resistance have made Belarus one of the most dangerous countries in the region for those opposing the war.

Repression for supporting Ukraine has not ceased since the beginning of Russia's full-scale invasion, and it continues to this day.

From the very first days of the full-scale war, the overwhelming part of the Belarusian civil society has sharply opposed the involvement of Belarus in the military conflict on the side of Russia.

Another 'referendum' on changing the Constitution of the Republic of Belarus was scheduled by the Lukashenko regime for 27 February 2022. At the same time, Belarusians, who strongly oppose the Russian aggression, saw the pseudo-referendum as an opportunity to express their disagreement with the policy of dragging Belarus into the military conflict.

According to the Human Rights Centre Viasna, the largest anti-war protests in Belarus took place on 27 and 28 February 2022. According to human rights activists, more than 1,100 people were arrested then. At the same time, at least 630 people ended up behind bars. The wave of arrests began in the afternoon on 27 February — the main voting day of the referendum. People wrote anti-war slogans on ballot papers and then gathered near polling stations to express their disagreement with the developments in Ukraine. Even though the majority of people at the announced anti-war protests were detained in Minsk, people protested even in the villages. They were arrested in main squares, at polling stations, and near administrative buildings, where they came out to say "No" to the war.[37]

With the onset of the invasion, the Belarusian authorities significantly tightened control over citizens' expressions and opinions. The Lukashenko regime, in its repression of individuals supporting Ukraine, has relied heavily on anti-extremism legislation, which has been substantially toughened in recent years.

According to the human rights organization Human Constanta, repression has continued throughout the entire period since the start of Russia's full-scale aggression against Ukraine, particularly targeting those accused of ties to the Kastus Kalinouski Regiment, which operates as part of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. The pressure on the Regiment takes multiple forms: criminal proceedings against the relatives of its members, persecution of potential volunteer fighters, and suppression of any form of material support. The unit is also increasingly featured in state propaganda and in statements by government agencies, which claim that its members may be planning attacks on Belarus.

On 9 January 2023, the Gomel Regional Court sentenced local resident Vladislav Yatsenko to five years in a high-security penal colony for posting messages on his Instagram account encouraging people to join the Kalinouski Regiment and the Azov Battalion, and for transferring 21 Euro to the Regiment's account.[38] On 30 January 2023, the Human Rights Centre Viasna reported another conviction: a resident of the Dokshitsy district was sentenced to 4.5 years of imprisonment under several "political" criminal charges after filling out a form in Telegram expressing his intention to travel to Ukraine to fight against Russian forces.[39]

Since 2023, criminal charges under Article 361-2 of the Criminal Code of Belarus — "Financing extremist activity" — have become widespread. This provision has been used against not only those who donated to Ukrainians engaged in combat, but also those who supported the Belarusian volunteer Kalinouski Regiment. In September 2024, the Regiment was officially recognized as a "terrorist organization"[40] in Belarus, meaning that all its members automatically became subjects of terrorism-related investigations under Article 289 of the Criminal Code.

[37] Protests in 25 Cities and Towns: How Belarusians Are Persecuted for Speaking Out Against the War: https://spring96.org/ru/news/107338

[38] For Aiding the Kalinouski Battalion — Five Years in a Penal Colony; For "Cynical" Anti-War Slogans — One and a Half: https://spring96.org/be/news/110426

[39] Political Prisoner from Dokshitsy District Sentenced for Intending to Fight in Ukraine: https://spring96.org/be/news/110572

[40] The Supreme Court of Belarus Declares the Kalinouski Regiment a "Terrorist Organization" https://www.svaboda.org/a/33134982.html

In addition, the authorities began to persecute individuals for symbols and statements. Hundreds of people were subjected to arrests, fines, and even prison sentences for displaying Ukrainian flags, posting messages in support of a Ukrainian victory, or simply using blue and yellow colors in social media or clothing.[41]

Ukrainians living in Belarus have also been pressured. Despite Lukashenko's official claims of "friendly attitude," in practice, Ukrainian nationals have faced repression, including arrests, interrogations, accusations of espionage, and deportations.[42] According to the Human Rights Centre Viasna, as of February 2025, at least 13 Ukrainian citizens had been convicted under various articles of the Belarusian Criminal Code on politically motivated charges.[43]

Over the past two years, the list of those repressed for supporting Ukraine has expanded. According to the Human Rights Centre Viasna, in February 2024, a father and a son, Sergei[44] and Pavel[45] Kabarchuk, were arrested. These Belarusians were detained at the time of the declared "counter-terrorist operation". Later, the State Security Committee (KGB) reported the apprehension of 'terrorists' allegedly sent by the Security Service of Ukraine to carry out terrorist attacks in Belarus and Russia. The men were sentenced to 20 years in prison. Both are included in the lists of "extremists" and "terrorists".

In August 2024, Ilya Naryshkin[46] was sentenced to 15 years in prison for wanting to join the Belarusian volunteer fighters in Ukraine. Ilya is on the list of persons involved in extremist activities.

Nikolai Losovski[47] was detained and sentenced to 10 years in prison in 2024 on charges of cooperation with the Security Service of Ukraine. Nikolai is included in the list of persons involved in extremist activities. The video broadcast by state television shows the arrested men appear to be beaten. Some of them were taken to attend the investigative actions in chains.

Viasna also reported on the case of 18-year-old Daniil Harasim,[48] who was detained in March 2024 and later sentenced to 10 years in prison under three articles of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Belarus. Daniil had been placed under constant surveillance. According to the investigation, he allegedly "cooperated with Ukrainian intelligence services" and "photographed military sites." He has been included on the official list of individuals involved in extremist activity.

In December 2024, the Investigative Committee of Belarus officially announced the launch of a special criminal proceeding targeting volunteer fighters of the Kalinouski Regiment.[49] The charges include approximately 20 articles of the Criminal Code, among them "an act of terrorism resulting in the death of a person".

On 24 April 2025, the General Prosecutor's Office of Belarus announced that the Minsk City Court had handed down guilty verdicts against 5 unit commanders and volunteer fighters of the Kastus Kalinouski Regiment. They were convicted of participating in armed formation, armed conflict, and military operations on the territory of a foreign state, as well as recruiting and training others. The charges included 11 criminal articles, with prison terms extending into several decades.[50]

One of the most high-profile cases was the so-called *Machulishchi case* or the *Machulishchi sabotage*. In February 2023, a Russian A-50 aircraft, used to guide Russian missiles to targets in Ukraine, was blown up. More than two dozen people were defendants in the case, 12 of whom were sentenced to prison terms ranging from two to 25 years.[51]

The case of the "rail partisans" is another example of active disagreement with Russia's aggression in Ukraine on the one hand and the incredible cruelty of the Regime on the other. The aim of the rail partisans was to sabotage the Belarusian railway. At least 13 people were detained on charges of disabling trains and disrupting the tracks. In total, they were sentenced to nearly two hundred years in prison. One of the "rail partisans", Vitaly Melnik, was shot in the knees during the arrest. He was also sentenced to 13 years in prison on five criminal charges, including "an act of terrorism."[52]

Another high-profile development was the shutdown of the anti-war project Belaruski Hajun,

[41] From Detention to Shot Kneecaps: The Consequences Faced by Belarusians for Their Anti-War Stance: https://spring96.org/ru/news/113108

[42] Three Years of War: How Support for Ukraine Is Prosecuted in Belarus: https://spring96.org/be/news/117497

[43] Human rights situation in Belarus. February 2025: https://spring96.org/ru/news/117562

[44] Sergei Kabarchuk. Political Prisoner: https://prisoners.spring96.org/ru/person/sjarhei-kabarczuk

[45] Pavel Kabarchuk. Political Prisoner: https://prisoners.spring96.org/ru/person/pavel-kabarczuk

[46] Ilya Naryshkin. Political Prisoner: https://prisoners.spring96.org/ru/person/illja-naryszkin

[47] Nikolai Losovski. Political Prisoner: https://prisoners.spring96.org/ru/person/mikalai-lasouski

[48] Daniil Garasim. Political Prisoner: https://prisoners.spring96.org/ru/person/daniil-herasim

[49] Special Proceedings Launched Against Vadim Prakopieu and Eight Kalinouski Regiment Volunteers: https://pozirk.online/ru/news/118184/

[50] In Minsk, a Trial in Absentia Ends with 90 Years for Five Defendants in the Kalinouski Regiment Case — Zerkalo: https://news.zerkalo.io/life/97720.html?tg=9

[51] Up to 25 Years in Penal Colony: Sentences Announced for 12 Defendants in the «Machulishchy Case»: https://spring96.org/ru/news/116403

[52] Railway Partisans and the Ukrainian Anthem at Karaoke: How Belarusians Are Repressed for Condemning the War in Ukraine: https://www.bbc.com/russian/articles/c16145229320

which had monitored the movement of Russian and Belarusian troops across Belarusian territory. In February 2025, it was reported that the project's Telegram chatbot had been hacked.[53] By March 2025, there were already several confirmed cases of arrests linked to photos and videos of Russian troops and equipment that had been sent to *Belaruski Hajun* back in the spring of 2022. The individuals involved are reportedly being charged under Article 361 Part 4 of the Criminal Code with "assisting extremist activity", which carries a penalty of up to seven years of restriction or deprivation of liberty.[54] According to Andrei Strizhak, head of the BYSOL Foundation, several hundred people contacted BYSOL for legal advice in the two months following the breach of Belaruski Hajun's contact database by Belarusian security forces.[55]

Since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Belarusian authorities have systematically cracked down on any expression of anti-war sentiment. According to Viasna, as of 24 February 2025, at least 41 individuals in Belarus have been convicted for donating to Belarusian volunteer fighters. At least 30 people have been sentenced for attempting or expressing intent to fight on the side of Ukraine, and at least 93 individuals[56] have been convicted for sending photos or videos of Russian military equipment to the media. The repression clearly affects all segments of Belarusian society, and the country has in effect become a battleground in an internal war waged by the state against its own people.

A striking example of whom the so-called "Belarusian Gestapo" — the Main Directorate for Combating Organized Crime and Corruption of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (GUBOPiK) — serves, is a photograph[57] taken inside its offices. The image shows Belarusian political prisoner Dzmitry Dashkevich. On the door of GUBOPiK office, stickers bearing the "Z" symbol are displayed. One of them reads: "Back our side!" The photo, taken on 24 March 2022, offers a stark illustration of the ideological line promoted by Belarusian state authorities. This worldview is built on a rigid binary: "our



Figure 2.18. **Interior of Offices at the Main Directorate for Combating Organized Crime and Corruption of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Belarus (GUBOPiK).**

[53] Motolko: Telegram bot of "Belaruski Hajun" was hacked: https://www.svaboda.org/a/33303995.html

[54] Expansion of the 'terrorist list' and arrests in the 'Hajun' case: chronicle of repression on 19–22 April https://spring96.org/ru/news/117811

[55] "Mostly in the Gomel region." More than two months have passed since the hacking of "Hajun": what is known about the associated arrests: https://news.zerkalo.io/life/97402.html

[56] Three Years of War: How Belarusians Are Persecuted for Supporting Ukraine https://spring96.org/ru/news/117502

[57] https://t.me/flagshtok/7933

side" versus "the enemy." Within this framework, it becomes clear that any Belarusian who speaks out against the war is automatically treated as the enemy.

It is important to remember that supporting Ukraine is not a crime. Yet under the Lukashenko regime, any expression of solidarity with the victims of war or dissent against military aggression is consistently treated as grounds for politically motivated persecution. This is not only a personal tragedy for those affected, but also a clear demonstration of how the Lukashenko regime operates in alliance with Russia, actively contributing to the sustainment of military aggression.

2.9. War Propaganda and Support for the War in Telegram Channels of Belarusian Military Units Assisting Russian Armed Forces Operations

With the onset of the war, several Telegram channels operated by units of the Belarusian Armed Forces began disseminating Russian war propaganda narratives.

The most intensive messaging targeted those military units and subdivisions that were directly involved in supporting Russian combat operations. These included the 61st, 116th, and 50th air bases, special operations forces, and units of the radio-technical troops and air Defense. The Telegram channels of these specific Belarusian military units were particularly active in promoting and legitimizing the so-called "Special Military Operation." The reason is clear: these Belarusian formations needed an ideological justification for their participation in a crime against peace.

The image below shows screenshots from the Telegram channel of the Belarusian 61st Fighter Air Base, located in the city of Baranovichy. As previously described, this air base played a significant role in conducting airstrikes against Ukraine.

The core narratives of the propaganda included the incitement of hatred toward the Ukrainian people, support for the war of aggression, and the denial of Ukraine's statehood and sovereignty. Derogatory and dehumanizing language was commonly used in agitation materials, including slurs such as "khokhlobandits," "Naziks," "Banderites," and "Ukro-fascists." Much of the con-



Figure 2.19. Screenshots from the Telegram channel of the Belarusian 61st Fighter Air Base, Baranovichy.



Figure 2.20. Screenshots from the Telegram channel of the 50th Mixed Air Base, Machulishchy.

tent was directly sourced from notorious Russian propaganda channels.

A significant part of the informational campaign targeting Belarusian military personnel focused on the glorification of the Russian soldier-occupier. As an example, the screenshots in the figure 2.20 are taken from the Telegram channel of the 50th Mixed Air Base, located in the town of Machulishchy. The 50th Air Base played a major role in both the preparation and implementation of the Russian invasion from Belarusian territory. Until mid-February 2023, the base supported flights of Russian A-50 long-range reconnaissance aircraft in coordination with MiG-31K jets armed with Kinzhal missiles, terrorizing the civilian population of Ukraine with the constant threat of missile strikes.

The Telegram channels are administered by officers assigned by the ideological departments and sections of military units. There is no doubt that the content published in these channels reflects the official policy of the Main Directorate for Ideological Work of the Ministry of Defense of Belarus. This directorate exercises strict oversight over the actions of subordinate ideological units within the armed forces and demands full compliance with its directives.

In Chapter 2.1, we presented evidence that battalion tactical groups formed from units of the 38th Separate Guards Air Assault Red Banner Brigade, together with border guard units, were responsible for securing the flank of the "Vostok" operational-tactical assault group of the Russian Armed Forces. At the start of the invasion of Ukraine, the Belarusian army was not psychologically or ideologically prepared for war. To ensure the unit carried out its assigned tasks, the 38th Brigade was subjected to intensive exposure to Russian propaganda, led by its own ideological officers.

The image below shows a photograph of Major Dmitry Viktorovich Beletski, an officer from the ideological department of the 38th Brigade and administrator of the brigade's Telegram channel, alongside examples of the content he posted.

The top right screenshot is a propaganda poster that explicitly labels Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel as "Nazis." The lower corner of the poster shows the producer — a company named "Ministry of Design of the Russian Federation." The bottom left screenshot is a still from a video that links the humanistic values underpinning the Ukrainian state with so-called "neo-Nazism."

From the very beginning of the war, personnel of the 38th Brigade have been subjected to a constant stream of information promoting the victories of the Russian army, the number of Ukrainian armored vehicles destroyed, and the reported casualties of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Images of Ukrainian soldiers surrendering are shown repeatedly, while losses on the Russian side are consistently concealed. A key theme of the messaging is the equation of Ukrainian soldiers with "Nazis".

The primary objective of ideological work in the Belarusian Armed Forces is to build and maintain the moral and psychological readiness of military personnel and civilian staff to carry out their assigned tasks under any conditions. In the face of clear moral unease among service members of the Belarusian army — and in full awareness that the regime is acting as a co-aggressor — the ideological apparatus of the Ministry of Defense of Belarus has been compelled to broadcasting Russian war propaganda to the 38th Brigade and other units with a single aim: to force Belarusian service members to assist the occupying forces in achieving their objectives.



Figure 2.21. Screenshots from the Telegram Channel of the 38th Separate Guards Air Assault Brigade, Brest.

2.10. Use of Civilian Infrastructure in Belarus for the Deployment of Russian Troops

As a co-aggressor alongside the Russian Federation in the war against Ukraine, the Minsk regime has provided civilian infrastructure for the long-term deployment of Russian troops, effectively turning civilian sites in Belarus into legitimate military targets for the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

One example of such actions is providing the civilian airport in Gomel[58] to the Russian Aerospace Forces to operate strike and reconnaissance drones.

Figure 2.22 presents screenshots showing a Forpost medium-range unmanned aerial vehicle, which can carry loitering munitions as its combat load.

Another example of the use of civilian infrastructure is the deployment of a Russian military vehicle repair unit[59] on the grounds of a district consumer cooperative motor depot in the town of Narovlia, Gomel Region.

In the figure 2.23 is a photograph taken on 15 March 2022, showing Russian military vehicles marked with the "V" tactical symbol. The equipment intended for repair and restoration can be seen, and at the entrance there is a sign reading: "Armored Weapons and Equipment Repair Site".

There are dozens of testimonies that military units of the Russian Armed Forces are accommodated in schools, civilian dormitories and hotels.



Figure 2.22. Russian Forpost UAV. March 2022, Gomel Airport.

[58] https://t.me/flagshtok/7838

[59] https://t.me/Hajun_BY/2311



Figure 2.23. Combat equipment repair unit Narovlya, Gomel region. 15 March 2022.

PART THREE.
POSITIONAL WAFARE

3.1. Belarusian Regime's Enforcement of Military and Special Equipment Supplies in Support of Russia

Since the beginning of the aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine, the government of Belarus has been imposing on the Russian Federation the supply of certain types of weapons produced in Belarus. With the development of the armed conflict, the government of Belarus persistently consolidated and expanded its presence on the arms market of the Russian Federation.

The expansion of certain types of production, including a manifold increase in output, has occurred directly as a result of the war. At present, a number of research and development projects are being carried out on behalf of the Russian Federation, along with the establishment of new production lines for military goods. These include joint ventures with significant financial backing from Russia.

A network of Russian Ministry of Defense military representatations has been established across Belarus, actively overseeing the fulfillment of Russian Defense contracts by Belarusian enterprises.

Senior officials within the Belarusian state apparatus have been directly involved in lobbying for the supply of weapons to the Russian Federation.

Production plans and any delays in the delivery of military goods under Russian state Defense orders were subject to strict oversight, primarily by officials from the Ministry of Industry of Belarus, and secondarily by the State Authority for Military Industry of Belarus. For example, the manufacturing and delivery of components for 122 mm Grad multiple launcher projectiles were personally supervised by Deputy Minister of Industry of the Republic of Belarus A.A. Kozlov.

Starting on 11 April 2023, daily video conferences were held at 18:00 in the meeting hall of the Ministry of Industry to address the production of components for rocket projectiles intended for the Russian Federation. The conferences were chaired by Aleksandr Nikolaevich Rogozhnik, Minister of Industry of the Republic of Belarus.

Figure 3.1 presents performance indicators of the State Authority for Military Industry of Belarus



Figure 3.1. Growth of deliveries by the State Authority for Military Industry of the Republic of Belarus.



Figure 3.2. **Growth of Military Exports by the State Authority for Military Industry of the Republic of Belarus.**

from 2020 to 2024. The charts show a decline in profitability across the agency's operations from 2021 to 2022. However, this trend changed dramatically with the onset of the war in Ukraine. The year 2022 marks the period during which the regime aggressively promoted and imposed the export of Belarusian-produced weapons, military equipment, and ammunition to the Russian Federation.

The visible decline in the production of military goods in 2022, as shown in the chart, is explained by the fact that the military contracts negotiated in 2021 did not anticipate that Russia's blitzkrieg would turn into a protracted war.

Nevertheless, throughout 2022, the Belarusian regime was actively engaged in negotiations over arms supplies and issued persistent "requests" to have products from Belarusian enterprises included in Russia's state Defense procurement programs.

Figure 3.2 shows a chart of exports by the State Authority for Military Industry of the Republic of Belarus from 2020 to 2024. The data clearly demonstrate that the surge in military production in Belarus was driven not by domestic needs, but by the war in Ukraine.

One piece of documentary evidence supporting this is a letter from A.I. Moroz, General Director of the BelOMO holding,[60] addressed to A.N. Rogozhnik, Minister of Industry of the Republic of Belarus.

The letter states explicitly that in November 2022, BelOMO proactively presented its products to the Main Missile and Artillery Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation. In January 2023, negotiations were held at the Shvabe holding with D.V. Shmidt, an adviser to the Russian Ministry of Defense. These discussions focused on including BelOMO products in Russia's state Defense procurement program, with planned deliveries for 2023–2025.

Ultimately, BelOMO succeeded in making significant progress in this area. In 2023, the company delivered 2,693 optoelectronic devices, including day and night sights, collimator sights, night vision attachments, monoculars, rangefinders, and laser target designators to the Russian joint-stock company OKB ASTRON, and in 2024, the number rose sharply to 105,161 units.

Another example of Belarus imposing its military products on Russian enterprises is a memo[61] on problematic areas of cooperation with the Russian Federation, signed by Deputy Minister of Industry of the Republic of Belarus A.A. Kozlov. The document outlines key areas of collaboration, including 122 mm and 152 mm artillery shells, MAZ vehicles, and BelOMO sights.

Another piece of documentary evidence showing that senior officials in the Belarusian govern-

[60] Letter from A.I. Moroz, Director General of the BelOMO Holding

[61] Memo on issues in cooperation with the Russian Federation

ment are actively seeking to profit from Russian state military contracts is a travel assignment[62] issued to Belarusian Minister of Defense V.G. Khrenin. The assignment explicitly lists the fourth objective of the official visit as: "To discuss matters related to the production of particularly in-demand models of military and special equipment in support of the Special Military Operation."

To further demonstrate that the regime is doing everything in its power to profit from the war, we cite a letter[63] from V.Y. Rossolai, Deputy Chair of the State Authority for Military Industry of Belarus, addressed to all Defense industry enterprises in Belarus. The letter instructs them to urgently report the number of items ready for delivery to Region 790, starting in 2025, in addition to quantities already covered by contractual obligations. In documentary correspondence, "Region 790" refers to the Russian Federation, and the contractual obligations mentioned are nothing else but Russian state Defense procurement contracts.

Information on the types and scale of arms production and supply to the Russian Federation is provided in more detail below.

3.2. Deliveries of Weapons, Military and Special Equipment, and Ammunition Components under Russian State Defense Contracts

3.2.1 Production and Delivery of Sighting Devices to the Russian Federation

The scale of sight production increased dramatically following the invasion of Ukraine. For example, the output of panoramic commander sights for T-90 tanks rose 15 times in the first eight months of the war compared to pre-war levels.

In May 2024, the organization BELPOL published a comprehensive investigation report[64] into the production and supply chains of optical sights manufactured by the OAO "Peleng", based in Minsk. All entities involved in the production chain were identified based on documentary evidence, parts of which were made public in the report.

Using available technical drawings, BELPOL was able to identify nearly all types of sights produced by Peleng.

The following is a list of sighting devices identified:

- Sosna-U sights for T-72B3 and T-80U tanks
- Kalina fire control system kits for T-90M tanks
- Ramka sights for Terminator tank support combat vehicles
- Panoramic commander sights for T-90M tanks
- Combined gunner sights for BTR-82A armored personnel carriers
- PNM-T multichannel gunner sights for T-72, T-80, and T-90 tanks
- 1K118P combined optical control devices for the Khrizantema-S anti-tank missile system
- Electro-optical targeting systems for the Derivatsiya-PVO mobile anti-aircraft artillery system
- PKP-MRO panoramic commander sights for combat modules

It has been established that more than 40 enterprises of various types of ownership are involved in the production and logistics of sight deliveries. Notably, only two enterprises[65] are formally part of the State Authority for Military Industry of the Republic of Belarus.

The sights are supplied to the following entities within the Russian military-industrial complex:

- AO Scientific and Production Corporation "Uralvagonzavod", Nizhny Novgorod
- AO Vologda Optical-Mechanical Plant, Vologda
- OOO "Oruzheynye Masterskiye", Shchyolkovo, Moscow region
- AO 41st Central Plant of Railway Techology, Lyubertsy, Moscow region
- AO Instrument Design Bureau, Tula
- AO Central Research Institute "Burevestnik", Nizhny Novgorod
- AO Scientific and Production Corporation "Machine-Building Design Bureau", Kolomna

Based on the contracts obtained and key technical specifications, the production volumes and timelines for the majority of the sighting devic-

[62] Assignment order for the official mission of the Minister of Defense of Belarus, V.G. Khrenin.

[62] Letter from V. Rossolai to military industry enterprises.

[64] https://youtu.be/eAc1S4zhFIk?si=p_DTFSFIzNifD9ye

[65] Overview of the Sight Manufacturing Process



Figure 3.3. **Combined gunner sight for the BTR-82A armored personnel carrier.**

es were established. Additional documents were later obtained that fully confirmed the estimates made during the investigation.

As an example and piece of documentary evidence, a memo[66] detailing the cooperation between OAO "Peleng" and the Russian AO "Uralvagonzavod Corporation" is attached. The memo is signed by V.Y. Rossolai, Deputy Chair of the State Authority for Military Industry of the Republic of Belarus.

According to the memo, in 2023, OAO "Peleng" supplied the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation under state Defense contracts the following:

- 600 units of Sosna-U sight modules for T-72B3 and T-80U tanks
- 189 Kalina fire control system sets for T-90M tanks (T-90M is not in service with the Belarusian Armed Forces)
- 10 Ramka sight systems for Terminator tank support combat vehicles (the Terminator is not in service with the Belarusian Armed Forces).

In 2024, the volume of supplies increased significantly and reached the following:

- 1,244 Sosna-U sight modules for T-72B3 and T-80U tanks
- 249 Kalina fire control system sets for T-90M tanks (not in service with the Belarusian Armed Forces)
- 30 Ramka sight systems for Terminator combat vehicles (not in service with the Belarusian Armed Forces).

In addition, BELPOL holds documentary evidence that Peleng was supposed to produce 1,550 combined gunner sights for the BTR-82A armored personnel carrier over 2023–2024.

A similar situation applies to another major producer of sighting devices for small arms, grenade launchers, and anti-tank missile systems — the BelOMO Holding.

Enterprises within the holding not only participate in the production chains for armored vehicle sights manufactured by Peleng but have also established their own independent network for the production and sale of sighting devices. The collaboration between Peleng and BelOMO is confirmed by a letter from the Deputy General Director of OAO "Vavilov Minsk Mechanical Plant (MMZ)". The letter reports delivery delays by BelOMO concerning components for a television backup sight, which in turn is expected to disrupt the schedule for delivering complete sighting systems to Russia.

The results of BelOMO operations are reflected in the speaking points of Deputy Prime Minister V.M. Karankevich.[67] The document was signed by A.A. Kozlov, Deputy Minister of Industry of the Republic of Belarus.

[66] Report on the collaboration between OAO Peleng and AO Uralvagonzavod

[67] Talking points from the speech by Deputy Prime Minister V.M. Karankevich

According to the document, in 2024, BelOMO Holding supplied the Russian company AO "OKB ASTRON" with the following:

- 18,600 opto-mechanical modules for night and day/night sights
- 12,061 units of night-vision goggles, monoculars, and night-vision attachments
- 2,500 opto-mechanical rangefinder modules
- 64,500 opto-mechanical modules for collimator sights
- 7,500 opto-mechanical modules for various types of day sights

The speaking points also state that BelOMO Holding is prepared to maintain these supply volumes to the Russian Federation in 2025.

The production of sights for Russia's military needs has become one of the key drivers of financial growth for both BelOMO Holding and the Peleng enterprise. For example, in 2024, Peleng launched two new facilities for sight assembly, and the company's workforce increased by nearly 32% over the course of the year.

To implement its plans for large-scale sight production, the regime established a front company in China — Shenzhen 5G Hi-Tech Innovation Co., Limited. The company's management was composed entirely of Belarusian nationals. During the operation of this front company, dozens of Chinese enterprises were engaged in the manufacture of mechanical and optical components for sights, and dozens of contracts were signed with Chinese suppliers.

On the basis of documentary evidence, BELPOL established that under just the first four contracts, more than 644,000 components and lenses were supplied to Peleng by Chinese manufacturers through the front company Shenzhen 5G Hi-Tech Innovation Co., Limited. These figures likely underestimate the true scale of deliveries, as BELPOL does not possess the complete set of supplementary agreements attached to the framework contracts between Peleng and Shenzhen 5G Hi-Tech Innovation Co., Limited.

3.2.2 Production and Supply of Ammunition Components to the Russian Federation

Cooperation on the supply of ammunition components to the Russian Federation was activated on 3 December 2022. On that day, in an atmosphere of urgency, an agreement on joint regional security in the military sphere was signed at Minsk Airport.

The signing was attended by State Secretary of the Security Council of Belarus A.G. Volfovich, Minister of Defense V.G. Khrenin, Deputy Prime Minister P.A. Parkhomchik, and Chairman of the Belarusian State Authority for Military Industry D.A. Pantus.

The details of the meeting and the decisions taken were withheld from the Belarusian public. The only document released to the media was titled "On Joint Regional Security in the Military Sphere." However, BELPOL believes that the talks were focused on comprehensive support for the destruction of the Ukrainian state.

One month after the signing of the agreement, on 16 January 2023, Deputy Prime Minister P.A. Parkhomchik met with Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation — the Minister of Industry and Trade Denis Manturov. The negotiations focused on the supply of components for 122 mm and 152 mm artillery shells and rockets, as evidenced by a letter from Chairman of the Belarusian State Authority for Military Industry Pantus to the General Director of the Russian AO "Technodinamika".[68]

Since that time, Mr. Pantus, as head of the Belarusian State Authority for Military Industry, has been engaged in ongoing correspondence with the director of the Russian AO Technodinamika, submitting repeated requests for the delivery of components for 122 mm and 152 mm munitions to Belarus (Pantus letter).[69]

The content of the letters makes it clear that the regime was seeking to procure from the Russian Federation key components required for assembling 122 mm rockets and 152 mm artillery shells — including fuses, propellant charges, shell casings, and related items. The planned volume of deliveries from Russia was 10,000 full sets of components per month for each type of munition.

In effect, the Minsk regime aimed to establish monthly production of 10,000 units of 122 mm rockets and 10,000 units of 152 mm artillery shells, with the Russian Federation intended as the primary recipient of the ammunition.

The basis for organizing the production of projectiles for multiple rocket launchers was the di-

[68] Letter from the Chairman of the State Authority for Military Industry Pantus to the General Director of the Russian AO "Technodinamika"

[69] Pantus' letter

rective of Lukashenko and the Prime Minister of Belarus.

On the basis of the order of the Ministry of Industry of the Republic of Belarus No. 33/1257r DSP dated 26.01.2023, the Belarusian enterprise "Precision Electromechanics Plant" and the Russian research and production association SPLAV signed a contract on 8 March 2023 for the supply of 184,269 parts of a 122 mm caliber rocket projectile within the framework of the state Defense procurement order of the Russian Federation.

On 23 June 2023, an additional contract No. 2311205 was signed for the supply of 50,000 assembled tail sections for 122 mm rockets, with a total value of 2,351,122,000 Russian rubles.

The Precision Electromechanics Plant, located in Dzerzhynsk, Minsk region, served as the main logistics hub for supplies to the Russian Federation and was also the facility responsible for assembling tail sections of the rockets. In total, under all signed contracts, the plant supplied 235,000 assembled units to Russia.

The delivery terms were as follows: starting in September 2023, Belarus was to supply 13,000 sets of 122 mm rocket components per month. Of these, only 1,000 fully assembled 122 mm rockets were returned to Belarus monthly. The remaining 12,000 sets of components stayed in Russia, where they were assembled into rockets for use in the "Grad" multiple launch rocket systems.

It is important to underscore that the Ministry of Industry of Belarus was directly involved in lobbying for the production of rocket components and their supply to the Russian Federation.

BELPOL conducted an investigation into the manufacture of components for 122 mm rockets.[70] Based on documentary evidence, the investigation uncovered the production scheme[71] for these components. The investigation report presents this scheme in detail and publicly discloses evidence of the regime's involvement in the supply of rocket components and assembled tail sections to Russia.

In addition to supplying finished components, some enterprises within the production chain also delivered semi-finished rocket parts directly to the Russian Federation.

For example, on 27 November 2023, a contract was signed between the Belarusian company OOO "BAZtube" (Zhodino, Minsk region) and the Russian AO "SHTAMP Machine-Building Plant" for the supply of tubular blanks used in the production of rocket components, specifically the "forward tube" and "tail tube" (see Figure 3.4).

The contract stipulated the supply of 60,300 tubular blanks, with a total value of 827,991,360 Russian rubles. This information is confirmed in the speaking points of Deputy Prime Minister V.M. Karankevich.

It was subsequently revealed that the Belarusian Ministry of Industry had drawn into the ammunition production scheme a number of enterprises that, prior to the war, had been exclusively engaged in civilian manufacturing. Among them



Figure 3.4. **Forward and tail tube of a 122 mm rocket projectile.**

[70] https://youtu.be/ZGKP7eGZH1o?si=kOsOLVfioWzUWoWp

[71] Diagram of the Production Chain for 122 mm rocket components

were BELAZ in Zhodino and the OAO "Borisov Plant of Automotive and Tractor Electrical Equipment" (BATE).

The case of the OAO "Legmash Plant", a formerly civilian-only manufacturer located in Orsha, Vitebsk region, is particularly telling.

In 2024, 435,109,829 shares of the Legmash Plant, previously owned by the Republic of Belarus, were transferred under the management of the State Authority for Military Industry, while V.Y. Rossolai, Deputy Chairman of the State Authority, was appointed as the state representative to the company's management bodies. The enterprise was thereby incorporated into the network of enterprises of the State Authority for Military Industry.

This move served a single purpose: to ensure — at any cost — strict fulfilment of obligations for the delivery of ammunition components to the Russian Federation, both in terms of volume and delivery deadlines.

Evidence that the supply of rocket components to the Russian Federation is systematic is provided in a memo issued by OOO "BAZtube", signed by the company's director, D.V. Bondarev.[72]

The first table in the document shows that, in 2024, the Russian Federation was scheduled to receive 105,000 tail tubes and an additional 105,000 forward tubes for rocket projectiles. In 2023, 50,000 of the same components had already been delivered. In other words, the Belarusian State Authority for Military Industry helped produce 155,000 rockets for the Grad multiple launch rocket systems.

Taking these contracts into account, a total of 4,514,207 components and assemblies for rockets were to be delivered to the Russian Federation, with a total value of 25,834,825,000 Russian rubles.

A batch of 155,000 9M22U rockets contains approximately 2,852,000 kilograms of fragmentation material and 992,000 kilograms of explosives.



Figure 3.5. **Figure 3.5 –Warhead Casing for a 122 mm Rocket. Legmash Plant, 30 May 2024.**

[72] Memo by OOO "Baztube"

3.2.3 Production and Supply of Assembly Units for "Grad" Multiple Launch Rocket System Combat Vehicles to the Russian Federation

The regime's desire to profit from arms supplies was so strong that Belarusian enterprises took on the production of items they had no prior experience with. For example, in late August 2023, OAO "Volatavto" attempted to launch production of launcher systems for the BM-21 "Grad" multiple launch rocket systems. The contracting party was ZAO "Special Design Bureau", located in Perm, Russian Federation. This fact is supported by a letter[73] from the company's Commercial Director, A.Y. Lomonosov. The letter asked for the production of 250 launcher systems in 2024. At Volatavto's request, the technical documentation for the BM-21 was supplied, as confirmed by the contract[74] signed between the Russian ZAO "Special Design Bureau" and the Belarusian OAO "Volatavto".

The contract ultimately fell through for two reasons. First, Belarusian enterprises were unable to master the necessary production technology in time. Second, the proposed pricing was unacceptable to the Russian party. As a result of the follow-up internal inquiry, several officials at Volatavto were subjected to disciplinary action for the contract's failure.

However, one year later, Volatavto succeeded in securing a new contract for the production of certain component assemblies for the BM-21, including elevation and traverse gearboxes for the launcher systems. The contract, dated 14 August 2024, covered 120 units. This is confirmed by an excerpt from the list of military-purpose goods intended for import into the Russian Federation, dated 26 September 2024, and submitted in a letter[75] addressed to the director of the ZAO "Special Design Bureau."

This example once again proves the fact that the Belarusian government uses any opportunity to make profits on the production of weapons for the Russian Federation.

3.2.4 Supply of Combat Unmanned Aerial Vehicles to the Russian Federation

On 22 July 2022, reports appeared in the media regarding the use of a new type of combat unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), the "Chekan," in Ukraine.[76]

Thanks to the fact that the UAV's warhead did not detonate upon being shot down by the Armed Forces of Ukraine, it was possible to identify the downed aircraft as a Chekan combat UAV. Below are photographs of the wreckage and images of the UAV displayed at an exhibition.

The Chekan unmanned aerial system is designed for aerial reconnaissance and damaging stationary and slow-moving targets, including exposed personnel and lightly armored vehicles, both during daylight and at night, at distances of up to 25 kilometers from a ground control station.

This type of strike UAV is manufactured by the Belarusian "558 Aircraft Repair Plant", located in Baranovichy.



Figure 3.6 Downed UAV Wreckage and the Chekan Model.

[73] Letter by Commercial Director of ZAO "Special Design Bureau"

[74] Contract for the transfer of BM-21 technical design documentation

[75] Excerpt from the List of Military Products for Importing into the Russian Federation

[76] https://avia.pro/news/belorusskiy-bespilotnik-chekan-byl-sbit-na-ukraine?utm_source=yxnews&utm_medium=desktop



Figure 3.7. Chekan UAV.

One month before the Chekan system was used in Ukraine, on 9 June 2022, under Contract No. 20886UOP, Belarus transferred four Chekan strike unmanned aerial systems for the use by the Russian military in Ukraine.

The four systems included a total of 24 strike UAVs, 4 ground-based launch units, and 4 control stations. Prior to the transfer, the UAV underwent "pre-sale preparation". During this process, personnel from the 558 Aircraft Repair Plant thoroughly removed all identifying markings that could reveal the origin of the equipment.

The urgency was so great that the strike UAVs were delivered in an unfinished state. The research and development work on the system had not yet been completed, and no test flights had been conducted to verify its tactical and technical characteristics.

This haste, along with the fact that the systems were not fully developed, serves as further evidence that, by mid-2022, the Lukashenko regime was determined to provide any possible assistance to support the failing Russian invasion of Ukraine.

3.3. Supply of Chassis by the Minsk Wheel Tractor Plant. Repair and Restoration of Chassis in the Russian Federation

The supply and repair of Belarusian-made chassis played a critical role in supporting combat operations in Ukraine, particularly those used in Iskander short-range ballistic missile systems, Smerch heavy self-propelled multiple launch rocket systems, air Defense systems, semi-trailer tractors for heavy armored vehicles, and other military equipment.

The list of Russian enterprises that received chassis and repair kits from the Belarusian company Minsk Wheel Tractor Plant (MZKT) is as follows:

- AO «Federal Scientific and Production Centre 'Titan-Barricades'»
- ZAO «Special Design Bureau»
- AO «MOVEN»
- AO «Obukhov Plant»
- AO «Nizhny Novgorod Plant of the 70th Anniversary of Victory»
- AO «TYAZHMASH»
- AO «Izhevsk Electromechanical Plant 'Kupol'»
- PAO «Scientific and Production Association 'Almaz'»
- AO «NITEL»
- AO «Shumerlya Plant of Special Vehicles»
- AO «Ulyanovsk Mechanical Plant»
- AO «Instrument Design Bureau named after Academician Shipunov»
- AO «Kaskad Krasnodar Instrument Plant»
- AO «Scientific and Production Corporation 'Design Bureau of Machine Building'»
- OAO «Radar Design Bureau»

- AO «Military-Industrial Corporation 'Scientific and Production Association of Machine Building'»
- OAO «Khabarovsk Radio Engineering Plant»
- AO « Research Institute of Measurement Instrumentation — Novosibirsk Plant named after the Komintern «
- OOO «OST-VEST-CONVERS»
- AO «Bryansk Automobile Plant»
- AO «Main Production and Technical Enterprise 'Granit'»
- AO «Concern 'Sozvezdie'»
- AO «Typhoon»

All information obtained by BELPOL is corroborated by data[77] on the movement of products from the Minsk Wheel Tractor Plant, recorded by the Community of Belarusian Railway Workers.

The diagram presented below shows the supply route, as identified by the Railway Workers' Community.

Scheme of Belarusian exports and production volumes of MZKT to enterprises of the Russian defense industry in 2022



Russian domestic market (supplied products):

- Cargo trucks – 219 railcars.
- Transport equipment – 31 railcars.
- Automobile trailers – 29 railcars.
- Railway cars transported on their own wheels – 27 railcars.

1. **Station: Saint Petersburg.** JSC "Obukhov Plant" *(defense industry enterprise)* – 61 railcars.
2. **Station: Mark.** PJSC "NPO Almaz" *(defense industry enterprise)* – 27 railcars.
3. **Station: Kostarikha.**
   - PJSC "Nitel" *(defense industry enterprise)* – 15 railcars.
   - JSC "NZ of the 70th Anniversary of Victory" *(defense industry enterprise)* – 29 railcars.
4. **Station: Shumerlya.** JSC "ShZSA" *(defense industry enterprise)* – 33 railcars.
5. **Station: Perm-1.** CJSC "SKB" *(defense industry enterprise)* – 40 railcars.
6. **Station: Vozhoy.** JSC "Izhevsk Electromechanical Plant 'Kupol'" *(defense industry enterprise)* – 10 railcars.
7. **Station: Syzran-1.** JSC "Tyazhmash" *(defense industry enterprise)* – 33 railcars.
8. **Station: Traktornaya-Tovarnaya.** JSC "RFNC Titan-Barricades" *(defense industry enterprise)* – 40 railcars.
9. **Station: Tula-1 Kurskaya.** JSC "Instrument Design Bureau named after Academician Shipunov" *(defense industry enterprise)* – 18 railcars.

Figure 3.8. Supply chain diagram of Minsk Wheel Tractor Plant products to Russian Defense industry enterprises.

[77] https://belzhd.info/military-transportation/eksportnye-obyomy-zheleznodorozhnyh-gruzov-v-rossiyu-za-2024-god-mzkt-i-gruzy-voennogo-naznacheniya/

The number of contracts for the supply of chassis and repair kits increased significantly in 2024. Minsk Wheel Tractor Plant is currently processing dozens of claims and requests for equipment repair.

As part of the repair work carried out under Russian government Defense contracts, the production of spare parts for the restoration of Russian military equipment has increased by more than 20%.

Throughout the entire period of Russia's war of aggression, the Minsk Wheel Tractor Plant (MZKT) has participated in the repair and restoration of equipment for the following Russian military units: 59968, 75127, 28042, 20155, 26292, 83266, 92495, 34586, 53956, 34096, 30375, 59149, 85388, 92088, 34103, 92729, 25788, 40218, 11754, 14245, 00916, 55081, 33558, 10544, 70148, 31665, 28158, and 92485.

It has assisted the Russian Federation in restoring chassis for short-range ballistic missile systems and heavy multiple launch rocket systems that were directly involved in the shelling of Ukrainian towns and villages. Among MZKT's clients are the 79th Guards Rocket Artillery Brigade, the 20th Guards Missile Brigade, the 12th Guards Missile Brigade, and the 48th Missile Brigade.

The actions of the commanding officers and personnel of these units during the war have been classified as war crimes.

It is particularly important to highlight that the Minsk Wheel Tractor Plant (MZKT) and its subsidiary VolatTransService provided maintenance for Russian military unit No. 03333, which is the 112th Guards Novorossiysk Missile Brigade.

This very brigade was responsible for the missile strike on a playground in the city of Sumy (Ukraine) on 13 April 2025. The attack resulted in



Figure 3.9. MZKT-7930-412 chassis for the Koalitsiya-SV artillery system.

the deaths of more than thirty people, including two children, and left over one hundred injured, including fifteen children.

BELPOL possesses dozens of repair part requests related to the maintenance of launcher chassis for the 112th Missile Brigade. One such request[78] is presented in this report as an example: Request No. 760, dated 11 June 2024, personally signed by A.N. Birulia, Director of VolatTransService, a branch of the Minsk Wheel Tractor Plant.

In the "delivery deadline" field of all documentation, the note "URGENT! SMO!" appear — an abbreviation for "URGENT! Special Military Operation".

To support the systematic restoration of military vehicle chassis in the Russian Federation, MZKT personnel were regularly deployed, as evidenced by a letter[79] from A.N. Birulia, Deputy General Director of VolatTransService, a branch of MZKT, responsible for warranty and service maintenance. The letter was addressed to Lieutenant General A.G. Semyonov, Commander of Air Defense Forces and Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Aerospace Forces. It included a list of 98 MZKT specialists to be granted access to work on Russian military equipment and armaments in 2024. Nearly all these specialists were certified at Security Clearance Level Two, meaning they were authorized to access classified and top-secret information.

Beyond the previously described support, the Russian Ministry of Defense has also placed new orders with MZKT for chassis intended for emerging weapons systems. For instance, the MZKT-7930-312 chassis was tested for compatibility with the Pantsir air Defense missile-gun system, with eighteen units scheduled for delivery by the end of August 2024 to AO "Design Bureau of Machine Building named after Academician Shipunov" in Tula, Russia.

In addition, MZKT is developing the MZKT-7930-412 chassis with an armored cabin, tailored for the Koalitsiya-SV self-propelled artillery system, also at the request of the Russian Ministry of Defense.

In 2023, AO "Nizhny Novgorod Plant of the 70th Anniversary of Victory" received a shipment of 24 MZKT-741501 semi-trailer tractors designed for transporting armored vehicles.

BELPOL possesses an extensive and well-documented evidence base regarding the supply of chassis for the needs of the Russian Ministry of Defense. A significant number of these documents contain explicit notes indicating that the equipment is being used, or is intended for use, on the territory of the so-called "Special Military Operation".

In 2024, production at OAO MZKT under Russian government Defense contracts increased by 69% in monetary terms and 50% in unit volume — from 164 units in 2023 to 246 units in 2024.

[78] Request No. 760, dated 11 June 2024, VTS MZKT

[79] Letter from A.N. Birulia, Deputy General Director of VolatTransService, MZKT, responsible for warranty and service maintenance

3.4. Deliveries of Ammunition and Military Equipment

According to data from the Community of Belarusian Railway Workers, approximately 131,535 tons of ammunition were transported by rail from Belarus to the Russian Federation between January 2022 and January 2023, including:

- January 2022 — 153 tons
- February 2022 — 50 tons
- March 2022 — 2,558 tons
- April 2022 — 29,741 tons
- May 2022 — 12,664 tons
- June 2022 — 3,351 tons
- July 2022 — 9,173 tons
- August 2022 — 5,595 tons
- September 2022 — 12,822 tons
- October 2022 — 13,333 tons
- November 2022 — 6,542 tons
- December 2022 — 10,592 tons
- January 2023 — 24,421 tons

This volume is 24 times greater than the ammunition stockpile originally created for the "Vostok" invasion grouping. Moreover, ammunition shipments continued beyond this period. For instance, in 2024, the shipment of 183 railcars carrying explosives and other types of ammunition (including artillery shells and missiles) from Belarus to the Russian Federation was documented.

Ammunition loading was carried out by servicemen of the Belarusian Armed Forces. For example, on 24 June 2022, ammunition was being loaded at military unit No. 67878, the 46th missile and ammunition arsenal, located in Bronnaya Gora.[80] At the same time, according to the manning report[81] of the 74th Separate Communications Regiment (Grodno), 16 rank-and-file members of the 74th Regiment were present at the loading site in Bronnaya Gora.

All ammunition shipments were directed to areas adjacent to active combat zones.

A distinctive feature of certain deliveries was that the Belarusian regime assisted in replenishing losses of ammunition and missiles[82] caused by Ukrainian drone strikes.

Since autumn 2022, shipments of military equipment from Belarusian Ministry of Defense storage facilities to the Russian Federation have been recorded. In October 2022 alone, the regime transferred 211 units of combat and special-purpose equipment to the Russian Ministry of Defense. This included 98 T-72A tanks — enough to form three full tank battalions. Additionally, 40 BMP-2 infantry fighting vehicles were transferred, 20 of which were delivered without turrets, intended for the installation of Berezhok combat modules. Notably, the optical sights for these modules were simultaneously being manufactured by the Belarusian company Peleng. In addition to armored vehicles, the shipment included 53 Ural military trucks and 10 other pieces of equipment.

The delivery of military equipment and ammunition took place during a critical period for Russian forces, serving as further evidence that the Lukashenko regime was determined to ensure the success of Russia's aggressive plans — at any cost.

3.5. Provision of Belarusian Training Grounds and Equipment for the Training of Russian Military Personnel

On 28 March 2023, Belarus and Russia signed an agreement[83] on the establishment and operation of joint combat training centers for training military personnel from both countries. Notably, these centers — used by Russian troops — had already been unlawfully operating on Belarusian territory prior to the signing of the agreement.

Specifically, the following Belarusian facilities were handed over to serve the needs of the Russian army: the Obuz-Lesnovsky training ground near Baranovichy, Repishche training ground near Osipovichy, Losvido training ground near Vitebsk, Machulishchy military airfield near Minsk, and Ziabrovka airfield near Gomel, as well as other facilities.

Under the terms of the agreement, the host country, Belarus, committed to providing the Russian military contingent stationed at training centers with a wide range of support free of charge. This includes real estate, airfield and engineering infrastructure, electricity, heating, other utilities, food, fuel and lubricants, and medical assistance.

[80] https://t.me/belzhd_live/1707

[81] Manning report of the 74th Separate Communications Regiment

[82] https://t.me/belzhd_live/2495

[83] http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/document/0001202403010001?index=1

Several examples confirm that these provisions were indeed implemented in practice. On 8 December 2022, a military train[84] carrying 13 T-72B3 tanks arrived at Zaslonovo station.

On 11 December 2022, another military train carrying BMP-2 infantry fighting vehicles[85] arrived at Polonka station. On 3 January 2023, 30 flatbed railcars loaded with wheeled military vehicles, 4 railcars with ammunition, and 2 passenger cars carrying personnel arrived at Polonka station.[86]

These examples represent only a small fraction of the broader picture. Russian military personnel and equipment consistently arrived and were unloaded near Belarusian Ministry of Defense training grounds. At these sites, Russian troops underwent training, and newly formed combat units conducted cohesion exercises.

Upon completing their training, the units were deployed to frontline areas to carry out combat missions.

For example, on 11 January 2023, a military train[87] departed from Polonka station, transporting 200 personnel and 37 flatbed railcars carrying both tracked and wheeled vehicles. The train's destination was Mitrofanovka station, located approximately 20 kilometers from the Russian-Ukrainian border.

On 25 February 2023, another Russian military train departed from a Belarusian training ground near Baranovichy, headed to Matveev Kurgan station in Rostov region,[88] along the Donetsk axis of hostilities (see Figure 3.10).

In place of the departing Russian units, new contingents regularly arrived in Belarus for training. For example, on 7 March 2023, a division armed with 152 mm Msta-B howitzers arrived at the artillery training ground in Osipovichy, Mogilev region.[89]

The training and deployment of Russian Armed Forces units from Belarus continued until at least July 2023.[90]

These actions provide yet another piece of evidence that the Minsk regime was determined to defeat the democratic state of Ukraine at any cost. The training of Russian military units in Belarus was systematic and well-organized, leaving no doubt that the regime's participation in this process was deliberate and proactive.



Figure 3.10. The rout of the military train.

[84] https://t.me/belzhd_live/2056
[85] https://t.me/belzhd_live/2056
[86] https://t.me/belzhd_live/2063
[87] https://t.me/belzhd_live/2121
[88] https://t.me/belzhd_live/2145
[89] https://belzhd.info/military-transportation/v-belarus-pribyvayut-ocherednye-voinskie-eshelony-s-tehnikoj-i-kontingentom-vs-rf/
[90] https://t.me/belzhd_live/2270

3.6. Production of Microchips and Their Supply to the Russian Federation

Since February 2022, the INTEGRAL holding has replaced the import of over 65 types of special-purpose (i.e. military) components.

INTEGRAL supplies its microelectronic products to 45 enterprises within the Russian Defense-industrial complex.

Some Russian consumers of these microchips include:

- AO Ulyanovsk Instrument Design Bureau
- AO Aero-Space Defense Concern Almaz-Antey
- AO Tactical Missiles Corporation
- PAO Korolev Rocket and Space Corporation «Energia»
- AO Russian Corporation for Rocket and Space Instrumentation and Information Systems
- AO Concern Sozvezdie
- AO Russian Space Systems
- AO Concern Avtomatika
- AO VEGA Radio Engineering Concern
- AO Radiant-Elcom
- AO Radiotechnical and Information Systems (RTI) Concern
- AO Academic Pilyugin Research and Production Center for Automation and Instrumentation, and a few other companies.



Figure 3.11. Microchips of INTEGRAL holding, found in Kh-69 missile.

The volume of supplies from the INTEGRAL holding to Russian Defense-related entities has been consistently growing.

To support this, INTEGRAL has established a distribution network within the Russian Federation, which includes:

- Joint-stock company AO "INTEGRAL SPb", where INTEGRAL holds a 51% share;
- OOO "Electromodul Trading House", with 51% share owned by INTEGRAL;
- OOO "TD INTEGRAL", with INTEGRAL holding 99% of the shares.

A striking example proving that Belarusian-made microchips are reaching Russian manufacturers is the discovery of INTEGRAL-produced chips[91] inside a downed Russian Kh-69 air-to-surface cruise missile.

Notably, some of these chips were manufactured after the start of the full-scale invasion. The image below shows microchips extracted from the remains of the Kh-69 missile, clearly bearing the INTEGRAL trademark, with production dates of July 2023 and January 2024.

A clear indication that a significant portion of INTEGRAL's microchip production is intended for the Russian Defense-industrial complex is a letter[92] sent to Russian customers by AO "INTEGRAL SPb", announcing a price increase for products manufactured by OAO INTEGRAL, along with an accompanying price list[93] for microchips. Both documents explicitly refer to "VP" (military specifications) and "OSM" (special small series) quality categories — designations that unambiguously identify the products as intended for military use. Furthermore, the price list was officially approved by Military Representative Office No. 4778 of the Ministry of Defense of Belarus.

The document lists over one thousand microchips and transistors of various types and configurations, all designated for use in military and special-purpose equipment.

In letter No. 77/38,[94] dated 4 January 2024, addressed to the Ministry of Industry of Belarus and signed by Deputy General Director P.V. Poludo, it is stated explicitly that INTEGRAL is substituting imported microchips with its own products. The letter clearly affirms that INTEGRAL's products were shipped to 47 enterprises within the Russian Defense-industrial complex, with the volume of these shipments increasing by a factor of 1.2 over the course of 2023.

3.7. Supplies of Other Products Under Russian Government Defense Contracts

The range of products supplied by Belarusian enterprises for the production of military equipment in the Russian Federation is broad and diverse.

Below are examples from different industrial sectors:

For instance, OAO "Belarusrezinotekhnika" supplies rubber-technical products to the Russian 81st Armor Repair Plant for the repair of armored vehicles. This is confirmed by a contract[95] between Belarusrezinotekhnika and the 81st Armor Repair Plant, which specifies the end client of the repair services as the Russian National Guard. Another document — a letter[96] addressed to the Commercial Director of Belarusrezinotekhnika from the 81st Armor Repair Plant — details the types of equipment for which the products will be used during capital repairs: specifically, BTR-82A and BTR-82AM armored personnel carriers.

Another example is OAO Forge Plant of Heavy Stamping, located in Zhodino, which supplies components to Russian companies such as AO "Bryansk Automobile Plant", PAO "KamAZ", and AO "Ural Automobile Plant". All these manufacturers produce military-grade equipment and are subjected to international sanctions.

Additionally, the OAO "Minsk Bearing Plant" (MPZ) supplies bearings to the Russian 81st Armor Repair Plant for the maintenance and repair of military vehicles. The contract[97] between these companies explicitly states that the bearings are being supplied "for the work carried out in the interests of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation."

The Belarusian company Tekhnolit also supplies engine components for the repair of military vehicles to the 81st Armor Repair Plant. This is confirmed by a test report[98] on the V-41-1S tank engine.

[91] https://war-sanctions.gur.gov.ua

[92] Letter announcing a price increase

[93] Price list

[94] Letter on deliveries to Russia

[95] Contract between Belarusrezinotekhnika and the 81st Armor Repair Plant

[96] Letter addressed to the Commercial Director of Belarusrezinotekhnika from the 81st Armor Repair Plant

[97] Contract for supplies of bearings to the 81st Armor Repair Plant

[98] Test report on the V-41-1S tank engine

The Lida-based OAO "Optik" Plant supplies lenses and prisms to the PAO "Rostov Mechanical Plant" for the TKN-4GA-03 universal gunner's sight, which is used in the modernization of infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers. The contract[99] between Optik Plant and the Rostov Mechanical Plant explicitly references the numbers of Russia's state Defense procurement contracts.

OAO "Belshina", acting through the Russian company OOO "Belneftekhim-ROS", has supplied automotive tires for the needs of the Russian Ministry of Defense:

- 19,000 units under contracts dated September 2022;
- 8,586 units under a contract dated 29 March 2023;
- 21,600 units under a contract dated 22 June 2023.

Additionally, the Telekhany branch of the State Enterprise "Belarustorg" manufactures ammunition boxes for delivery to the Russian Federation.

Special attention should be given to the supply of military uniforms and gear to the Russian Federation.

One of the key witnesses to the production of military-use items for Russia is former political prisoner Polina Sharenda-Panasiuk, who provided first-hand testimony on how the Belarusian penitentiary system exploits the forced, unregulated, and effectively unpaid labor of both political and regular prisoners.

Polina Sharenda-Panasiuk worked at Republican Unitary Enterprise No. 4 under the Department of Corrections of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Belarus, located in the Gomel region.

At this correctional facility, large quantities of uniforms, backpacks, tactical vests, stretchers, and other items essential for the sustainment and combat readiness of soldiers and military units are produced.

According to the testimony of Polina Sharendo-Ponasiuk, combat integrated suits were sewn in the correctional facility. In an interview[100] with the political prisoner broadcast by Belarus 1, trousers from such a suit were shown.

The uniform shown in the video began to be manufactured in February 2024.

According to the testimony of the political prisoner, the design was developed in Moscow-based laboratories, and the fabric was supplied from Russia.

The initial batch consisted of 1,500 units, produced in preparation for the 9 May parade in Moscow. Officially, the order was placed by the Russian Ministry of Defense for the Special Rapid Response Unit (SOBR).

The packaging was labelled "combat suit with integrated elbow and knee protection from the



Figure 3.12. **Pants of the combat integrated suit.**

[99] Contract between Optik Plant and the Rostov Mechanical Plant

[100] https://youtu.be/8i68-0dgJ1A?si=v2Qau6vMDBs9Avr0 (12.39)

"BCSO" (combat suit) kit." The set included a jacket, a fleece polo-style shirt, and pants.

The Belarusian OOO "Antineya" supplied knee and elbow pads for this combat uniform. The packaging of its products was marked with the designation "Military District V." In January 2025, state-owned enterprise No. 4 (RUP No. 4) began sewing a new batch of the uniforms.

In total, from 2023 to the present, the overall number of military uniform orders has reached 80,000 sets.

In addition to combat uniforms, RUP No. 4 manufactures thousands of sleeping bags, stretchers, and waist ammunition pouches, as well as camouflage helmet covers, underwear, and backpacks.

The image below shows the appearance of a mid-season all-weather field uniform set manufactured at Penal Colony No. 2, under the Department of Corrections of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Belarus, located in Bobruisk, Mogilev region. This uniform set is produced in accordance with technical specifications developed by the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation.[101]

In addition to uniforms, the penal colony also manufactures crates for 152 mm artillery shells. The involvement of the Ministry of Industry of Belarus in supplying the Russian military is evidenced by a letter[102] from A.I. Belenko, Deputy General Director of BelOMO, addressed to the Ministry.

The letter reveals that the Ministry of Industry had tasked BelOMO with launching the production of plastic knee and elbow pads, with a planned monthly output of 10,000 units. These items were intended for inclusion in military uniform kits.



Figure 3.13. **Mid-season uniform from the all-weather field gear set. Correctional Colony No. 2.**

[101] Mid-season all-weather field uniform, technical specifications

[102] Letter from A.I. Belenko, Deputy General Director of BelOMO

3.8. Facilitation of Airspace for Drone and Aerial Missile Strikes by the Republic of Belarus. Participation in Auxiliary Demonstrative Operations

Since July 2024, the Lukashenko regime resumed granting the Russian occupants access to Belarusian airspace — this time to launch attacks on Ukrainian territory using Shahed-type combat drones and air-launched missiles fired by Russian Aerospace Forces aircraft. Figure 3.14 presents statistical data based on monitoring by the Belaruski Hajun project.

Between July 2024 and January 2025, the Belarusian Air Force and Air Defense Forces shot down only 6 out of 389 drones.

According to standard air Defense procedures, any unidentified object entering Belarusian airspace without prior notification must be intercepted and either forced to land or destroyed. Each radar group at air bases or technical radar posts is equipped with an Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) transponder system that queries airborne objects for recognition codes. Since reconnaissance and combat drones are not equipped with the onboard systems necessary to respond to these queries, they are automatically classified as "hostile" within the air Defense network. All radar posts and technical units are part of an integrated information system that reports to the highest level of command within the Belarusian Air Force and Air Defense Forces. As a result, the approach of such drones is detected well before they reach Belarusian airspace, and commanders have ample time to scramble aircraft and neutralize any airspace violators near the border.

The unrestricted flights of Russian drones through Belarusian airspace — without any response from the Belarusian Air Force or Air Defense Forces — point to one undeniable conclusion: the regime is warned in advance about drone strikes against Ukrainian territory and deliberately permits Russian drones to maneuver within Belarusian airspace. This conduct is both conscious and intentional.

In addition to allowing these flights, the Lukashenko regime has actively supported auxiliary operations associated with Russia's air strikes on Ukraine. Until late February 2023, the 50th Composite Air Base in Machulishchy (Minsk District) hosted and serviced a Russian aviation group, which included an A-50 airborne early warning and control aircraft and two MiG-31K fighter jets



Figure 3.14. Statistics on the Use of Belarusian Airspace by Russian Drones to Strike Ukraine.

equipped with Kinzhal missiles. Each time this group took flight, air raid sirens were triggered across Ukraine, prompting civilians to seek shelter in bomb shelters.

The most illustrative example of these operations occurred on 10 February 2023. On that day, Ukraine was subjected to multiple large-scale airstrikes. During and between these attacks, a group of Kinzhal missile carriers and an A-50 early warning aircraft took off three times, prolonging the air raid alerts and forcing civilians to remain in bomb shelters for the entire day.

These flights were conducted regularly. The sorties of the A-50 aircraft should be regarded as acts of psychological terror against the civilian population of Ukraine, leveraging the threat of missile launches from Belarusian territory. In addition to sowing fear, the A-50 also conducted aerial reconnaissance of targets within Ukraine while remaining in Belarusian airspace.

3.9. Forced Displacement and Indoctrination of Ukrainian Children

On 4 October 2024, during a side event at the Warsaw OSCE Human Dimension Conference, a report titled "Stolen Childhood: How the Belarusian Regime is Erasing Ukrainian Children's Identity through Displacement, Re education, and Militarization",[103] was presented. The report was prepared by BELPOL in collaboration with its partners: Freedom House, the Regional Centre for Human Rights, the Human Rights Centre Viasna, and the Human Rights Centre ZMINA.

The key findings of the report are as follows:

1. Aleksandr Lukashenko personally laid the foundation for the displacement of Ukrainian children to Belarusian territory.
2. The Belarusian regime is actively implementing the Russian state policy of destroying Ukrainian identity through systematic indoctrination and reeducation of children.
3. The Belarusian regime is complicit in the Russian militarization of Ukrainian children.
4. The Union State of Russia and Belarus plays a critical role in financing and organizing the displacement, indoctrination, reeducation, and militarization of Ukrainian children.
5. The Belarusian and Russian regimes are exploiting Ukrainian children for propaganda purposes.

The report presents evidence that the Minsk regime transferred at least 2,219 Ukrainian children to Belarus between 2021 and mid-2024, using various routes.

In 2021, Lukashenko signed a decree "On the rehabilitation of a group of children from Donetsk region," initiating a program hosted at the Zubryonok children's educational and recreational camp. Between 15 September and 5 October 2021, the Lukashenko regime for the first time transferred



[103] https://drive.google.com/file/d/1JtBat2NZlKOXNGTun2NyfHYByFMr-g6c/view

150 Ukrainian children to Belarus. The majority of these children were from orphanages in Donetsk — a Ukrainian city under Russian occupation since 2014. Notably, children from the same orphanage were among the first to be deported to Russia just days before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

At the same time, Belarusian pro-regime activist and propagandist, Aleksei Talai — a vocal supporter of Russia's war of aggression — launched a fundraising campaign, ostensibly to finance the "rehabilitation" of children with disabilities from Donbas in Belarus.

Following the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine, the Minsk regime significantly expanded its efforts to relocate Ukrainian children to Belarus. In March, individuals operating on behalf of the regime transferred 15 children with disabilities to the Ostroshitskiy Gorodok rehabilitation center. In June, another 30 children were brought to the "Volna" resort. In September, 650 children were brought to "Dubrava" camp. Additionally, 52 children aged 8 to 13 were relocated from a cadet corps based in Russian-occupied Ukrainian territory. According to confidential sources, by October that same year, another 600 Ukrainian children — including 16 cadets — were present at the same camp. In December, the regime moved a further 40 children to the Zolotye Peski resort center. This was followed by the transfer of an additional 43 children, including several who had lost their parents in the war. In April 2022, the Belarusian regime forcibly relocated 700 Ukrainian children to Belarus, including 30 orphans aged 5 to 15 from the Antratsit Special Education Boarding School.

In 2023, Aleksei Talai — closely connected to the Lukashenko regime and fully backed by it — collaborated with the occupying administrations of Luhansk and Donetsk regions to organize the transfer of another 350 children to the "Dubrava"



Figure 3.15. Statistics on the transfer of Ukrainian children from occupied territories to Belarus.



Figure 3.16. **Route of transfer of Ukrainian children to Belarus.**

resort center and 11 children with disabilities to the Ostroshitskiy Gorodok rehabilitation center.

The transfer route passed through Russia's Rostov region. In September, 44 children were sent to Belarus and enrolled in local schools with support from state-run backbone enterprises, including the Polymir and Naftan plants, which are part of Belarus's petrochemical industry. In October, 40 more children were relocated to the "Kolas" rehabilitation and wellness center in the Kobryn district of Brest region.

In March 2024, the Minsk regime transferred 40 children from the Kherson region to the "Lesnaya Polyana" Rehabilitation and Wellness Centre, presenting the relocation as a "reward for academic excellence." This transfer was carried out with the support of the head of the occupying administration in Kherson, Vladimir Saldo, and the head of the Department for Work with the Evacuees, Tatyana Kuzmich. In May, Eleonora Fedorenko, the adviser on children's rights to the so-called "Donetsk People's Republic," accompanied another group of children to the "Dubrovenka" resort center, including six children with disabilities, injured by explosive devices. That same month, the Russian Embassy in Belarus facilitated the transfer of an additional 32 children.

In total, from 2021 to June 2024, at least 2,219 Ukrainian children were transferred to Belarus, reflecting a large-scale, systematic relocation effort jointly orchestrated by the Belarusian and Russian regimes. This ongoing and coordinated transfer of children indicates deliberate and organized attempts at their indoctrination. Of these children, at least 27 were not only moved to Belarus but later transported onward to Russia, further underscoring the scale of this coordinated effort. Notably, the Lukashenko regime was especially active in transferring Ukrainian children during the 2022 and 2023 school years, suggesting the use of the school system as a tool for indoctrination, re-education, and militarization of Ukrainian children. This timeline contradicts the stated "recreational" purpose of the relocations, which would typically correspond to the summer period.

Although Belarusian authorities publicly justify the transfer of Ukrainian children to Belarus as "rehabilitation" or "rest," the institutions where

these children are placed are in fact re-education camps, where propaganda is embedded in both schooling and leisure activities.

The largest groups of children were transported in the autumn and spring — during the school year — rather than over the summer. Just as in Russia, children were enrolled in local educational institutions. At least two groups of Ukrainian children, housed in Novopolotsk in December 2022 and September 2023, attended classes in nearby Belarusian schools.

Instruction is conducted in Russian and includes, among other things, propaganda of the "Russian World" ideology, narratives about the nature and history of the Second World War, and incitement of hatred toward other nations, including Ukraine.

A striking example of re-education efforts in modern Belarus, targeting not only Ukrainian but also Belarusian children, is the Law "On the Genocide of the Belarusian People" and the associated school curriculum. This course, which forms part of the educational program starting in primary school, attributes crimes committed by Nazi German forces to Ukrainians and other nationalities. The law conflates the actions and collaboration of individual Ukrainians or certain groups with Nazi forces with those of the Ukrainian nation as a whole.

Moreover, Ukrainian children are immersed in these Russian regime-sponsored narratives beyond the classroom as well.

For example, the Belarusian state identifies Ukrainian children in Belarus as "Russians" and recognizes the Russian citizenship that was forcibly imposed upon them. Belarus's state-controlled media routinely refer to these children as "young" or "new citizens of Russia," and the same language is used by those organizing their transfer — most notably, Aleksei Talai. This practice effectively strips Ukrainian children of their identity and ethnicity. Both Belarusian authorities and the transfer organizers systematically indoctrinate children with the belief that Ukrainian territories occupied by Russia are, and always have been, part of Russia.





On 18 June 2023, at the Belarusian children's recreation camp Dubrava, Belarusian pro-regime singers, the Gruzdev Sisters,[104] performed for a group of children brought from occupied Ukrainian territories. To illustrate the type of hatred being instilled in these children, one of the singers declared from the stage: *"Let Biden die — God, forgive me. Zelensky, too. And may Putin thrive and take full control of all of Ukraine."*

Moreover, during their stay in Belarus, Ukrainian children are exploited as instruments of propaganda, further exposing them to re-traumatization.

In state-controlled Belarusian media segments, children are shown speaking on camera about shelling and injuries they or their family members have sustained. The interviews typically involve leading questions on traumatic topics: shelling, how the children felt during active hostilities, whether "blown-out windows" are considered normal, and similar subjects.

Journalists persistently press children for details, urging them to recall and relive traumatic experiences, often to the point of tears. In addition to showcasing these "children's stories," authorities and organizers systematically use children to convey state-sponsored propaganda narratives. On Belarusian state television, which is entirely controlled by the Lukashenko regime, children repeat Russian propaganda language, referring to the full-scale invasion of Ukraine as a "special military operation." They claim that "Ukrainian militants are indiscriminately shelling the city," that "Mariupol is beginning to revive," and that "Russia is rescuing us." In some instances, children describe themselves as "Russian children."

In one TV story, an interviewer directly asks a Ukrainian boy on camera whether he would go to war if he were older. The boy replies that he would, because "Ukraine came to my land and is killing people like me." The filming of children for Belarusian and Russian propaganda purposes is carried out with complete disregard for their right to privacy. In several video segments, children's real names and surnames are disclosed, along with other identifying information such as their hometown and age. In some cases, footage includes materials that could be used to easily identify individual children.

A defining feature of the Russian occupation of Ukrainian territory and the transfer of Ukrainian children to Russia is their involvement in militarized youth organizations and the promotion of military service in the Russian armed forces. As militarization serves to prepare and recruit children for future service in Russian military institutions, in Belarus it is primarily manifested through organized visits and interactions with law enforcement personnel, military officers, and paramilitary youth groups. For example, the cultural program

[104] https://www.youtube.com/shorts/3l_DfzjSCUI



for children from Donetsk and Mariupol who were staying at the "Volna" resort center in June 2022 included a visit to the "Khatyn" memorial complex dedicated to those killed during the Second World War, as well as a field trip to a Special Forces Military Unit 3214 of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Belarus. During the visit, children were given a tour of the base, attended a military parade concert, and watched military academy cadets perform hand-to-hand combat demonstrations.

In photographs from the event, children are seen holding weapons, and one boy is wearing a T-shirt with the Latin letter "Z" — a symbol widely used by the Kremlin to promote and rally support for its invasion of Ukraine.

In April 2023, children from Russian-occupied regions of Ukraine met with members of the Soligorsk military-patriotic club "Rodnik" at the "Dubrava" camp. Club representatives were dressed in stylized Soviet-era military uniforms from the Second World War, serving as yet another example of how Russian and Belarusian propaganda applies WWII-related narratives.

In June 2024, the Personnel Training Centre of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Belarus held a concert for children from the Donetsk region who were undergoing "rehabilitation" at the Ostroshitski Gorodok facility. Encounters between children and representatives of Belarusian law enforcement bodies are not uncommon. For instance, children have met with officers from juvenile affairs unit of district police department, the Main Directorate for Combating Organized Crime and Corruption (GUBOPiK), and military personnel from military unit No. 3214 of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The format of such events tends to follow a similar pattern: officials conduct guided tours, show children the weapons, and teach them how to handle them. Whenever possible, the authorities arrange meetings with representatives of military units or military departments of higher education institutions. In one example from October 2023, children from Severodonetsk and Lysychansk, before returning to occupied Ukrainian territory, met with cadets from the Military Transport Faculty of the Belarusian State University of Transport at the railway station in Gomel.

Forced participation in militarized propaganda, implemented by the Belarusian regime in line with Russian practices, also affects children living in Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine. Occupation authorities have filmed children, such as those from Horlivka, who appear in staged videos "thanking" the Belarusian Ministry of Internal Affairs. In

these videos, children perform military-style gestures and chant lines from propagandistic songs.

The conclusions of the joint report by BELPOL, Freedom House, the Regional Centre for Human Rights, the Human Rights Centre Viasna, and Human Rights Centre ZMINA include:

The Belarusian regime is complicit in the Russian policy of displacement, indoctrination and militarization of Ukrainian children through the transfer of Ukrainian children from temporarily occupied areas of Ukraine to Belarus, starting in 2021, and perpetrating the Russian model of reeducation and militarization in the territory of Belarus. This is confirmed by several factors.

1. Evidence supports the conclusion that the Belarusian regime has copied the Russian government's systematic approach to displacing Ukrainian children with the goal of erasing their national identity. When analyzing cases of children deprived of parental care, researchers identified at least three among this group whose displacement to Belarus qualifies as **deportation**.

2. The system of education and "recreation" that Ukrainian children in Belarus are placed into is focused on spreading Russian propaganda narratives that aim to demonize certain nations, including Ukraine. Activities are conducted in Russian, and Ukrainian children are persistently identified as "Russians" or "citizens of Russia" within the system and in Belarusian and Russian state-owned media, as well as public communications.

3. Along with reeducation, militarization of Ukrainian children is a clear goal of the displacement. Ukrainian children in Belarusian facilities are routinely subjected to content that promotes service in the Russian Armed Forces and glorifies the Soviet role in World War II, drawing parallels between that effort and the ongoing Russian war against Ukraine. Ukrainian children that have joined Russian militarized youth organizations in the occupied territories, while transferred to Belarus, also serve as propaganda actors themselves.

4. There are five categories of people who are complicit in the displacement, reeducation, and militarization of Ukrainian children:

- Belarusian officials,
- Russian officials,
- officials of the Union State;
- occupying authorities in Ukraine;
- Belarusian GONGO representatives, operating under the full patronage of the Lukashenko regime.



a. Belarusian officials, both at the central and regional levels, authorize and support the policy, allocate budgetary funds for and ensure that children stay in state institutions, as well as study in local educational institutions and participate in propaganda "cultural" events.
b. Russian officials, apart from perpetrating the policy in Russia, support and endorse the engagement of the Belarusian regime in the displacement, reeducation, and militarization of Ukrainian children in Belarus.
c. Officials of the Union State, composed of officials who also hold positions in the Belarusian and Russian regimes, authorize and finance the policy.
d. Occupying authorities in Ukraine ensure the recruitment of groups of Ukrainian children and the dissemination of propaganda about the displacement, reeducation, and militarization of those children. This group operates in coordination with representatives of the Lukashenko regime.
e. Representatives of Belarusian GONGOs and foundations that initiate, organize, and campaign to finance the displacement and reeducation of Ukrainian children.

5. The role of Belarusian GONGOs and foundations cannot be understated. They operate at the behest of and are loyal to Belarusian state authorities and/ or the Russian authorities, including in occupied Ukraine, and will not take actions that would contradict state policy. Moreover, their activities related to the displacement and indoctrination of Ukrainian children are widely supported by Belarusian government officials and/or the Russian and occupation authorities, and funded, among other things, by Belarus's state-affiliated enterprises, which link their activities to the state policy, while some of them are directly owned by businessmen closely connected to Lukashenko's inner circle.

6. In view of this, the actions of the representatives of Belarus and the Union State demonstrate that they aid and abet Russia, the main perpetrator, in the form of providing the means to commit the crime, which is a sufficient basis for criminal liability.

7. The political indoctrination and militarization of Ukrainian children in Belarus violates fundamental rights and freedoms of the child, including the right to freedom of thought, the right to education, the right to assimilate one's culture, to practice one's religion and use one's language, and to be protected from interference with one's identity.

In addition, the reeducation of Ukrainian children on the territory of Belarus, in the context of the Russian war against Ukraine, qualifies as discriminatory persecution, which is a crime against humanity.

In September 2024, the materials used in the report, as well as the report itself, were submitted to the International Criminal Court for legal assessment under international law.

CONCLUSIONS

The documents, videos, photographs, and investigative materials presented in the report constitute irrefutable evidence of the following:

1. The Lukashenko regime had prior knowledge of the Russian Federation's planned attack on Ukraine and actively participated in the formation of the Russian invasion grouping on the territory of Belarus.

2. Armed forces and security agencies under the control of the illegitimate "authorities" in Belarus conducted reconnaissance of military targets and border areas on Ukrainian territory, passing this information to the Russian Federation.

3. Belarusian communications troops deployed their equipment and personnel to ensure communications and command support for the Russian invasion grouping.

4. The Minsk regime took part in both combat support and logistical support operations for the Russian offensive grouping, including force protection, radio-technical support, medical care, and material-technical support (such as fuel and ammunition supply, maintenance and repair of military equipment).

5. The Lukashenko regime granted Russia unrestricted access to Belarusian airspace for the purpose of conducting acts of aggression.

6. During the course of hostilities, the illegitimate "authorities" of Belarus supplied the Russian military with ammunition and combat equipment from the depots and arsenals of the Belarusian Ministry of Defense.

7. The Minsk regime took the initiative to repurpose several enterprises under the State Authority for Military Industry and the Ministry of Industry to produce military goods in fulfilment of Russian state Defense contracts.

8. The Lukashenko regime orchestrated harsh repressions against Belarusian citizens who attempted to obstruct Russian aggression against Ukraine or who donated funds to the Armed Forces of Ukraine or Belarusian volunteer fighters.

9. The Minsk regime is directly complicit in the unlawful transfer of Ukrainian children from Russia-occupied territories, with the aim of subjecting them to indoctrination.

Thus, the Lukashenko regime is a full-fledged accomplice in Russia's aggression against Ukraine.

On 17 March 2023, the International Criminal Court in The Hague issued an arrest warrant for Russian President Vladimir Putin. However, his chief accomplice, Alexander Lukashenko, has yet to face a proper legal assessment of his criminal actions.

BELPOL stands ready to initiate proceedings to hold dictator Lukashenko, the leadership of the Belarusian Armed Forces, security agencies, the State Authority for Military Industry, and other individuals criminally accountable for their complicity in Russia's aggression against Ukraine — and to submit irrefutable evidence in support of such charges.



REPORT

THE LUKASHENKO REGIME'S INVOLVEMENT IN RUSSIA'S AGGRESSION AGAINST UKRAINE

BELPOL